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This thesis is comprised of four self-contained papers utilising standardised test
score data, specifically data from the Australian National Assessment Program -
Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN). The analysis presented by this thesis is par-
ticularly pertinent given the recent publication of the findings of the Review to
Achieve Educational Excellence in Australian Schools, chaired by David Gon-
ski AC.
The first paper provides a survey on the uses of standardised test score data
for economic analysis, and a discussion of the uses and limitations of the NA-
PLAN data set. This paper establishes two main areas for analysis. Firstly, the
analysis of school funding policy, given the provision of schools’ financial data
enabled by the My School website, which will be explored in the second paper
of this thesis. Next, the analysis of how student background characteristics may
impact achievement, which is analysed further in the third and fourth papers of
this thesis.
As outlined above, the second paper focuses on the topic of school funding.
This paper explores the causal impact of school funding on student achievement
in NAPLAN. Using school-average test score data paired with funding inform-
ation for each school, we determine how the three different types of funding
received by Australian schools impact test scores differently depending on sec-
tor and state. We find, in general, that funding from the federal government has
the least beneficial impact, with state government funding and parent fees more
likely to provide the greatest benefit to schools. These results have a significant
policy impact, indicating that funding is most beneficial when provided at as
local a level as possible.
The third paper of this thesis turns to the socio-educational determinants of
educational achievement in Australian schoolchildren. We find that students
with an Indigenous or language other than English background are at risk of
poor performance, as well as students with a parent who did not complete year
12, does not have a university degree or is not employed. Secondly, we find
that private schooling makes a student more likely to meet and surpass national
benchmarks for achievement, on average. However, the probability of a private
school student performing in the higher NAPLAN bands changes based on their
other socio-educational features.
This thesis concludes with a short fourth paper that provides another per-
spective to predicting the event of ‘low achievement’ by implementing machine
learning strategies.
Together, these papers constitute an overview of the possibilities for econo-
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There’s a saying in Illinois I
learned when I was down in a lot
of rural communities. They said,
‘Just weighing a pig doesn’t fatten
it.’ You can weigh it all the time,
but it’s not making the hog fatter.
So the point being, if all we’re
doing is testing and then teaching
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PREFACE
The turn of the millennium brought about a boom in the administration of stand-
ardised tests by governments across the globe, and thus increased the collection
of data on educational outcomes and associated student background character-
istics. The focus on the role of data in accountability practice has led to an
explosion in the availability of data to not only the policy-maker, but also the
econometrician. New technologies have meant that data can be made available
quickly, with greater coverage and scope, and potentially in new forms not con-
ducive to traditional econometric methods. Numerous projects have developed
for the collection of education data, such as the My School website in Australia,
the Barnard Columbia No Child Left Behind Data Project, as well as projects
in developing countries, which can be explored at Open Data for Africa. We
are also seeing a growing interest in data linkage projects, where, for example,
school education data could be linked to other administrative data sets such as
health records, census data, and government expenditures. In the modern age,
data is no longer a scarce resource. A key question is then how this data can be
1
PREFACE
used practically to actually improve policy outcomes.
The goal of the applied economist is primarily to identify the causal effect
of one variable on an outcome variable. This can be particularly difficult in
the case of observational data sets where data comes from administrative or
survey sources, rather than collected from a controlled experimental study. Fre-
quently, the type of data available to the applied economist is from adminis-
trative sources, such as a government census, or health records. The issue with
these types of data is that it is more difficult to provide convincing arguments
for the exogeneity of the variables it contains. Furthermore, it is challenging
to provide counterfactual analysis of potential outcomes given that we only ob-
serve each unit of observation in one state of the outcome of interest, to which
they were not randomly assigned. The analysis of school education is then fur-
ther complicated as the variables of interest; for example, ‘achievement’, are
abstract in nature and thus difficult to measure. It becomes difficult to develop
well-justified theories that explain the assumptions underlying education theory
and thus any modelling decisions.
Analysis of school education typically relies on empirical work rather than
theoretical work. Moreover, school education has always been a popular field for
the testing of novel econometric methodologies and theories to achieve causal
inference. No such clearer example exists than the classic work on instrumental
variables of Angrist and Krueger (1991). Consider the basic linear regression
model estimated using ordinary least squares:
yi = β0 +β1xi + εi, (1)
where y is the log of weekly earnings, x is years of schooling, ε is an error term,
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and β j, j = 0,1, are coefficients to be estimated with β1 being the returns to
schooling. For consistency of β1 we require, among other assumptions, exogen-
eity of the covariates x, or E[ei|xi] = 0. This assumption is often implausible,
especially in the case of schooling. For example, it is unlikely that funding
is determined completely exogenously,1 and it has been well-documented that
the choice of private schooling is not exogenous.2 The standard approach to
consistently estimating β1 in the case of endogenous regressors is to use an in-
strumental variable. That is, an additional variable, zi, that is uncorrelated with
the outcome variable (except in its ability to predict xi), yet is highly correlated
with the endogenous covariate in question.
The Angrist and Krueger (1991) approach is to use the individual’s quarter
of birth, QOBi, to instrument for their level of schooling.3 This choice is based
on institutional factors, where schooling in the United States of America was
compulsory until the age of 16. The total schooling received by each individual
therefore depended on their birthday. Those born earlier in the year are older
than their classmates when they begin school. This means that if they drop out as
soon as they turn 16 they will have completed fewer years of schooling than their
classmates born later in the year. These younger individuals have to wait longer
until they turn 16 to drop out, thus accruing more time in schooling. Angrist and
Krueger (1991) argue that quarter of birth is therefore correlated with schooling
(i.e., relevant). This variable satisfies the exclusion restriction as they argue
that an individual’s birthdate is unlikely to be correlated with other personal
1This is explored in the second paper of this thesis.
2We look at this difficulty in estimation in the third paper of this thesis.
3Other attempts to identify the returns to schooling include Card (1993), Lemieux and Card
(2001), and approaches utilising data on twins such as Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994). See
Card (1999) for a review of the education and earnings literature.
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attributes and wage (i.e., it provides exogenous variation in schooling).4 Using
two-stage least squares (2SLS), they find that men who attained more schooling
as a result of these compulsory schooling laws received higher wages. Each
extra year of schooling gives an estimated wage increase of about 7.5%. They
particularly highlight the implication that their findings have for the literature
on omitted variable bias; arguing that conventional OLS estimates of the return
from schooling are biased downwards.
While this appears to be a simple yet effective approach, it is not without
its limitations. Bound et al. (1995) discuss the issues inherent to instrumental
variable estimation when instruments are weak, that is, when the correlation
between the instrument(s) and the endogenous explanatory variable is low. In
fact, they argue that this case is common. This presents a danger to applied work,
as even in the presence of what the researcher sees as a clear ‘natural experiment’
or source of exogenous variation from a policy sense, it is not enough to justify
that IV estimates are unbiased.
The discussion above provides just one example of the significant difficulties
involved in any econometric analysis of education. The central question of this
thesis is, given the multitude of test score data becoming available to the re-
searcher, if and how can this data be used effectively in the econometric analysis
of education policies. As highlighted by Varian (2014) and Einav and Levin
(2014), it has been taken for granted that ‘big data’ sets, or any large modern
data sets, will dramatically change how businesses and governments operate.
Large-scale administrative data sets are purported to provide the opportunity to
improve the ways we analyse any kind of economic activity. We believe that
4Note that Bound et al. (1995) invalidated the quarter of birth IVs, and many other studies
have found them to be weak.
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the collection of standardised test score data in Australia provides an interesting
case study for these massive data sets, electronic versions of which are highly
available to researchers. The goal of this thesis is to provide some examples of
potential econometric applications of National Assessment Program - Literacy
and Numeracy data to education policy in Australia.
The ‘Gonski’ reports on schooling and the rhetoric surrounding them have
provided a set of assumptions for schooling policy in Australia that have under-
pinned a very particular approach to combatting the problem of students achiev-
ing poor educational standards. These include that funding can be a cure for
poor performance, and a remedy for social disadvantage. It also reinforces the
presumption that all students can perform ‘above average’, which we know to be
a mathematical impossibility. In order to truly “ensure that differences in edu-
cational outcomes are not the result of differences in wealth, income, power or
possessions,” (Gonski et al., 2011) we must question these assumptions properly
before providing blueprints for policy.
The contribution of this thesis is to explore these assumptions and provide
a discussion of what analysis is appropriate, and in turn what conclusions can
and can not be made, from the NAPLAN set of data. The papers here contained
provide, to our knowledge, not only the first systematic study of the effects of
school funding on NAPLAN scores, but also the first systematic study of the de-
terminants of poor achievement in students across Australia in both public and
private schools. The first paper of this thesis provides a survey of existing ap-
proaches to the economic analysis of standardised test score data, and describes
the NAPLAN testing programme and data. While the paper outlines a number
of limitations inherent in the data that restricts the ability of the econometrician
to achieve causal inference, it pinpoints two particular areas for further analysis,
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which will comprise the main body of the thesis. First, to use the financial
information in the school-level data to develop a better understanding of how
funding relates to achievement in Australian schools; and second, to use the
student-level data to examine what kinds of background characteristics make a
student at risk of poor performance.
With this agenda in mind, the second paper questions the assumption that
funding is causally related to test scores. We argue that the difficulty in estimat-
ing the causal effect of funding is twofold. First, funding may affect outcomes
in a heterogenous manner over the distribution of test scores, and therefore can
not be identified adequately with a mean-focused approach. Given this, we im-
plement the quantile regression for panel data (QRPD) method (Powell, 2014,
2015, 2016) to estimate these effects. Second, funding may be endogenously
determined by test scores in the previous period. In order to achieve identifica-
tion of this parameter, we propose instrumenting with the level of funding in the
previous period.
The third paper of this thesis focuses on another source of bias that must
be considered when analysing school education data, that is, that school choice
suffers from sample selection. As with the Angrist and Krueger (1991) ex-
ample, unobservable variables such as ability are a significant determinant of
test scores. Moreover, school choice may often be determined by the same un-
observables. We illustrate an alternative approach to the typical instrumental
variable 2SLS method to address this sample selection bias, namely the control
function approach of Wooldridge (2015), in an attempt to identify the effect of
private schooling. These papers highlight the difficulties involved with the eco-
nomic analysis of test score data and propose potential solutions for these issues,
given the data currently at hand.
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The final paper of this thesis explores machine learning approaches to predic-
tion, with the goal of determining if these methods can improve the econometri-
cian’s ability to analyse problems of this nature. While the econometric analysis
of standardised test score data remains an area for contention, with much left
unanswered, the problems involved with identifying a causal effect should not
prevent us from analysing the data as best we can. Using machine learning
techniques, we attempt to predict if a student will perform below standard on
their next NAPLAN test. We find that we are able to categorise these children
with a simple logistic regression, and that machine learning techniques are not
necessary to improve the quality of predictions.
This thesis attempts to provide a way forward to make the data collected
from NAPLAN truly valuable to the policy-maker, and therefore to the chil-
dren required to sit these tests, in order that it can assist in actually improving
educational outcomes for Australian children.
7
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Abstract
Understanding effective uses for standardised test score data is central to the de-
velopment of good policy and practice. This study provides a discussion of the
Australian National Assessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN).
We begin with an overview of standardised testing, and various programs ad-
ministered to students across the globe. Next, we outline the NAPLAN testing
programme in detail, followed by a discussion of the limitations of the resulting
data. We conclude with a survey of the current literature analysing standardised
test score data. We highlight two areas for future research in the Australian con-
text: the analysis of school funding, and the analysis of social disadvantage in
schooling.
Keywords: Education, national testing, standardised test score data, economic
methodology, Australia
JEL Classification: B41, C81, I21.
1 Introduction
Standardised testing plays a primary role in designing policies aimed at improv-
ing education systems across the globe, as achievement on these tests is strongly
correlated with measures such as national GDP and individual economic well-
being (Barro, 1991; Peterson and West, 2003). In Australia, the federal gov-
ernment introduced the National Assessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy
(NAPLAN) in 2008. These tests produce scores in literacy and numeracy for all
∗This research is supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP)
Scholarship. Thanks must also be given to the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Report-




Australian students in grades 3, 5, 7, and 9 each year, which are used regularly to
inform education policy. Despite efforts to improve schooling, the performance
of Australian students in international tests, such as the Programme for Inter-
national Student Assessment (PISA), has been declining.1 This paper therefore
aims to investigate the uses and limitations of the NAPLAN test score data, in an
effort to understand what we can learn in Australia about improving education
standards using standardised tests.
The application of econometric techniques to test scores is a popular and
growing field internationally. Modern analysis of the Australian education sec-
tor has taken the form of two reviews, undertaken by independent committees
led by businessman David Gonski AC to provide advice to the federal govern-
ment. The 2011 Review of Funding for Schooling (Gonski et al., 2011) and the
2018 Review to Achieve Educational Excellence in Australian Schools (Gonski
et al., 2018) have outlined numerous deficiencies in Australian schooling and
attempted to propose solutions for these. However, many of these solutions
are based on beliefs about schooling policy that are in some cases disproven or
contentious in the economic literature. For example, there is an emphasis on
improving outcomes for disadvantaged students by increasing their funding, yet
Hanushek (2003) has shown that this relationship may be intangible. Moreover,
the most recent review has proposed that NAPLAN testing be made redund-
ant by replacing it with an online assessment tool for teachers, arguing that
NAPLAN is inflexible and timed poorly. It is therefore at present particularly
important to understand the usefulness and effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of
NAPLAN testing to argue if it should or should not be replaced. This paper will
recommend uses for the entire NAPLAN data set to understand how we can best
1See Ryan (2013) for a discussion of the Australia’s declining PISA test scores.
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utilise standardised test results to improve schooling policies in Australia.
This paper assesses the international literature on standardised test scores, in
order to find what the Australian data can contribute. We find that, compared to
the kinds of analyses that have been implemented internationally, there are signi-
ficant limitations inherent to the NAPLAN data set. For example, IV approaches
and panel data approaches are difficult to implement given the current state of
the data. However, there remain two policy areas that the applied economist can
learn about in Australia: (1) the funding of schools, and (2) the equitability of
schools.
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 details standardised test score
data sets from across the globe that have been used for economic analysis. Sec-
tion 3 focuses on an overview of the Australian NAPLAN data set followed by
a discussion of its limitations in Section 4. Section 5 provides a review of the
existing literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 Standardised testing
Standardised testing is used by many countries as a means for evaluating their
education systems.2 A summary is given in Table 1. Perhaps the most well-
known examples of testing programs are those undertaken internationally; namely,
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), Progress in Inter-
national Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), and Trends in International Mathem-
atics and Science Study (TIMSS). These international tests allow comparisons
between countries, enabling policy-makers at both national and international
levels to design large-scale policy goals for education. For example, the inform-
2Morris (2011) provides an overview of standardised testing in OECD countries.
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ation may be used to address Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs) by the United Nations. Moreover, they are
used by countries to determine how their education system may be performing
relatively to those across the globe. The primary role of these tests is therefore
that of education policy evaluation.
Conversely, national testing programs may perform many different functions.
Governments primarily introduce them for the purpose of monitoring school
systems and policy design, at a more detailed national level. For example, the
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB)3 was instituted in the United States
of America to enforce compulsory national testing (Peterson and West, 2003).
The aim of NCLB was to require states to set achievement standards against
which all students would be tested, in an effort to combat disadvantage in the
educational system. The testing process was tied to federal grants, as well as
certain policy interventions that were aimed at improving schools missing their
targets. Testing programs such as these are known as ‘high-stakes’ testing, that
is, testing that has significant consequences for either the student taking the test
or the school.4 Other examples of high-stakes testing regimes include the Pan-
Canadian Assessment Program (PCAP), which has consequences for some high
school students’ final grades and university entrance, and the System to Measure
Quality in Education (SIMCE) in Chile, which rates school quality based on
their achievement.
Other types of testing programs, or ‘low-stakes’ programs, may still play im-
portant policy roles. For example, they still measure student and school achieve-
ment in a way that may monitor school performance. Importantly, they may also
3Replaced by the Every Student Succeeds Act in 2015.
4See McDermott (2011) for more on high-stakes testing.
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Table 1: Summary of standardised testing programs




























































Chile Since 2012 (but
earlier test data
available)
Many subject areas Grades 2, 4,




































































Reading and math Grade 6 Various numbers of
participating coun-
tries in each wave
Note: For further information about national testing in European countries see Eurydice, European Commission
13
3 NAPLAN TESTING
play a role in formative assessment, that is, they behave as diagnostic tests to al-
low teachers and schools to isolate students and subject areas that need increased
focus or resources. Testing regimes such as the National Institute for the Evalu-
ation of the Educational System of Education and Training (INVALSI) testing in
Italy, the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational
Quality (SACMEQ) tests in Africa, the National Achievement Survey (NAS)
in India, the National Literacy and Numeracy Strategy in Ireland, and the Na-
tional Monitoring Study of Student Achievement (NMSSA) in New Zealand are
examples of low-stakes testing regimes.
It must be noted that some researchers question whether test scores exhaust-
ively measure educational achievement. Discussions of this nature lie outside
the scope of this study and will be left to those from the field of education.
Jacob et al. (2014) discuss the use of aggregate data in the evaluation of schools,
and conclude that these kinds of data are in fact sufficient and appropriate to
evaluate a range of educational policies. Furthermore, these kinds of data are
typically accepted in the economics literature as a valid measure of educational
output. Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) have also shown that these kinds of
data are important for regressions involving economic growth, despite their po-
tential flaws.
3 NAPLAN testing
The first round of NAPLAN testing took place in 2008, and since has been
administered yearly to students in years 3, 5, 7, and 9 across all schools in
Australia. The NAPLAN tests cover reading, writing, numeracy, and language
conventions (spelling, grammar, and punctuation). The questions in all tests
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typically range in difficulty in order to best diagnose the level that each student
is at. There are also particular skills that a student is expected to have mastered
at certain year levels (e.g., to recognise and continue a number pattern), and
questions allowing them to demonstrate their ability to meet these minimum
standards also form part of each test.
The reading test focuses on the reading and comprehension of English. Stu-
dents are provided with a magazine containing various types of written text.
They then answer questions related to the text. An example question could
be (following reading a text about gardening): Which word or group of words
from the last paragraph tells the reader when to take the vegetables out of the
garden?5 The results from this test are those typically analysed by researchers
looking at ‘reading skills’.
The numeracy test assesses a student’s ability in mathematics, namely: num-
ber and algebra; measurement and geometry; and statistics and probability. The
tests contain both multiple choice and short answer questions. In years 7 and
9, the students sit both a section where they are allowed a calculator, and an-
other section where they are not. An example question from a numeracy test
might be: Select the two even numbers from the list below. This is another test
that is of particular interest to researchers, in order to understand mathematical
achievement.
NAPLAN consists of two other tests, which are less popular for analysis
by researchers. The first is a writing test that provides students with a prompt
about which they must write a certain type of text (imaginative, informative, or
persuasive). An example for an imaginative prompt may be: The idea for your
story is ‘The Box’. A persuasive prompt may be: Reading books is better than
5Example questions are taken from nap.edu.au
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watching TV. There has not yet been a test assessing informative writing. Due
to these differences in text type, it is more difficult to compare scores for the
writing test across testing periods, even for the same student. The writing test
also differs in that it must be assessed by graders against criteria (rather than
there being correct answers). While the writing test measures an important skill
and is of great value, it is of most use to schools and teachers, not to policy-
makers, and will not be analysed further here.
The final NAPLAN test assesses language conventions, that is, spelling, gram-
mar, and punctuation. This test complements the reading and writing tests where
these skills must be demonstrated in context. There are separate minimum stand-
ards for spelling, and grammar and punctuation. The standards for grammar and
punctuation might be; for example, identifying the correct location of a full stop.
For spelling, a student may be able to demonstrate that they can correct spelling
errors in a piece of text.
Pugh and Foster (2014) have provided some discussion on the relationship
between the Australian NAPLAN data and data collected by other programs, but
at that early point in time regarding NAPLAN testing there was little availability
of data to researchers aside from that published publicly on the My School web-
site, particularly regarding the individual student-level data. The NAPLAN data
primarily differs from other data sets described in the previous section in that
it cannot neatly be defined as ‘low-stakes’ or ‘high-stakes’ testing, which may
provide difficulties in understanding the reliability of the data. While there are
no clear consequences to poor performance on NAPLAN testing, there remains
the threat of governments allocating funding based on scores, as well as the
publication of a school’s scores on the My School website, which may behave
as a kind of ‘hidden high stake’ as it may affect school enrolments. The tests
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are described as benefiting students, parents, teachers, and schools, particularly
in understanding a child’s progress and identifying goals for teaching programs
and uncovering those students that may need extra support. The tests are also of
benefit to policy-makers, as the data can be used to support school improvement.
Raw data from NAPLAN testing, both student and school-level, for each
year is available from the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting
Authority (ACARA) upon application via their Data Access Program. School-
average data is published publicly on the My School website each year.
4 Limitations of the NAPLAN data set
There remain a number of issues that limits the value of the NAPLAN data to
the econometrician, particularly at the individual-level. Namely, (1) the lack
of unique student identifiers and (2) background covariates that are both time-
invariant and not detailed enough.
Firstly, the individual-level data lacks unique student identifiers that are con-
sistent over time, making it difficult to follow a student between schools.6 This
makes it difficult to undertake certain kinds of analysis. For example, if a stu-
dent changes schools between the previous testing period and the current period,
the researcher has no information as to what school, or even school system, the
student was previously in. It is therefore impossible to track switchers between
the public and private school systems, which would provide better evidence as
to the value (or lack thereof) of private schooling in Australia. Unique identifi-
ers would also make it easier to link NAPLAN data to other administrative data
6Note that improving the ability to track students over time has been recommended as early
as Miller and Voon (2011), and the introduction of a unique student identifier was a recommend-
ation made by the most recent Gonski report.
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such as health data or tax data to widen the types of analyses that are possible.
The second distinct limitation of the NAPLAN data is a lack of background
covariates that would allow researchers to better account for socio-economic ef-
fects. This is despite the fact that governments have made it a priority that NA-
PLAN scores only be assessed in terms of schools with similar backgrounds.
While there are ethical issues involved with the use of data on children, which
cannot be denied, it would significantly improve the accuracy of any research
using the NAPLAN data to provide more detailed covariates to the researcher.
For example, the school-level data includes postcodes but this information is
not included in the individual-level data. The data has been de-identified to the
point that it almost lacks value completely, despite the requirements of ethics
approval involved in the process of obtaining the data. There is scarce informa-
tion as to the location of the school, which would provide a potentially valid and
useful instrument for understanding the role of private schooling, as an example.
The data set does not even differentiate between the Independent and Catholic
schooling sectors, despite this differentiation at the school-level. These are just
a few pieces of missing variables that limit the present capabilities of this data.
Both the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC) and the Lon-
gitudinal Surveys of Australian Youth (LSAY) provide evidence of the useful-
ness of richer data sets including test score outcomes. For example, the LSAC
provides data on NAPLAN scores alongside other non-cognitive scores, and
more detailed family background information tracked over time. For example,
Kalb and van Ours (2014) are able to estimate the effect of parents reading to
children at age 4-5 on their test outcomes at least to age 10 or 11, which they
find to be positive and significant. Furthermore, Warren and Haisken-DeNew
(2013) use this data to show that pre-schooling (and the qualifications of their
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pre-school teachers) has a positive effect on a student’s later educational attain-
ment. This is all crucial information that is left out of the wider NAPLAN data
set. As another example, the LSAY data is able to link PISA scores of a stu-
dent at age 15 to their later employment rates and earning capacities at age 25
(Polidano and Ryan, 2017). Using data from the Victorian Government and
TIMSS, Ryan (2017b) find that almost 10% of the variation in achievement in
Australian high schools can be explained by the effect of teachers. Yet, both the
school-level and individual-level NAPLAN data sets do not even discern which
particular classroom a student is in within a school grade, let alone who they
are being taught by. While the LSAC and LSAY remain valuable data sets, they
both face their own issues of lower sample sizes, and attrition. The NAPLAN
data collected by ACARA therefore provides a unique opportunity to broaden
the evidence base for policy; however, the quantity of data collected must not be
at the detriment of the quality of the variables included.
In their data survey on PanelWhiz and the Australian Longitudinal Data In-
frastructure in Economics, Hahn and Haisken-DeNew (2013) describe the hier-
archical structures of data sets such as the LSAC. They describe certain naming
schemes for these hierarchical data sets as the ‘international state of the art’,
and efforts to build a graphical user interface in STATA to easily analyse data
sets that fit this structure. As the NAPLAN data is hierarchical in nature, i.e.
state-level, school-level, and student-level, it begs the question as to why this
data has not been formatted in such a way to gain the most use from it, as is the
norm of other data sets. By presenting the data hierarchically, one could also
include information on teachers,7 and further variables that need not necessar-
7It is worth noting that the most recent report on schooling from the Grattan Institute also
recommends collecting more data on teaching in order to support a more adaptive education
system (Goss and Sonnemann, 2018).
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ily fit the typical panel data structure. The data organisational tools exist, and
modern machine learning techniques are suited to these kinds of data. Instead,
the researcher analysing the NAPLAN data set is faced with a mammoth task
in reorganising the structure of the data sheets available, with little payoff and
ability to understand the hierarchical nature of the data, and thus the theoretical
nesting of models.
While there are a number of limitations in the uses of the NAPLAN data
set, it nevertheless provides a unique opportunity with which to research educa-
tion policy in Australia. The potential uses of this data will be detailed in the
following section.
5 Uses for the NAPLAN data
We identify five particular areas in which the economist may learn from Aus-
tralia about schooling, using the NAPLAN data.8 These areas cover test scores;
(1) as accountability mechanisms; (2) as measurements of school funding ef-
ficiency; and (3) as metrics to analyse school management practices. These
areas all fall under the umbrella of school resourcing. Next, we look at using
test scores to analyse; (4) organisational structures and school choice; and (5)
student bodies, under the umbrella of achieving equitable schooling.
5.1 Accountability mechanisms
Hamilton et al. (2002) define a test-based accountability system as “a set of
policies and procedures that provide rewards or sanctions as a consequence of
scores on large-scale achievement tests.” The theory of change behind these
8We expand on the three areas focused on by the OECD in Woessman et al. (2007): ac-
countability, autonomy, and choice.
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systems is that public education can be improved simply by requiring all stu-
dents to take standardised tests, as a kind of information intervention.9 Schools
are then punished or rewarded depending on their performance. This strategy is
based on the typical principal-agent problem faced by the economist, where test-
ing provides feedback to governments about schools’ behaviour. In practicality,
the role for tests using this definition is to ensure that students are achieving
‘good’ results (however that may be defined by the government). For Australia,
this ties into the recent recommendation to “Enhance school and system internal
self-review and external quality assurance processes for the purposes of monit-
oring and reviewing student learning gain” (Gonski et al., 2018).
A large body of literature argues that school accountability mechanisms, such
as standardised testing, lead to improvements in outcomes (McDermott, 2011;
Hamilton et al., 2002; Peterson and West, 2003). At the individual-level, it
has been shown in the behavioural laboratory by Levitt et al. (2016) that when
students are faced with both financial and non-financial incentives to perform
better on tests, they do. While the literature agrees that increased accountability
works in theory and on the individual-level, little has been done to evaluate the
Australian system to see if it is fulfilling its potential - despite the fact that a by-
product of NAPLAN testing is a vast source of data on educational outcomes.
The international literature, specifically in the United States where it has been
a flagship policy, is quite detailed on testing in terms of an accountability mech-
anism and its effect on achievement. Hanushek and Raymond (2005) analyse
the effect of the accountability mechanisms introduced in the 1990s on achieve-
9Information interventions need not only involve standardised testing, as will discussed
later in this section. See Pandey et al. (2009) as an example of some other types of school-
based information interventions aimed at improving educational outcomes in India. See Cornell-
Farrow (2014) for more on accountability mechanisms in schooling and NAPLAN testing.
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ment growth in various states as measured by the National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress (NAEP), by looking at differences in achievement growth across
states over time. As discussed previously, the United States enforced a policy
whereby reform in schools was driven by high-stakes testing. Their analysis
shows that these implementations had a clear positive impact on achievement
over the period studied. However, it was also found that this reform had differ-
ential impacts on certain types of students. For example, over the period studied
the black-white test score gap worsened.
A natural experiment in the United Kingdom, where league tables10 were
abolished in Wales but not England, tells a similar story of the heterogeneous
impacts of accountability mechanisms on student achievement. Burgess et al.
(2013) finds that the abolishment of league tables in Wales reduced school
effectiveness when compared to England, and again that this policy affected
schools heterogeneously. Most interestingly, removing the league tables had
no impact on the performance of schools already performing in the top quart-
ile. This may mean that league tables are effective at improving outcomes in
average-to-lower performing schools.
This league table story is of particular interest to the Australian case, where
the My School website behaves in a manner similar to league tables. The key
difference is that, in Australia, schools can only be compared that are ‘statistic-
ally similar’ to each other, based on their ICSEA measures. As NAPLAN testing
and the My School website were introduced in similar time periods, it is, how-
ever, difficult to undertake any analysis of the impacts this accountability mech-
anism has had on student and school performance. A lack of data from the pre-
vious periods render the possibility of a difference-in-difference style analysis
10A method whereby schools are publicly ranked on achievement.
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impossible using the NAPLAN data. While testing existed in many states be-
fore the implementation of NAPLAN, there is little way of knowing if the scores
achieved on these various state-wide tests are comparable to those in NAPLAN,
complicating the researcher’s ability to disentangle the effect that the publica-
tion of school-average NAPLAN scores online has had on overall achievement.
It would also be difficult to know if any increases in student achievement are due
to cheating. For example, Battistin et al. (2017) show clear incidence of cheat-
ing in Italian schools, thanks to a natural experiment where only some schools
are randomly assigned a monitor. Once score manipulation on INVALSI testing
is taken into account, regional rankings for academic performance are in fact
reversed. This cheating may be due to both the real and reputational risks that
are faced by schools that achieve low scores.
If we take cheating into account, this may tell a much different story as to
why Hanushek and Raymond (2005) and Burgess et al. (2013) find that ac-
countability mechanisms are affecting school performance differently. Perhaps,
faced with the negative ramifications of low performance, schools are not ac-
tually improving their practices, instead partaking in cheating or manipulative
behaviours. These need not be negative or unethical behaviours. For example,
Reback (2008) has also shown that accountability systems may not just raise
levels of student achievement, but change the distribution of student achieve-
ment. Looking at the United States where schools must meet a level of min-
imum competency, they show that this policy causes schools to reallocate their
resources to focus on improving the performance of students who are on the
pass/fail margin. Testing may therefore improve the scores of these children
more, at the detriment of others. It is also difficult to know if these students are
being coached to improve their short-run performance, or if they are actually
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reaching a higher level of educational performance in the long-run. It is also
difficult to know if in response to tests, schools limit their curriculum to ‘teach
to the test’, thus improving test scores but diminishing the quality of education
students receive.11
Perhaps given the drawbacks associated with testing regimes, as discussed
above, school systems around the globe are shifting to more nuanced and soph-
isticated accountability tools. This may include external school monitoring,
such as the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) scheme in the United
Kingdom where schools are regularly inspected, or self-evaluation tools that
emphasise community engagement like the ‘report card’ systems in countries
such as India and Brazil or the Ghanian process of School Performance Ap-
praisal Meetings (Cornell-Farrow, 2014). It has been recommended that Aus-
tralia move to an online version of NAPLAN,12 followed by a proposed shift to
an online formative assessment tool that is of greater benefit to schools, teachers,
and thus students. This has particular ramifications for the role of NAPLAN data
in policy-making and economic analysis. On one hand, it may cause the loss of
a significant data source for governments to provide evidence-based policy solu-
tions, but on the other it may improve the usefulness of the data; for example, the
issues involved with the time lag of the data would be solved.13 It could prove
invaluable, providing that the system retains elements of collecting compulsory,
standardised measures across cohorts. An example of this is the app Classroom
Monitor, developed for monitoring classroom achievement in the UK, which
11Lazear (2006) provides a theory for how best to incentivise high-stakes testing regimes,
with a comparison to deterrents for speeding.
12A process for which pilot studies have recently been undertaken with questions raised as
to the comparability of data collected from written and online tests.
13Note that Levitt et al. (2016) also show that the power of incentives to motivate students to
perform well on tests disappears if there is a delay between the test and receiving the reward.
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also provides pre-set reporting tools for reporting to organisations such as Ofs-
ted. A program such as this could allow schools to develop internal formative
assessment tools within a framework that also allows for the collection of stand-
ardised information across schools for use by policy-makers. This would also
increase student familiarity with using the tool, which could ultimately lead to
better quality information.
In terms of the role of NAPLAN in economic decision-making, the move
to an online-based formative tool could therefore in fact improve the kinds of
analysis that can be done. For example, the tool would necessitate creating
student accounts which would stay with the individual across their school life.
The approach could thus increase the value of the NAPLAN data, instead of
making it redundant as some posit.
5.2 Impacts of school funding
There are numerous arguments for the public funding of schools - whether this
be a positive externality argument, an ethical argument for equality among cit-
izens, or another. In Australia, Parish (1963) argued that “it is the proper func-
tion of government to encourage investment in education,” as well as that gov-
ernment funding in the education sector should extend to all types of schools,
including the private system. Given that governments are providing billions of
dollars to schools each year, it is natural that an analysis of the efficiency of
these funds be undertaken. This plays into the theory of accountability mechan-
isms detailed above, where schools must justify that they are spending money
effectively by providing a good quality education to their students.
Levin (1974) and Hanushek (1979) discuss the educational production func-
tion, which considers schools to behave like a type of firm producing the out-
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put ‘education’. This output is generally measured as school-average scores in
standardised tests. Output is determined by two inputs - school resources and
average student background. This theoretical framework has informed econo-
metric specifications for analysing school funding in the literature.
Internationally, the literature has been divided as to how resources impact
student test score achievement. In the United States, Card and Payne (2002)
studied micro-samples of SAT scores (a standardised test for college admission)
using a series of models to look at how school finance reform and redistributions
of school spending affect the distribution of test scores. It was found that test
score gaps between disadvantaged communities can be narrowed by equalising
spending across richer and poorer districts. In the state of Maine, Deller and
Rudnicki (1993) constructed a set of nominally efficient schools, or schools that
are able to maximise student achievement given their particular characteristics.
This study identified inefficiencies in production in these schools, but found
it difficult to pinpoint a particular policy pattern behind their result. Graddy
and Stevens (2005) have also found different results for the efficiency of school
resources across various school types. By studying panel data from the Inde-
pendent Schools Information Service in the United Kingdom, it was found that
decreased student-teacher ratios (i.e., hiring more teachers) are related to higher
examination results. This result is interesting given that this has not been found
to be the case in any state schools in the United Kingdom.
What has been highlighted is that the results of analysis of school funding
or resources are highly dependent on context, and often lead to conflicting con-
clusions. Eric A. Hanushek, Paul and Jean Hanna Senior Fellow at Stanford’s
Hoover Institution, has written prolifically on the issues involved with the estim-
ation of educational production functions. Hanushek (1979) details the lack of
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conceptual clarity and analytical problems involved with the estimation of edu-
cational production functions. The fact that this literature crosses many discip-
linary boundaries; for example, that of the education literature, the public policy
literature, the social sciences literature, and the economics literature, may also
be a reason behind the conflicting results of analyses thus far. Hanushek dis-
cusses that the original use of input-output analysis in the Coleman Report14
morphed into the economist’s educational production function - which does not
come without ramifications regarding the interpretation of results. The major
difference between an input-output analysis and the production function is that
the latter absorbs the concept of maximisation, that is, that a school is perform-
ing efficiently in turning resources into educational output. Hanushek argues
that no one would expect a firm to change its behaviour given the estimation of
a theoretical production function, so why should these be taken so seriously in
the case of schooling? A number of conceptual limitations to the estimation of
these functions are outlined:
• Standard production functions have some kind of homogeneous output
produced at various numbers of unit. What is a unit of schooling?
• In fact, most schools produce multiple outputs. Standardised test scores
represent just one measure for these possible outputs.
• There are relatively fixed levels of labour and capital in a school, i.e., one
teacher with a number of students in their class that may vary slightly.
This lack of variation tends to mean that it explains very little in terms of
the variation in outcomes.
14A study undertaken in the United States of America on the equality of educational oppor-
tunity, mandated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
27
5 USES FOR THE NAPLAN DATA
• Choices in inputs tend to be guided by data availability rather than any
conceptual notions. Dewey et al. (2000) further discuss how the inclusion
of parental income in these functions can confound demand and produc-
tion, leading to misspecification.
• It is nigh impossible to decipher if schools are behaving efficiently in pro-
duction.
Other issues include deciding on a functional form, the level of aggregation
(Hanushek et al., 1996), accounting for selection effects into certain schools,
multicollinearity, addressing assumptions such as that ability remains constant
over time (Ding and Lehrer, 2014), including the cumulative nature of schooling
(Todd and Wolpin, 2003), not to mention choosing statistical methods correctly.
Hanushek (2003) bemoans the lack of understanding of incentives at play in
input-based analyses of schooling, as well as exploring the variations in teacher
quality not affected by resources that affect performance.15
While it is exceedingly difficult to estimate the true impact of resources in
schools, this should not detract from attempts to quantify them as much as pos-
sible. In Australia, the literature has been particularly focused on this issue due
to its political pre-eminence in educational policy discourse. A concerted ef-
fort to understand how funding is working in Australian schools is key to the
cogency of this debate. Research thus far has highlighted the inefficiency of
the funding of schools in Australia. Watson and Ryan (2010) argue that as
private schools typically use extra government funding to hire more teachers
rather than to decrease their school fees charged to parents, noted as early as
15See Hanushek and Rivkin (2010); Hanushek (2011); Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff
(2014a,b) for further analysis of the economic analysis of the impacts of teachers. This lit-
erature is outside the scope of possibilities for the NAPLAN data at this point in time.
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Williams (1985), current funding schemes undermine the public system and fail
to improve access to the private system for those from lower socio-economic
backgrounds. In Victoria, Dancer and Blackburn (2017) find only 37.5% of
school studied are efficient. Similarly, Blackburn et al. (2014) find schools in
New South Wales to be moderately inefficient. Although it is again highlighted
that context matters, as those with the most favourable socio-economic envir-
onments are most efficient. They also note the efficiency gains from increased
enrolments at a school.16 In Victoria, Cobb-Clark and Jha (2013) estimate the
relationship of per-pupil expenditure on achievement in test scores using a value-
added model accounting for lagged achievement, and find that these two vari-
ables are only moderately related. Finally, an input-output analysis undertaken
by Nghiem et al. (2016) find that NAPLAN test score growth could be improved
by 64%, on average, by learning from best practice.
The My School website phenomenon has also meant the collection of fin-
ancial data alongside test score data, allowing a broader view on the efficiency
of government spending in schools across all states and territories for the first
time. Previous attempts at analysis have focused on much smaller sample sizes,
in only particular school systems or states. As outlined above, most analyses of
school funding cannot be easily generalised outside of their particular context.
The NAPLAN data therefore provide an exciting opportunity to shed light on
funding across Australia as a whole, which is of particular use to the federal
government as they are increasingly spending more in schools. This is also use-
ful for state governments to make better-informed policy comparisons between
16Note that Chakraborty and Harper (2017) contradict this result, finding that schools in
New South Wales are quite efficient using a technical inefficiency effects model. They find that
primary schools are 88.6% efficient and secondary schools 96.4% efficient. However, this paper
is more focused on the impacts of socio-economic factors on school efficiency, than overall
resource efficiency.
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each other, to encourage best practice within the federal system. While the
financial data is limited at this point in time, for example; it does not provide de-
tailed breakdowns on how funding is spent within a school, it provides a useful
starting point from which to reposition the funding debate towards evidence.
5.3 School management
In their analysis of school efficiency, Cobb-Clark and Jha (2013) also find that
budget allocation matters when looking at how schools produce outcomes. Santin
and Sicilia (2015) similarly conclude that if the responsibility for school budget
distribution is given to principals themselves, there are positive effects for the
efficiency of public schools in Uruguay. School leadership and management
clearly play an important role in the ability of a school to produce higher out-
comes. A further recommendation of the second Gonski review is to empower
school leaders, as well as to support a profession of expert educators. The fol-
lowing section will therefore explore how the NAPLAN data can be used to
better understand best practice for school management.
In Brazil, Tavares (2015) finds that management practices such as perform-
ance monitoring and target-setting led to improvements in math scores, espe-
cially in disadvantaged schools. These improvements are most likely due to
changes in management and teaching practice. In an analysis of 1800 high
schools in 8 countries, Bloom et al. (2015) also find that schools with higher
quality management achieve better educational outcomes. In a slightly tangen-
tial study, focused on the private schooling sector, Green et al. (2011) conclude
that private schools in the United Kingdom have been most successful at trans-
lating their curriculum into producing the outputs demanded by the economy.
The management direction of a school clearly plays a strong role in determining
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how successful that school will be.
The question must be therefore be asked as to if and how NAPLAN can
contribute to the understanding of school management, and if this data can play
a role in constructing, for example, a management index to isolate best practice.
Ultimately, the managerial quality of a school is what one is trying to determine
through the implementation of the various accountability mechanisms discussed
in the previous sections. One goal of NAPLAN testing, and the My School
website, would be to incentivise school management to change their practices
and innovate in such a way that will improve their educational outcomes.
Coelli et al. (2018) undertook a survey of school principals in Australia, to
understand if school managers responded to the increased public scrutiny of
NAPLAN test score reporting on the My School website. This study attempts
to look inside the ‘black box’ of the educational production function, to uncover
what policies and practices schools have actually implemented over the period
of study. Principals from all school sectors were surveyed, both prior to and then
three years following the publication of the first round of data online. The first
survey uncovered differences in policy and practice between low-performing
schools and high-performing schools, as well as between school sectors. For
example, low-performing schools are most likely to have shorter school days,
and less involved parents; however, are more likely to use interventions such
as tutoring of struggling students. Private schools were most likely to set more
homework, as well as to incentivise teachers to produce high outcomes, such as
with the threat of dismissal. Their results show that the My School website did
not cause already low-performing schools to change their practices. There was,
however, evidence of narrowing the curriculum and directing resources to the
subject areas covered in NAPLAN, to the detriment of other areas. One potential
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reason for this could be that education policy is so rigid that these principals do
not have any real managerial power over how their schools are run. It may also
be the case that they do not prioritise My School publications, or that there has
not been enough time for the policy to make a real long-term impact.
What this study shows is that while the NAPLAN data is important to un-
cover which schools are performing poorly, it does not say enough about what
policies and practices are occurring in schools to truly diagnose these problems.
The data alone is not enough to determine which schools are managed best, or
which schools are behaving most efficiently. What the data could do is target
particular schools (using proper random sampling techniques, and stratifying by
levels of achievement) on which further data could then be collected to uncover
key differences between low-performing and high-performing schools of sim-
ilar backgrounds. This, however, would require significant commitment from
government and the education sector at large to allow this to occur.
5.4 School choice
School choice, particularly between the public and private schooling sectors, has
been an especially popular topic in the economic literature on schooling. This
is likely due to the role it plays in government decision-making about which
sectors to allocate public funding to, and at what levels. This is also an import-
ant topic for parents when making decisions about where to send their children
to school. Standardised test scores are the measure that is most often used to
compare performance between schools, and school sectors.17
17Note that there is also a literature on how school sector impacts later life outcomes, for
example; Polidano and Jha (2015) find that wages for students from Catholic schools grow at
a faster rate with labour market experience than those of a public school graduate. They also
find a similar result for those from independent private schools, arguing that these school sectors
may be better at preparing students for work.
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The literature is contentious as to whether private schools cause students to
perform better. At first glance, it would appear that private schools score higher
on tests. However, it is difficult to disentangle this effect from a self-selection
effect. Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) find that a voucher program in Chile, which
enabled any student to attend private school if they so wished, increased sorting
as the ‘best’ students left for the private sector; however, there was no effect on
test scores. It is arguable that both parents with academically gifted students as
well as those who most value education will be willing to pay to send their child
to a private school. This self-selection effect is what causes the improved test
scores in private schools, not the education provided. Indeed, there is a large
part of the literature focused on how best to combat the problems involved with
estimating the effect of private schooling, such as Altonji et al. (2000). This
study proposes a method by which to use the selection on observables to guide
the amount of selection on unobservables involved in school choice.18 This
literature has wider ramifications for approaches to estimation with selection on
unobservables in applied microeconomics at large.
In terms of the findings of the literature, the case has been argued for both
sides. In England, Gibbons and Silva (2011) find that students in religious
primary schools progress faster than those in the public system, but that this
is explained away by self-selection on pre-existing characteristics. A similar
result is found by Elder and Jepsen (2014) in the United States and Chudgar
and Quin (2012) in India. In Australia, Ryan (2013) find that declines in PISA
scores are more evident in private schools than in public schools. In contrast,
Lefebvre et al. (2011) find that the percentile rank of a student in math will in-
crease by between 4 and 10 points for those switching from a public to a private
18See Cardak and Vecci (2013) for use of a similar methodology in Australia.
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school (the treatment effect on the treated). In their analysis of charter schools,
Zimmer et al. (2012) highlight that the assumptions of the modelling approach
play a very real role when estimating the impacts of schools, and that this may
be why the literature has shown mixed results thus far.
Another explanation for why students may perform better in private schools
is that of a ‘peer effect’. That is, students will perform better when they are in a
better environment with high-performing fellow students. Using a subset of the
NAPLAN data from the Victorian Government, McVicar et al. (2018) find that
there are positive effects from having higher-achieving peers. However, in their
analysis of exam schools in Boston and New York, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014)
find that peer characteristics do not have a clear causal effect on test scores.
By exploiting the cutoff scores for attendance at these schools, they are able to
implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to compare students above
and below the threshold who attended schools with different peers. Ellison and
Swanson (2016) also find a lack of evidence for the direct impact of peer effects,
through a non-parametric analysis of scores achieved in the American Mathem-
atics Competitions. Ryan (2017a) explains the difficulties of estimating peer
effects, and argues that the methods used in the literature are often contentious
if they are not based on some source of external manipulation of peer groups.
This may explain the differing results in this body of literature.
Nevertheless, it remains clear that schools produce high-achieving students at
different rates. Ellison and Swanson (2016) illustrate that there are differences
in the frequency between seemingly-similar schools, yet struggle to provide an
explanation for this. Perhaps the public/private debate is too broad, but school
choice at the micro-level does matter. In a survey of the literature, Bast and
Walberg (2004) find that parents are just as good at rating the performance of
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schools as experts, and that students who attend their ‘school of choice’ will
perform better than those in their assigned public schools. This supports the
finding in Chicago of Cullen et al. (2005) that students who are assigned a school
and then opt out to attend a different school do better than those who stay in that
to which they were assigned.19 The ability of parents to best match their child to
a school may explain the success of the charter school movement in the United
States.20 For example, Hanushek et al. (2007) find that the parental decision to
leave a charter school is significantly related to quality. While charter schools,
on average, do not perform better than public schools, there is considerable
heterogeneity in the sector. By reducing the transaction costs for students to
switch schools, it may incentivise schools to improve their quality to attract
students.21
The effect of private schooling is also contested in the Australian literature.
One must also note that the findings in other countries cannot be directly related
to the Australian context, as we have a particularly large and heterogeneous
private sector, where not all schools are necessarily expensive and ‘elite’. Fur-
thermore, parents choose private schooling for reasons that may differ to those
by parents in other countries.22
In their analysis of the early NAPLAN data, Miller and Voon (2012) find
that private schools achieve higher test scores on average than public schools,
19This feeds into the literature on school vouchers. See Levin (1998) for a discussion of the
effectiveness and costs of voucher programs.
20Note that school choice policy mechanisms could include affirmative action policies, see
Doan (2016).
21Note that this must also be understood in terms of a capacity approach, where schools can
only improve given the resources to do so, not just through incentives. This forms part of the
analysis of school funding in previous sections, as well as an understanding of a school’s student
body, which will be explored in the following section.
22See Dearden et al. (2011) for a comparison of the determinants of school choice between
the United Kingdom and Australia.
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but that this effect may be due to selection processes. Nghiem et al. (2015)
use a subset of the NAPLAN data, linked to data from the Longitudinal Study
of Australian Children (LSAC), and find that school type does not affect either
cognitive or non-cognitive development in children.
The expanded individual-level NAPLAN data set provides an opportunity to
analyse the effect of school choice on outcomes in more detail. With back-
ground information on observable characteristics, and information about the
background and test scores of a student’s peers, we may be able to better isolate
the effect of switching school sectors, or even the effect of particular individual
schools. This could be a powerful tool not only for governments, but also for
schools who want to understand how best to serve their students. This, of course,
would come along with a number of ethical issues and would need to be conduc-
ted sensitively. At the level of public versus private schooling, we can begin to
get an idea of the effect of school sector by using observables such as the work
and education status of the students’ parents. However, this area of analysis
would benefit from a deeper study using Census data about what determines a
parent’s decision to send their child to a private school.
This area of study is also currently restricted by the inability to follow a
student between schools through time. If we could follow students throughout
time, and observe them switching between systems, we would be able to per-
form analysis on the switchers such as that undertaken by Lefebvre et al. (2011).
We would argue that this would be the best methodology for clearly identifying
the effect of private schooling in Australia. A second approach would be to im-
plement a matching approach; however, as the background characteristics con-
tained in the data are limited at present, it would be difficult to ensure that we are
truly matching similar students across sectors. It would therefore require further
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collection of more detailed background characteristic data to best implement a
matching approach.
5.5 The provision of equitable schooling
The final question that must be asked, and indeed has been as early as Summers
and Wolfe (1977), is if schools really can make a difference at all. A primary
goal of the Australian federal government, and indeed perhaps the driving force
of both Gonski reviews themselves, is that of “Equipping every student to grow
and succeed in a changing world.”23 It is, however, disputed if schools are able
to change or mould outcomes for students given their pre-existing characteristics
and home life. To take the education production function approach, are the
only inputs that truly matter those of the student themselves? For example,
Polidano et al. (2013) find that the lower educational aspirations of low SES
students and their parents is one of the most important contributing factors of
lower achievement in Australia, not differences in school characteristics. This is
a particularly popular area for economic analysis, as will be detailed presently.
Cullen et al. (2013) have argued that high schools typically have student bod-
ies that have outside options to schooling, as well as exhibiting great hetero-
geneity, making it difficult for schools to prepare their students for the world.
They further note that this is particularly the case for high schools with disad-
vantaged students or in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. While their conclusion
is that these schools should realign their goals to focus on practical life and la-
bour market skills, instead of the traditional focus on testing, their study draws
particular attention to the question of how schools can cater to students with
such vastly different backgrounds and needs, in a world focused on providing
23Emphasis my own.
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equitable education for all. Our task in this section is to analyse the literature on
disadvantage so far, and determine how and if test scores really can play a role
in understanding these issues.
A popular area for analysis, particularly in the United States, has been to ana-
lyse the impacts of racial background on achievement. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. and
Steven D. Levitt have studied the question of the black-white test score gap in
depth, both in the first two years of school (Fryer and Levitt, 2004) and through
the third grade (Fryer and Levitt, 2005). Using data from the Early Childhood
Longitudinal Survey, they show that, once controlling for a small number of
background covariates, there is no gap in test score achievement between stu-
dents from white and black backgrounds. However, they find that over the first
two years of school, black students typically fall behind faster than their peers
from other racial backgrounds (Fryer and Levitt, 2004). By the third grade, the
test score gap can no longer be explained by observable background character-
istics (Fryer and Levitt, 2005). The only explanation that can be suggested with
some level of empirical backing is that it is something to do with school quality
that is causing these differences (Fryer and Levitt, 2004), but this is disputed in
Fryer and Levitt (2005).
Largely in Europe, the discussion of race has expanded to analyse how chan-
ging concentrations of immigrant students in the classroom may affect outcomes
for both native-born and immigrant students. In Denmark, using PISA data,
Jensen and Rasmussen (2011) find that by increasing the concentration of im-
migrant students in a classroom, students achieve lower scores in both reading
and math, with a stronger effect for native students. This has also been studied
in Italy, with Ballatore et al. (2018) identifying a pure ethnic composition ef-
38
5 USES FOR THE NAPLAN DATA
fect by exploiting the rules of class formation governed by Maimonides’ rule.24
These kinds of rules for governing class size specify a particular number of stu-
dents at which the class will be split in half. In Italy it is difficult to predict if
classes will reach the threshold at which classes are split, creating an element
of randomisation in class sizes. It also creates randomisation as to whether new
immigrants are ‘added’ to a class (the class is not split), or whether they ‘re-
place’ native students in a class (the class is split). By analysing INVALSI test
data, they find that there is a negative effect on native test scores, especially in
the case of first-generation immigrants. This may be due to disruptions in class
due to language barriers.
The literature shows that it may not only be the composition in the classroom
that matters for test score outcomes, but even the composition of your neigh-
bourhood. While Gibbons et al. (2013) find that changes over time in neigh-
bourhood composition do not affect test scores in England, Nicoletti and Rabe
(2013) find that neighbourhood may explain up to 10-15% of the variance in
test score performance. Nevertheless, family plays a much larger role in ex-
plaining the gap, with family background explaining 44-55% of the variance
in test scores. The reasons that family background may influence your school
performance are varied. Behrman and Knowles (1999) illustrate the consider-
able relationship between household income and a child’s educational success
in Vietnam. Stevens and Schaller (2011) show that, in the short-run, a child
will suffer from educational difficulties when faced with a parent losing their
job. Using an experimental approach in schools in Chicago Heights, Fryer et al.
(2015) show that a student’s test scores can be improved by incentivising par-
24Maimonides was a Jewish scholar in the Middle Ages, who first noticed a correlation
between class size and student achievement.
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ents to participate in their child’s education. While the literature makes it clear
that family characteristics have a significant impact on educational outcomes,
this remains a significant limitation of the NAPLAN data at present. While both
the educational literature (Ford, 2013) and the economic literature (Cobb-Clark
and Nguyen, 2012) have highlighted that a detailed understanding of racial,
economic, language, educational, and social backgrounds of a child’s family
will determine their educational outcomes, these variables are only included at
broad levels of granularity. For example, there are only four categories to cover
all possible jobs that a parent may have; while we know that a student comes
from a language background other than English, we don’t know what that lan-
guage is; we have no understanding of a child’s living situation; and we know
little about their parent(s)’ income. While we can understand these questions in
broad strokes with the current data set, these are important contextual questions
that must be clarified in greater detail before we can truly begin to understand
how policy changes may differentially affect individual students.
There are also individual-level characteristics that may affect a student’s per-
formance, specifically their gender and their age. It is generally conventional
wisdom, and supported by much of the literature, that girls have an advantage
in reading, and boys have an advantage in math. Bedard and Cho (2010) ana-
lyse the gender test-score gap across a number of OECD countries using the
TIMSS data. However, countries with pro-female sorting or policies in place
have smaller observed gender gaps in math than those that did not. Moreover,
the gender gap can be influenced by regional characteristics. For example, using
micro-data from SACMEQ in 19 African countries, Dickerson et al. (2015) find
that fertility levels in a region are a determinant of the size of the gender gap in
mathematics in Africa. In countries such as Pakistan, girls may be disadvant-
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aged in all subject areas. Using surveys of rural households, Alderman et al.
(1996) find that girls are at a significant educational disadvantage in developing
countries, and that both demand and supply side factors may help to improve
this gap. The gender gap may also change over time, as with the black-white
test score gap. Fryer and Levitt (2010) indicate that in the United States there
is no difference in math performance between boys and girls when they start
school, but that over time girls begin to fall behind. Questions related to gender
can be studied well with the existing NAPLAN data. Gender is included as a
covariate for each individual student, and we can therefore also deduce from the
genders of their classmates if they are attending a same-sex or co-educational
school. Due to the large sample size, the Australian data may have significant
promise for analysing the impacts of same-sex schooling on outcomes, for both
genders.
Finally, a large part of the literature focuses on the age of starting school, as
this is a policy that can be directly controlled by governments. Using two birth
cohorts in the United Kingdom, Crawford et al. (2014) find that children born
earlier in the year do better in tests, and that age adjustments to scores may be ne-
cessary. Black et al. (2011) also find that older children in Norway perform bet-
ter on tests, and that IQ scores are slightly negatively affected by starting school
later.25 However, while older children do better this does not mean that it is
necessarily of benefit to hold back your child from starting school. Fletcher and
Kim (2016) find that starting kindergarten earlier increases average test scores
in the United States. It has also been found in Australia, using the LSAC sub-
set of data, that starting school earlier improved cognitive skills, particularly
25In Norway, there is a discontinuity around 1 January as to whether students start school in
that calendar year or not.
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for socio-economically disadvantaged students (Suziedelyte and Zhu, 2015). In
analysing the life-cycle effects of school starting age in Sweden, Fredriksson
and Ockert (2014) argue that the literature finding that older students perform
better is confounded, and that there may be differing effects over the life-cycle
but no absolute difference between older and younger students. While student
ages are built into the individual-level NAPLAN data set, it remains more diffi-
cult to analyse these kinds of questions in the Australian context.26 This is due
to differences in policies about the age of starting school across states. For ex-
ample, Queensland only introduced a compulsory full year of prep (for students
aged 5, also known as reception) in 2017, bringing them into line with the thir-
teen years of schooling usual in the other states.27 There are also differences in
rules as to when students start their first year of school, with some doing three,
four, or five terms of reception. We would require data on at what age a stu-
dent started school to be able to analyse these kinds of questions. At this point
in time, however, it could be possible to analyse differences between how well
older and younger students within the same grade level perform on NAPLAN
testing.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the various areas in which NAPLAN data may be use-
ful for economic analysis and for policy-makers. Particularly, we believe that
there is much to learn about the following topics, given the NAPLAN data in its
current form at the time of writing. Firstly,
26Note that these questions may be better suited to the LSAC subset of the NAPLAN data,
such as in Suziedelyte and Zhu (2015).
27Miller and Voon (2014) illustrate the lower outcomes achieved by schools in Queensland
using a regression discontinuity approach comparing this state to New South Wales.
42
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
(1) Use the financial information contained in the My School set of data,
that is, the school-average level data, to develop a greater understanding
of how funding is really impacting Australian schools (both public and
private);
(2) Use the student-level data to examine what kinds of students are at risk
of performing poorly on tests such as NAPLAN, in order to understand
where policy can be best targeted.
Item (1) is of importance following from our discussions of accountability mech-
anisms and the efficiency of school funding. The concept of school choice is
also closely linked to an understanding of how funding is best utilised, as gov-
ernments decide where to allocate their funding. Item (2) is also a pivotal piece
of understanding to create accountability mechanisms that are fair, as this will
only be made possible through a thorough understanding of how the goal of
equitable schooling plays into these policy decisions.
It is worth noting that more can be done to improve the econometric uses of
the data, particularly the implementation of a unique student identifier as de-
tailed in the Gonski report. The collection of more detailed background statist-
ics, and for these to be made available to the researcher given ethics clearance,
would also vastly improve the quality of analysis and thus the evidence base
from which policy can be determined. Despite these drawbacks, which do sig-
nificantly affect the econometrician’s ability to achieve identification and detect
causality in the field of education, the results of analysis of this kind using the
NAPLAN data must not be underestimated. This data still has much to tell about
the nature of schooling in Australia.
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Abstract
This study sheds new light on the relationship between school funding and stu-
dent achievement on standardised tests in Australian primary schools. We use a
school-average test score data set from the National Assessment Program - Lit-
eracy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) paired with funding data for each school to de-
termine how the three different types of funding received by Australian schools
impact test scores differently depending on sector and state. We find, in general,
that funding from the federal government has the least beneficial impact, with
state government funding and parent fees more likely to provide the greatest be-
nefit to schools. The policy implication of these results is that federalism has a
role to play in delivering successful funding policy to Australian schools, and that
funding is most beneficial when provided at as local a level as possible.
Keywords: National testing, school funding, quantile regression, monte carlo.
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1 Introduction
Policy-makers and school officials often argue for increased funding to poorly
performing schools in order to improve their learning outcomes. In turn, test
scores provide regular and consistent measurement of these outcomes, and thus a
systematic way to allocate funds on the basis of performance. As a result, school
∗This research is supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP)
Scholarship. Thanks must also be given to the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Report-
ing Authority for the provision of the data utilised by this study. Thank you to participants at the
2016 Australasian Meeting of the Econometric Society, and a number of anonymous referees




accountability mechanisms are increasingly linking monetary incentives to per-
formance on standardised tests. Under the United States’ No Child Left Behind
policy, for example, schools not achieving certain pass rates can be faced with
monetary sanctions. In a contrasting strategy, the Australian Review of Funding
for Schooling advocated the targeting of increased funding to schools achieving
low scores on standardised tests. There is, however, little empirical evidence that
higher levels of funding will lead to higher levels of achievement.1 In fact, while
funding in Australian schools has increased each year, performance in interna-
tional test programs such as PISA has declined. Funding increases nevertheless
continue to be the major focus of Australian education policy. We therefore aim
to understand if there is a causal relationship between funding and test scores in
Australian primary schools, using data from the National Assessment Program
- Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN).
The impacts of school resources on educational outcomes are notoriously dif-
ficult to estimate. We argue that this difficulty is the result of heterogeneity in
impacts across the test score distribution.2 Schools that are already performing
well will be little impacted by increased levels of funding, and schools perform-
ing poorly may well be restricted by their capacity, or some kind of unknown
school fixed effect. To compound the problem, schools achieving high scores are
often high fee private schools. While some studies may argue that high levels of
resources in these schools lead to improved educational outcomes, the students
in these schools are in fact a selected population with above-average abilities
or background characteristics.3 The higher fees in these schools are likely an
1See Hanushek (2003) and Cullen et al. (2013) for discussions on the failure of resource
increases to improve educational outcomes.
2See Bitler et al. (2006) for similar arguments regarding the effects of welfare reform and




indicator of their desirability for high-performing students, rather than driving
the improved results themselves. We therefore propose a method to estimate the
effect of funding in Australian primary schools on reading and numeracy test
scores, taking into account heterogeneity in effects over the score distribution.
Additionally, we account for potential reverse causality between funding and
scores to allow for the possibility that scores obtained in preceding years are
determining the level of fees charged by a school.
It is generally well accepted that re-allocating resources within a school or
school district can improve performance,4 but the actual marginal effect of a
dollar has not been clearly identified. In the United Kingdom, Green et al.
(2011) have concluded that higher levels of resources in private schools con-
tribute to improved educational attainment. Furthermore, Graddy and Stevens
(2005) show that the lower teacher-student ratios in private schools lead to bet-
ter outcomes for their students. In Australia, Miller and Voon (2012) found that
average NAPLAN scores in private schools are consistently higher than those
in public schools; however, hypothesise that these differences are explained by
self-selection processes, rather than the increased levels of resources in private
schools. To further this argument, Nghiem et al. (2015) found that, once con-
trolling for sample selection, there is little difference in the outcomes produced
by public and private schools. These findings in Australia are also supported by
Elder and Jepsen (2014) in the United States and Gibbons and Silva (2011) in
the United Kingdom. In contrast, Lefebvre et al. (2011) found that switching to
4In the United States, Card and Payne (2002) found that changes in the allocation of fund-
ing within school districts led to equalisation in the test score gap between disadvantaged and
advantaged students. At the school-level, Cobb-Clark and Jha (2013) found that the strategic
budget allocation of principals in Victorian public schools (who operate with a significant level
of autonomy in financial decision-making) matters for improving student achievement. Fur-
thermore, Reback (2008) has shown the strategic shifting of resources in Texan schools to help
particular students improve their scores.
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a private school in Canada improves a student’s mathematics score by between
4 and 10 points. Card and Krueger (1994) also find that increased school re-
sources are associated with higher educational attainment, although the range
of their coefficients is wide. The amalgamation of test score data and funding
information on the Australian My School website allows a unique opportunity
to identify the effect of funding itself, in both public and private schools.
Specifically, using this data on test scores and school funding,5 we investigate
the effect of three major sources of funding - the federal government, the state
government and parent fees - on school-average test scores in reading and nu-
meracy. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to undertake a systematic ana-
lysis of the impacts of funding in Australian primary schools. Using an uncon-
ditional panel quantile regression approach that accounts for both unobserved
school-fixed effects and endogeneity, we show that the relationship between
funding and NAPLAN test scores differs between public and private schools,
as well as varying along the distribution of test scores and across states. These
are results that may be overlooked if implementing traditional mean-focused
approaches such as fixed effects models. In particular, we show that federal
funding generally has a negative impact on average test scores in both public
and private schools. Meanwhile, state funding is in many cases positively cor-
related with average scores, especially in public schools in Victoria and private
schools in New South Wales and South Australia. Our results also indicate that
parent fees impact positively on average NAPLAN test scores for many schools.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes
the institutional context followed by a discussion of the data in Section 3. The




methodology is discussed in Section 4 and results are presented in Section 5.
Section 6 provides some discussion and concluding remarks.
2 Institutional context
2.1 The Australian school system
There are three sectors of schools in Australia, with the largest being the public
system, which is administered and funded by the government. These schools
provide a secular education to students living in the local area at a minimal cost,
although a minority of these schools are selective on other characteristics such
as a student’s ability. The second largest schooling sector is the Catholic sector.
These schools provide a Catholic education to those of the Catholic faith, and
are also mainly funded by the government. They, however, differ from public
schools in that they provide an education based on a Christian ethos.6 Lastly, the
‘private’ sector is made up of non-government or independent institutions that
have their own governing board responsible for the school’s operation. These
schools often provide religious education, e.g., Anglican, Methodist, and are
more expensive to attend and traditional in style. However, some independent
schools simply provide different curriculums such as the Steiner system of inde-
pendent schools, or are geared towards special interests such as sport or music
programs. While these schools are governed independently, they still receive
government funding. In addition, these schools charge parent fees that vary sig-
nificantly from levels similar to those charged by public schools to thousands of
dollars a year, and many private schools provide scholarships to attract talented
6We do not consider Catholic schools as they are mostly funded by the government yet
differ in the type of education they provide.
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students without the means to attend.
2.2 Policy context
Australia has a federal style of government, combining a national government
(often referred to as the ‘Commonwealth’ or the ‘federal’ government) with state
and territory governments, and local governments. Constitutional responsibility
for the delivery of school education rests with the state and territory govern-
ments; however, these governments co-operate with the Australian government
via the Ministerial Council for Education, Early Childhood Development, and
Youth Affairs (MCEEDYA)7 to develop and co-ordinate goals for improving
educational outcomes and strategies for achieving them nationally.
Federalism allows for variance in government policy throughout the country,
in order to better accommodate for a diverse citizenry, as well as the customisa-
tion of policy to best meet local community needs. Theoretically, this variance
causes competition between states and territories, which becomes an incent-
ive to provide the best services possible. Nevertheless, this system comes with
many potential disadvantages, notably in the realm of education policy delivery.
While the state and territory governments hold residual Constitutional power
for the provision of education under section 197, the Commonwealth has in-
creasingly encroached on this policy area through the use of section 96, which
allows the federal government to provide grants on such terms as the parliament
sees fit. Furthermore, state and territory governments are restrained financially
due to vertical fiscal imbalance, where the Commonwealth is responsible for the
majority of tax collection yet the states and territories are responsible for the
7This body has been replaced by the Council of Australian Government’s Standing Council
on School Education and Early Childhood since the period studied in this paper.
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majority of public service provision. Therefore, in practice, responsibility for
education funding is shared due to the federal government’s power to make tied
grants to the states. This can lead to inefficiency, duplication of funding and
services, lack of transparency, and blame-shifting.
Different federal governments have used this responsibility in various ways,
due to their differing ideologies in regards to the role of federalism in the polit-
ical process. There was little federal involvement in school funding until the
Karmel Report on schooling in 1973 established Commonwealth intervention
in this policy area. At this time, the Whitlam Labor government was extensively
increasing the number of grants provided to the states on the basis of creating the
welfare state. The moves of the Whitlam government highlight that, in a federal
system, the Commonwealth has a role to play in ensuring national standards are
met across all states and territories. This is reflected in the longstanding com-
mitment of all federal governments since the 1970s to provide a minimum grant
to all schools, including non-government schools, to make sure that all students
receive some form of government support. It was also found, and widely accep-
ted at the time, that the funding of non-government schools has the extra benefit
of taking pressure off the public sector to assume the costs of educating these
students.
Despite the apparent consensus on the funding of schools, there remains con-
tention in the amounts of funding and the levels of government from which this
funding should come. While Whitlam saw a role for the Commonwealth to
provide national leadership on welfare within the constraints of the federal sys-
tem, the Hawke and Keating governments pragmatically saw federal reform as
an opportunity to more efficiently use government resources. However, in an
attempt to make the political system more efficient, this reform may have in fact
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increased inefficiency due to duplication.
Throughout the period of our study, the belief that the Commonwealth should
provide national leadership was mirrored by the rhetoric of the ‘Education Re-
volution’ of the Rudd and Gillard Labor governments. This period saw the
creation of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority
(ACARA), the National Assessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy (NA-
PLAN), the My School website, and a National Curriculum.
In 2011, the government commissioned the Review of Funding for Schooling,
popularly known as the Gonski report, the most comprehensive report of school
funding since the 1973 Karmel report. The report explains that Australia needs
effective funding arrangements for funding schools across all levels of govern-
ment - arrangements that ensure resources are being provided where they are
needed. It is argued that the existing arrangements are unnecessarily complex,
lack coherence and transparency, and involve a duplication of funding effort in
some areas. It was found that, due to current policy processes with their roots in
the reforms of the 1970s, government funding of schools is marked by a distinct
lack of co-ordination. Moreover, it is difficult to hold the government account-
able for schooling, as it is unclear what level of government money is coming
from, and what role each government should be playing. The Gonski review,
however, did not establish a causal link between levels of funding and educa-
tional outcomes. Thus, this study has an important role to play in the context of
this report, and in future reform of education funding policy.
2.3 School funding 2009-2012
In the time period studied by this paper, the roles and responsibilities of the
federal government, and the state and territory governments, regarding the pro-
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vision of school funding were described by the National Education Agreement
(NEA). Under this agreement, the federal government assumed responsibility
for providing funding to the state and territory governments, as well as non-
government systems and schools. This was aimed at enabling schools to deliver
better services to reach certain nationally-agreed outcomes and objectives. This
agreement included $42.4 billion8 of funding to schools. Alongside this fund-
ing, the federal government signed national partnership agreements with state
and territory governments to provide extra funding for certain areas. National
partnership agreements in this time period included: Improving Teacher Quality
($550 million), Education in Low Socio-economic Status School Communities
(over $1 billion), and Literacy and Numeracy ($500 million).
A significant driver of this extra federal funding provided to schools just be-
fore our period of study was the Global Financial Crisis, with the funding form-
ing part of the fiscal stimulus programme of the Australian government. Partic-
ularly controversial was the provision of one-off extra capital funding to schools
for the building of general purpose and library buildings. It must be noted that,
for this reason, we do not consider capital expenditure in this paper. Instead, we
focus on recurrent funding that is provided yearly to schools.
2.3.1 Public schools
Public schools are funded by their relevant state or territory government, with
levels of funding generally being determined by need. In Queensland, Victoria
and South Australia, government funding was determined by a standard amount
per student plus a needs-based component determined by socio-economic status
scores in the time period studied. Schools in New South Wales were allocated
8All amounts are reported in real Australian dollars throughout this paper.
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funding based on the Australian Government Education Resources Index, which
allocates funding taking into account the private income of the school.9 In the
time period covered by our analysis,10 over 80% of the funding received by pub-
lic schools came from this source. The federal government supplemented this
funding with a contribution equal to 10% of Average Government School Recur-
rent Costs (AGSRC) per student (a measure of the estimated cost of educating
a student in the public system). The total amount of recurrent funding provided
to each school increased each year, keeping these proportions the same. In the-
ory, schools in the public system are completely funded by the government, but
many are charging a small ‘voluntary contribution’ to parents to supplement this
funding. This contribution, however, is not compulsory and minimal in size, av-
eraging at only $362 per student each year.
2.3.2 Private schools
In contrast to public schools, private schools are, for the most part, funded by
parent fees, charging an average of $6957 per student each year. The amount
charged in the private sector, however, varies significantly from $0 to over $27,000
per student. It must therefore not be assumed that all private schools receive gen-
erous amounts of private funding. As discussed in the preceding section, private
schools have also attracted government funding since the 1970s, giving parents
9NAPLAN scores had no formal role in school funding formulas until 2014, which is after
the period studied here. See Gonski et al. (2011) for more information on the different funding
mechanisms across states in the time period studied.
10From 2009-2012 Australian schools were funded by the ‘Average Government School Re-
current Costs’ system. As mentioned previously, the Review of Funding for Schooling was con-
ducted in 2011 and thus our analyses should be considered alongside the findings of this report.
This report argued that levels of school funding are too low and should be increased overall as
well as changing to a method of allocation based on individual student need. The ‘Better Schools
Plan’ announced following this report was due to commence 1 January 2014. Due to changes
in government, the recommendations have not been fully implemented (a modified version has
been put in place) and are still under consideration and a cause for debate.
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greater choice in the type of education that their child receives.11 The amount
of government funding provided to students in private schools is calculated de-
pending on the average socio-economic status of their students. On average,
the amount of government funding received by private schools is about 40% of
their total income, provided largely by the federal government. The state gov-
ernments supplement this with a proportion of funding that is less than half of
that provided by the federal government. These grants are provided to private
schools to meet operating expenses in that calendar year and are largely spent
on teacher salaries. A study by Williams (1985) has shown that private schools
used government funding to hire extra teachers and improve teacher-student ra-
tios, thereby driving increased enrolments in this sector.
It must be noted that private schools in this time period are taking their gov-
ernment funding as given, i.e., exogenous, and may manage their budgets ac-
cordingly. One could argue that schools may have behaved strategically and
varied their fees given their pre-existing knowledge of what government funding
they would receive. This is, however, unlikely as private schools are discouraged
from using government subsidies to replace parent fees and generally increase
their fees each year only to reflect inflation. Furthermore, families already at-
tending the school or prospective students have an expectation of what fees will
be each year, restricting a school’s ability to increase fees suddenly.
2.4 The National Assessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy
The National Education Agreement also details a system of performance report-
ing for schools, of which the National Assessment Program forms part. The
National Assessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) was intro-
11See Watson and Ryan (2010).
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duced in 2008 and assesses students using standardised tests in reading, writing,
language conventions, and numeracy each year. At the school level, student par-
ticipation in NAPLAN tests is approximately 95%, with the lowest participation
rate at 93.1% for the 2011 numeracy test in South Australia. Nevertheless, no
test is able to perfectly measure a student’s level of achievement and thus all
tests are subject to a certain amount of measurement error. However, each year
the NAPLAN tests and data go through rigorous quality assurance processes in
independent agencies to ensure reliability and validity of the data.
The My School website has also played a significant role in ensuring high data
standards in the collection of financial data from schools. While some amounts
published may only be estimates (due to the state and territory governments
rebundling funds before passing them on to schools), the public provision of
the data ensures reliability. Traditionally, transparency on government spending
ensures that money cannot be misappropriated or misalloacted. All schools are
able to check their entries on My School, and it is likely that if their budgets were
not consistent with those published they would protest. State and territory gov-
ernments therefore have an incentive to rebundle funding allocations in a manner
that aligns with the amounts estimated by the federal government as published
on My School. Furthermore, the calculation of income values was a significant
methodological challenge faced during the implementation of this programme.
Principals of independent schools argued that the data was either overstating
their income or not taking their expenses into account, whereas the Australian
Education Union (AEU) argued that the information understated the income of
independent schools. Earlier in the development of My School 2.0, the launch
had been postponed to ensure the reliability of the data, after accounting firm
Deloitte believed there were methodological flaws. It is fundamental that finan-
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cial data is calculated correctly, as, paired with NAPLAN results, financial data
is used to assess funding requirements. It is therefore likely that the funding data
produced is reliable, as each school has an incentive for their true income to be
reflected on the My School website.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 The National Assessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy
We use Australian school-average data from the National Assessment Program
- Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) to estimate the impact of different sources
of school funding on average scores achieved at the grade 3 level in reading and
numeracy. Each year, all students in grades 3, 5, 7 and 9 sit tests in reading,
writing, language conventions and numeracy. The school-average scores are
reported by ACARA on the publicly-available My School website to allow for
comparisons in performance between schools. The data collected for this project
are unique in that information on student background and school resources are
also collected, in order that comparisons only be made between similar schools.
This is unlike the traditional league tables in countries such as the United King-
dom. The paradigm driving the structure of this particular test score data set,
that only schools with similar resources are comparable on performance, leads
us to question if resources indeed impact performance.
3.2 Sample and variable definitions
The raw data used by this study come from four years of NAPLAN testing
(2009-2012) in every school in Australia, and have been provided by the Aus-
tralian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA). Given these
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data, we have produced a detailed panel data set comprising public and private
schools and their corresponding grade 3 reading and numeracy test scores. We
focus on grade 3 as this is the earliest grade with data available. Hanushek
(1979) argues that production function types of empirical specifications with
test scores as the outcome are most appropriate in the early grades, where read-
ing and numeracy are the main outputs. It is arguable that later grades produce
multiple outputs with a focus on a broader range of subjects and outcomes, cre-
ating problems in estimation when focusing on just reading and numeracy test
scores as educational output. Results for grade 5 are produced in Appendix E
for the purposes of robustness checks. Despite high levels of participation in
NAPLAN, there are cases of missing data that are generally the result of testing
exemptions granted to individual students due to disability or low English pro-
ficiency. While there could be differences in the number of exemptions granted
between public and private schools, our results will not be significantly affected
as the total fraction of exemptions granted is relatively small.
We have necessarily made further sample restrictions for the purpose of sim-
plifying the analysis. Firstly, we focus only on four large neighbouring states:
New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and South Australia. Due to Aus-
tralia’s federal system of government, school funding and governance structures
differ, often greatly, across states. We analyse each state separately, thus allow-
ing us to account for the fact that the relationship between funding and scores
may vary between states. These states have been chosen as more populous states
in Australia, allowing for larger sample sizes, as well as due to their differences
in funding allocation and school administration policies.12
12Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern Territory would have much
smaller sample sizes than the states studied. While large in size, Western Australia has been
omitted due to a similar policy context to New South Wales. The four remaining states all have
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Secondly, as we are interested in understanding how the relationship may
vary across school type, we classify schools into the following two groups: i)
Public schools, which are any schools funded and administered by the state gov-
ernment, and ii) Private schools, which are any schools run independently from
the government. Catholic schools have been omitted from our sample as they
cannot be strictly defined into either of these two groups, as outlined in sec-
tion 2.1. Finally, our methodology requires that we are working with a balanced
panel, so we only consider schools that have recorded test scores for the entire
period of study.13 We are left with a sample of 3778 Australian primary schools,
with 85% of these schools being public.
3.2.1 NAPLAN score
We analyse two separate outcome variables, the school-average NAPLAN test
score in reading and the score in numeracy. NAPLAN results for each stu-
dent are calculated as mean scale scores given the raw marks achieved on each
test. The scale for each subject area ranges from zero to 1000 and the same
scale is used from grade 3 to grade 9. The test score scale provides not only
an ordinal ranking but a scale that quantifies how much better or worse students
differences in institutional context that may be of interest.
1311.45% of public schools and 11.04% of private schools in our original data set did not
have data for all four years. A small part of this is attrition due to schools opening, closing, or
amalgamating. Attrition will cause bias if it unequally affects the sample in either the exposure
or outcome. In our case, school openings and closures are evenly spread over school sector,
states, scores achieved, and average amount of funding received and therefore does not affect
our analysis. In Australia, school closures and openings are more likely to be the result of insti-
tutional factors, such as geographical redistribution, which are not analysed here. The majority
of schools enter and exit the data set due to small class sizes, as scores are only reported when
there are more than 5 students in the class. We already require the omission of smaller schools
on the basis of economies of scale, as an analysis for schools in general will not match with the
requirements of very small schools. The balancing of our panel therefore poses no threat to our
sample regarding bias.
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are performing from their peers.14 This particular construction also means that
scores are comparable over time. Provided the individual scores of each stu-
dent, ACARA calculates the average score for each subject for each grade level
in each school.
The average grade 3 scores for reading and numeracy for public and private
schools in each state are presented in Table 1. It can be seen that private schools
are systematically scoring higher, on average, than public schools in both read-
ing and numeracy across all states. For example, the average reading score in
New South Wales is 452 in private schools, but only 410 in public schools, a dif-
ference of 42 points. This supports the findings by Miller and Voon (2012) that
private schools perform better than public schools on NAPLAN testing at the ag-
gregate level. Further analysis shows that the differences in score between public
and private schools extends to the entire distribution of scores. As illustrated in
Figure 1, not only is the state average score higher in private schools, but there
are also a significant number of public schools with scores well below the overall
state average, illustrated by the long left hand tail. These observed distributional
differences motivate our quantile regression style of analysis, which allows us to
analyse how the impact of funding is changing along this distribution of scores.
The summary statistics also highlight why we need to treat these four states
separately, as we can see significant differences in achievement. For example,
while public school students are scoring lower on average than their private
counterparts from the same state, it can be seen that Victorian public school
students are achieving higher scores than private school students in both South
Australia and Queensland in numeracy. Furthermore, while public school stu-
14As discussed in Hanushek (1979), these kind of test score scales are better suited to educa-
tional production function style analysis.
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dents in New South Wales perform worse than public school students in Victoria,
the averages for private schooling in these states are relatively similar. These
differences in score would indicate that there may be differences in production
technologies, not only between public and private schools, but also between
schools in different states.




South Australia 393 427 34***
(2.278)
New South Wales 410 452 42***
(1.481)
Victoria 426 457 31***
(1.717)
Queensland 385 424 39***
(1.870)
Numeracy
South Australia 371 399 28***
(1.869)
New South Wales 394 429 35***
(1.282)
Victoria 409 432 23***
(1.573)
Queensland 371 400 29***
(1.670)
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 for t-tests for difference
in means between public and private schools, calculated us-
ing OLS regression with robust standard errors to correct
for heteroskedasticity. Standard error for the difference in
mean in parentheses.
3.2.2 Funding
We have three key variables of interest, chosen following the three major sources
of recurrent funding in schools. Australia’s federal structure of governance
means that all types of schools receive money from both their relevant state
government, and the Australian government. In addition, schools have varying
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Figure 1: The distribution of school average NAPLAN test scores. The
distributions for public schools are given by the solid navy line, and the
distributions for private schools by the broken line.
abilities to charge fees to the parents of attending students. As can be seen in
Figure 2, the total amount of funding per student varies, on average, between
states and between public and private schools.15 Perhaps more notably, there
are significant differences in the relative amount of each type of funding that
different schools receive. There are a number of issues involved with the current
0 5,000 10,000 15,000






0 5,000 10,000 15,000






Figure 2: Relative sources of funding in Australian primary schools by state and
sector. The bars above show the average amount of each source of funding
received by schools in that particular state and sector. It must be noted that as
these are averages the amounts of funding illustrated here may not be actually
received by any school.
15Detailed summary statistics can be found in Appendix A.
62
3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
process of school funding in Australia that any analysis must consider, as dis-
cussed in section 2.3. Clearly, school funding is a complex system with patterns
of allocation depending on school sector, location and socio-economic back-
ground. We aim to discover how these three different sources of funding are
impacting test scores in each sector and state, driven by this understanding of
how funding is provided and spent. It is arguable that the current system repres-
ents significant overlap of state and federal responsibilities, so an understanding
of how each type of funding is related to scores is important to determine how
best to allocate money in Australian schools to improve outcomes. We therefore
include variables for each type of funding. The funding information collected
by ACARA is separated into four different categories: Australian government
(federal) recurrent funding, state government recurrent funding, parent fees and
other private funding sources. Capital funding information is also included.
These last two sources of funding have been omitted from our study as they are
expressed as flows rather than stocks and may be sporadically high, low or zero.
We focus instead on the recurrent funding received by schools aimed at meeting
operating costs, with the overall capital wealth effect in schools captured by the
fixed effect.
Furthermore, we aim to find out if the differences we can see in private school
test score achievement, illustrated in section 3.2.1, result from their different
funding structure. It can be seen from Figure 2 that private schools receive,
on average, more funding per student than public schools. This leads us to
question if it is the increased resources in this school sector that are leading to
improved student performance on NAPLAN, or if some other factor is driving
this difference, such as self-selection. We therefore estimate the effect of each
type of funding in the two sectors separately, so that we can see how production
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technologies may differ between the two school systems.
The preceding analysis also highlights that funding in schools is not ran-
domly assigned. Most specifically, it is possible that the levels of parent fees
charged, which vary significantly between schools, may be driven by demand
for attendance at that school based on their performance in previous periods.
The yearly publication of NAPLAN results on the My School website can be
thought of as a kind of indicator of quality, which parents use when choosing
a school for their child. The potential for reverse causality between funding
and test scores will be accounted for in our methodology, to ensure that we are
estimating the true causal effect of funding in schools.
3.2.3 Controlling for socio-economic status
We control for school background using the Index of Community Socio-Educational
Advantage (ICSEA), an indicator constructed by ACARA that measures a school’s
average socio-educational background.16 This measure was also used to control
for socio-educational advantage by Miller and Voon (2012) who found that this
indicator was the main determinant of NAPLAN score. We interpret the ICSEA
as a kind of propensity score for high educational attainment. Furthermore, as
discussed in the previous section, the amount of government funding received by
a school is largely determined by socio-economic status. The ICSEA is there-
fore correlated with the funding variables and must be included to control for
confounding bias. Other controls usual in the literature, such as parent educa-
tion, language background, and parent employment are included in the ICSEA
and thus are omitted from our specification.17 Our estimation method condi-
16See www.acara.edu.au for information on how this measure is constructed.
17While it would be better to use the original variables, our methodology employs an MCMC
process that behaves better with a smaller number of variables. A propensity score-type control
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tions on the school fixed effect, thus removing the need to control for any school
characteristics that do not vary over time, such as location.
4 Framework and methodology
4.1 Framework
We follow the traditional education production function approach.18 Let
Ait = f (Bit , Pit , Sit , Ii), (1)
where Ait measures the achievement of student i at time t, Bit measures student
i’s background, Pit is the effects of a student’s peers, Sit denotes school inputs,
and Ii student i’s innate abilities, which do not vary over time.
We aggregate this relationship to the school-level19 as this is the unit at which
funding is allocated and spent, giving us the following reduced-form model:
Āk jt = g(B̄k jt , S̄k jt , αk j), (2)
where Āk jt measures the average achievement of school k in state j in year t,
which is some function, g(·), of average student background, B̄k jt , school fund-
ing, S̄k jt , and a school fixed effect, αk j, that absorbs peer effects and the school’s
therefore is best in our situation.
18While the use of the production function approach can be disputed, as discussed in
Hanushek (1979), it must be recognised that the formulation of school policy relies on sys-
tematic data collection and evaluation. These forms of study thus retain high levels of policy
relevance for understanding the influence of various factors on schooling performance.
19Hanushek et al. (1996) have argued that well-specified linear models yield unbiased es-
timates for school resources when data are aggregated. In cases with the presence of omitted
variable bias, aggregation may upwards bias estimates. This is kept in mind when interpreting
our results. Jacob et al. (2014) have also shown that aggregate data are sufficient to address
many of these kinds of school policy evaluation questions.
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‘innate ability’ to produce good students. This may be determined by tangible
measures such as levels of capital or intangible measures such as ethos and or-
ganisation. Many production function-type studies place severe restrictions on
the production technology, g(·), namely that of uniform input effectiveness. By
implementing quantile regression analysis, we allow this assumption to remain
flexible so that the effectiveness of school inputs may vary across the score dis-
tribution, as well as between the public and private school sectors. This follows
Summers and Wolfe (1977), who find that the effects of school resources are
not fixed across students and schools. It must also be recognised that we cannot
assume that schools are behaving efficiently in their choice of g(·).20
In using this functional form, there are a number of further assumptions that
are usual in the literature.21 Firstly, we assume additive separability, so that the
effects of each input do not interact with each other. This is necessary so that
we can include separate variables for each source of funding into our specific-
ation.22 Many studies assume input assignment based on fixed characteristics,
requiring that funding is allocated in each period based on fixed characterist-
ics such as socio-economic background. Due to the formulaic funding model
largely based on socio-economic status, described in section 3.2.2, we believe
that this assumption is met, but we will allow for the possibility of lobbying for
increased funding by schools based on test scores. The possibility of lobbying
introduces a threat to identification, which we will address in section 4.4.
Most importantly, there remains a discussion in the literature regarding the
20Deller and Rudnicki (1993) identified production inefficiencies in elementary schools in
Maine.
21See Harris (2010) and Todd and Wolpin (2003) for discussions on the assumptions under-
lying education production function models.
22Further work needs to be done to understand the efficiency of each type of funding at the
school-budget level and how they may interact with each other, but is at present limited by data
availability.
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effects of previous period inputs in the current period. We assume total decay in
school input effects. This is plausible in our case as the nature of our data means
that we observe different cohorts of students each year. As recurrent funding
must be spent in the year it is provided, the money spent on teacher salaries or
operations in a grade 3 classroom in the preceding year will not affect students
in the current year. This contrasts with studies at the individual level that follow
the same students throughout a number of years.23 In our analysis, the time
dimension of the data serves instead to allow conditioning on the school fixed
effect, rather than providing a value-added or cumulative-type of specification.
This assumption does, however, mean that our results may not be generalisable
to other grades and must be interpreted only as the contemporaneous effect of
funding in a grade 3 classroom.
4.2 Econometric specification
Let Apk jt denote the average score in school k in state j at time t, where p = 0 if
school k is public and p = 1 if k is private.24 Note that we have dropped the bars
to signify that these are school-average scores for ease of notation. Following
equation (2), we consider the following specification:






k jtβ p +B
p′
k jtγp + u
p
k jt , (3)
23Many of these studies assume geometric decay of varying extents to estimate either cu-
mulative EPFs or value-added specifications. This is not necessary in our case, simplifying the
assumptions that must be made for estimation considerably.
24To assess whether pooling public and private schools together is more appropriate, we
have conducted F-tests for the significance of interaction terms with a private dummy and the
funding variables in the pooled model. These are reproduced in Appendix B. The tests rejected
the null hypothesis of non-significance. Therefore, the remainder of our analysis considers the
estimation of separate models for public and private schools and each state. This allows for
changes in production technology g(·), as detailed in the theoretical model.
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where α pk j is a school fixed effect, φ
p
jt denotes time-specific effects that control
for any shock that may have affected test scores in all schools in year t, and
Bpk jt the Index of Community Socio-Educational Advantage (ICSEA) to control
for a school’s proneness to achieving high (or low) test scores based on their
average student background. The upk jt represent idiosyncratic shocks. S
p
k jt is a
vector of the three funding variables of interest: federal funding, state funding
and parent fees. We are interested in identifying β p, to understand how funding
is impacting test scores in Australian primary schools, and compare how this
changes between public and private schools and across the distribution of scores.
As we are concerned with the impact of funding across the distribution of
schools’ test performance, we estimate quantile treatment effects (QTEs) for
each of the three types of funding. Specifically, following Powell (2014, 2015,
2016), we rewrite equation (3) to produce a quantile regression estimator for
panel data (QRPD) with non-additive fixed effects:















k jt ∼U (0,1) (5)
where Spk jt is the vector of funding treatment variables, and S
p′
k jtβ p(·) is strictly
increasing. U p∗k jt represents proneness for the outcome (high or low achieve-
ment), an unknown function, g(·), of the school fixed effect α pk j, the time fixed
effect φ jt p, and the control covariate Bpjkt , such that the disturbance term U
p
k jt
is uniformly distributed. This U p∗k jt behaves as an aggregate term that determ-
ines rank in the distribution of the latent outcome, determined by both observed
and unobserved factors. Since we observe each school in four time periods, we
learn a school’s proneness to high or low scores. This probability is allowed to
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vary across schools as well as within schools over time. Note that the QRPD
method allows us to choose which variables enter the quantile function, and
which are used to estimate the conditional probability. It therefore allows us
to interpret the estimates in the same way as we would cross-sectional quantile
estimates while conditioning on the fixed effects to aid identification.25 That is,
we are able to estimate unconditional quantiles, which are of greater relevance
for policy analysis.26
We define the τ th quantile of the score given the treatment S = s as:
QA(τ|S = s) = s′β p(τ), (6)
for some τ ∈ (0,1). The quantile treatment effects are given by the causal effect




25The majority of quantile estimation methods for panel data; for example, Koenker (2004),
Harding and Lamarche (2009), Lamarche (2010), Canay (2011), and Galvao Jr (2011), include
an additive term for fixed effects, altering the interpretation of the estimates, i.e., they must be
interpreted as conditional quantiles. These estimators would provide estimates of the distribu-












k jt . In other
words, schools that are at the top of the conditional score distribution given their unobserved
characteristics, may actually be at the bottom end of the unconditional score distribution.
26Firpo et al. (2009) provide an estimator for unconditional quantile regressions (replicated
in Baltagi and Ghosh (2017)) that cannot yet incorporate instrumental variables as required by
our analysis. Frolich and Melly (2013) provide an estimator for unconditional quantile treatment
effects under endogeneity; however, they consider only a binary treatment variable.
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E[1(Apk jt ≤ q(S
p
k jt ,τ))− τ ] = 0 (QRPD-GMM2)








k jt , S
p
k jt are the funding treatment
variables, τ is the τ-quantile of Ak jt , and q(·) is a strictly increasing function
of τ . QRPD-GMM1 is a within transformation that specifies that within school
variation in the instruments is used for identification.28 QRPD-GMM2 ensures
that the function q(·) behaves like a quantile function. The GMM estimator of
β p(τ) in equation (6) solves the minimisation problem:
min
b∈B



























k jt ≤ S
p′
k jtb) ≤ τ for all t
}
, b := β (τ), W (·)
is a weighting matrix, and N is the number of schools. The parameters are re-
stricted to B in order to ensure that Apk jt ≤ S
p′
k jtb holds for approximately 100τ%
of the observations in each time period. It is worth noting that the Powell (2016)
method yields consistent estimates for short T and large n, as is the case in
this study. This is in contrast to additive fixed effect and instrumental variable
27See Powell (2015, 2016) for the full assumptions and proofs for the model.
28Typical instrumental variable quantile regression, such as Chernozhukov and Hansen
(2006) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008), relies on a much stronger restriction that




k jt) = τ .
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quantile estimates from other more traditional methods. Our method for solv-
ing this optimisation problem is outlined in the following section 4.3. Issues
surrounding identification are then discussed in section 4.4.
4.3 Estimation
We implement simulation-based estimation via adaptive Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC).29 These methods estimate by sampling directly from the joint
parameter distribution, with the aim of simulating the distribution of interest by
constructing a Markov chain with the same stationary limiting distribution. This
type of estimation avoids optimisation, which can pose a problem when dealing
with difficult densities in cases such as ours.30 Powell (2015) has shown that
MCMC methods work well in multivariate applications of QRPD.31
Specifically, we implement a Metropolis-Hastings type algorithm, a variation
on adaptive MCMC with vanishing adaptation32 that uses an accept/reject rule
where each draw is retained with a certain probability33 to ‘correct’ an arbitrary
Markov chain. If this acceptance rate of draws is too low the algorithm will
get stuck in a certain region of the parameter range, whereas if it is too high
the algorithm will not reach the tails of the distribution. Following Roberts et al.
(1997) and Roberts and Rosenthal (2001), we initially targeted mean acceptance
rates between 0.44 and 0.234. We ultimately report results from estimations with
29See Roberts and Rosenthal (2009) for examples, and Baker (2014) for a discussion of
adaptive MCMC routines in Stata.
30MCMC methods have many applications to traditional statistical inference problems usu-
ally estimated by maximum likelihood or GMM procedures, see Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003) for a discussion.
31See Stata module at Baker (2016).
32An example of this algorithm is reproduced in Appendix D.
33See Step 5 in Appendix D.
71
4 FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
a targeted acceptance rate of 0.4534 with 2000 draws35 and a burn-in period of
100 for each estimation run. This relatively high acceptance rate was chosen as
it is particularly difficult to traverse the support of the distribution well in our
case.36 Furthermore, as the distributions are significantly heavy-tailed, we also
take logarithms of all variables with the aim of improving the mixing properties
of the algorithm.37 The point estimates are calculated by averaging the draws
from this process38 and the standard errors are derived from the variance of these
draws and clustered by school.
4.4 Identification strategy
As discussed in section 3.2.2, a significant threat to identification of β p rests
with possible endogeneity between levels of funding and test scores achieved
in previous periods. This comes from the administrative nature of our data,
which means that funding has not been randomly assigned to schools but is in-
stead determined endogenously within the system. More precisely, funding is
determined by the socio-economic status of the school (the ICSEA) and by the
level of funding received in the previous period. Furthermore, especially in the
case of parent fees, we argue that levels of funding are determined partly by test
scores in the previous period. As a result of this reverse causality between fund-
34The achieved acceptance rates lie between 0.414 and 0.483, with an average of 0.445.
35Implementing more than 2000 draws caused difficulties in deriving standard errors.
36As discussed in Jarner and Roberts (2007), Metropolis-type algorithms can perform poorly
if local moves find it difficult to move between modes or reach significantly into the tails of the
distribution. This is the reasoning behind our choice of acceptance rate, as lower acceptance
rates such as 0.25 cause the algorithm to become stuck in the wrong area of the parameter space.
37This follows Mengersen and Tweedie (1996), who find that random-walk Metropolis al-
gorithms for a density π are geometrically ergodic iff π has exponential or sub-exponential tails.
Taking logs will ensure this condition. Taking logarithms of the funding and score variables also
give useful scaling properties.
38As autocorrelation is a property of MCMC algorithms we retain only one in every three
draws to calculate this mean.
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ing and scores, the upk jt in equation (3) may not be i.i.d. and uncorrelated with




k jt ] 6= 0, thus potentially making the quantile
estimates inconsistent.
We identify the causal effect by taking a limited-information structural mod-
elling approach, where levels of funding in the current period are implicitly
determined by funding in the previous periods through the use of instrumental
variables.39 There is little doubt that the lagged levels of funding are correlated
with funding in the current period, as illustrated by Table C1 in Appendix C.
It can be seen that, in most cases, lagged funding are not weak instruments.40
The problem, however, is whether they are valid instruments. Due to data limit-
ations regarding the dimension of time, we can only use one lag of each funding
variable as an instrument. This results in a just-identified model, preventing us
from testing the exclusion restriction to check instrument validity. However, as
considered by our assumption of total decay in section 4.1, the money spent in
a grade 3 classroom in the preceding year will have no impact upon the scores
of the grade 3 students in the current year. While spending on capital is unlikely
to depreciate between cohorts, recall that we focus on recurrent funding that is
spent on daily operations each year. We can therefore conclude that the lagged
funding variables are likely not correlated with upk jt , and this assumption is in
fact the identifying assumption of the model. To further document this identi-
fication strategy, we estimate the QRPD model with no control of endogeneity
(no IVs used), and then recover the fitted residuals. See Appendix C for cor-
relations between these predicted residuals and the demeaned lagged funding
39Note that the QRPD estimator avoids the usual problems involved with using lagged vari-
ables alongside a fixed effects term, as we condition on the fixed effect instead of actually
estimating it.
402SLS estimates using the lags as instruments are reproduced in Appendix C for interest.
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variables at the 0.1 and 0.9 quantile. These highlight that the lagged levels of
funding are good instrumental variable candidates across the entire distribution
of the support, not just at the mean. Scatterplots shown for Victoria, as an ex-
emplar, evidence that there is no systematic correlation between the predicted
residuals and the candidate instruments. Note that we test for correlation with
the demeaned lags of funding to match the first-order conditions given in Powell
(2016).
5 Results
We look at the relationship between school average NAPLAN test scores and
state funding, federal funding, and parent fees, respectively in section 5.2, sec-
tion 5.3, and section 5.4. In order to keep the results concise, we only present
the estimates for the 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9 quantiles in the tables. We
show that there is a complex and changing relationship between funding and
test scores, depending on state, sector, and provenance of funding. Moreover,
our results illustrate that any attempt to isolate the effect of school funding must
take into account heterogeneity of impacts across the test score distribution.
5.1 A note on coefficient interpretation
The reader will notice that many coefficients are negative, which seems counter-
intuitive as funding is unlikely to have a negative impact on test scores. We have
interpreted these coefficients as indicating a problem with the levels of fund-
ing, which we have termed ’inefficient’ referring to allocative inefficiency. We
expect that the marginal effect of a dollar is non-linear across the test score dis-
tribution, and it is also true that it may be non-linear depending on the level of
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funding received. For example, it may be more allocatively efficient, on average,
for an extra dollar in a high performing school to be given to a low-performing
school instead. There is likely a point at which the marginal utility of an extra
dollar is negligible, and we believe this may be driving negative coefficients.
The opposite is of course also possible, that low-performing schools are receiv-
ing levels of funding that are too low to have a beneficial impact, and this could
explain negative coefficients for these schools.
It will also be noted by the reader that many of the results exhibit reversals
in sign and magnitude across the test score distribution. This is to be expected
given the hypothesis above that the marginal effect will change over levels of
funding. This is also why funding appears to have little effect on average, as
the effects cancel each other out. It may be the case, for example, that the
level of funding provided to a school is not the optimal amount for a given
level of achievement, but is for another given level of achievement. It is likely
that funding levels or policies may better target higher-achieving students than
lower-achievers, or vice versa, and that this will also change depending on a
state’s institutional factors.
5.2 State funding
Table 2 and Table 3 present the estimates for state funding on reading and nu-
meracy NAPLAN scores. It can be seen that state government funding is, for the
most part, positively impacting NAPLAN scores, but with considerable hetero-
geneity between states and school type. This positive relationship is particularly
strong in the case of Victorian public schools, where state funding has a pos-
itive and significant impact on scores from the 0.25 quantile and above, with a
large coefficient of 1.182 on the 0.9 quantile for numeracy. Interestingly, this is
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a result that was missed by the simple 2SLS results in Table C6 in Appendix C,
which indicate an insignificant relationship between state funding and NAPLAN
scores for numeracy. Once heterogeneity in impacts across the distribution have
been taken into account, however, we can see that there is indeed a strong posit-
ive relationship between state funding and test scores in many Victorian public
schools, which a traditional mean-focused approach missed.
Conversely, we largely see a negative relationship between state funding and
test scores in public schools in New South Wales, except at the 0.1 quantile for
reading and the 0.9 quantile for numeracy. As noted in section 4.1, these negat-
ive coefficients are especially problematic given that these types of estimations
at the aggregate level are most likely to have positively biased estimates. The
negative coefficients would indicate that state government funding may not be
working efficiently to improve basic skills in New South Wales. This finding
is particularly interesting given the context that public school students in New
South Wales are, on average, performing worse than those in Victoria, as we saw
previously in the summary statistics in Table 1. Indeed, Victorian public school
students are even performing better in numeracy than private school students in
both South Australia and Queensland, despite the fact that Victoria is the state
where the largest proportion of families choose private education.
The major difference between these two states in their budget allocation
mechanisms is that New South Wales allocates funding and implements school
policy with a traditional top-down approach,41 whereas Victorian principals
have a significant amount of power to allocate their budgets within school as
they see fit. Cobb-Clark and Jha (2013) have shown that this allocative power
41Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory follow the same system and have
not been studied here.
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improves efficiency of spending in Victorian public schools. It is therefore ar-
guable that a top-down approach to funding is less successful than one founded
in the tenets of federalism, where decision-making regarding spending is made
most successfully at as local a level as possible.
Interestingly, however, the top-down approach of the New South Wales gov-
ernment has potentially played a role in helping the private system thrive. Our
results show that private schools in New South Wales receive a significant pos-
itive benefit from their state government funding, again especially at the higher
quantiles with a coefficient of 1.151 at the 0.75 and 1.216 for the 0.9 quantile
for reading, and 1.666 for numeracy at the 0.9 quantile. This means that at
the higher quantiles, a 1% increase of state government funding approximately
translates to a 1% increase in NAPLAN score. This is not a small impact consid-
ering that these are already high-performing schools achieving NAPLAN scores
at the 90th quantile. It must also be noted that this seems to be at the expense
of public schools in New South Wales, which in contrast exhibit largely neg-
ative coefficients for state funding. Despite the relatively similar performance
between private schools in New South Wales and Victoria, on average, we do
not see a similar trend in Victorian private schools, with the coefficients on state
funding either insignificant or negative, except at the 0.75 quantile for numeracy.
The positive impact of state funding on NAPLAN test scores largely contin-
ues in schools in Queensland and South Australia. In Queensland, we see some
small positive effects generally around the median for both public and private
schools,42 and in South Australia we also see some positive effects. These two
42It must be noted that, unlike other states in Australia, Queensland lagged in developing
a significant education system until the 1960s (Collins et al., 2011) and the socio-economic




states have funding policies based on standard and needs-based components,
similar to Victoria, and as a result are behaving in a similar fashion.
Table 2: Quantile Estimates for State Funding (Reading)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia 0.261* −0.067 0.082 −0.094 0.127***
(0.137) (0.054 ) (0.056 ) (0.138 ) (0.015 )
New South Wales 0.189*** −0.114*** −0.117 −0.039** −0.335***
(0.037) (0.008 ) (0.090 ) (0.016 ) (0.013 )
Victoria 0.172 0.662*** 0.484** 0.502*** 0.553***
(0.134) (0.156 ) (0.203 ) (0.067 ) (0.154 )
Queensland 0.151 −0.050** 0.278*** 0.251** 0.009
(0.135) (0.020 ) (0.050 ) (0.101 ) (0.011 )
Private schools
South Australia 0.409 0.466*** 0.951*** −0.211*** 0.052***
(0.262) (0.056 ) (0.006 ) (0.029 ) (0.001 )
New South Wales 0.111*** 0.123*** 0.004 1.151*** 1.216***
(0.042) (0.038 ) (0.181 ) (0.066 ) (0.000 )
Victoria 0.107 0.449 0.323 −0.012 −0.037***
(0.177) (0.546 ) (0.406 ) (0.010 ) (0.001 )
Queensland -0.037*** 0.117* 0.035*** 0.175*** −0.151
(0.006) (0.061 ) (0.003 ) (0.054 ) (0.272 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Quantile Estimates for State Funding (Numeracy)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia -0.268 −0.095 0.819** 0.002 −0.001
(0.244) (0.077 ) (0.405 ) (0.008 ) (0.003 )
New South Wales 0.033 0.023 −0.041 −0.236*** 0.407***
(0.087) (0.064 ) (0.031 ) (0.003 ) (0.010 )
Victoria 0.115 0.527** 0.384*** 0.759*** 1.182***
(0.240) (0.235 ) (0.145 ) (0.107 ) (0.298 )
Queensland 0.026 0.695*** 0.658* 0.008 0.291
(0.045) (0.239 ) (0.349 ) (0.055 ) (0.208 )
Private schools
South Australia 0.334*** 0.017 0.947*** 0.409*** 0.039
(0.048) (0.150 ) (0.002 ) (0.002 ) (0.026 )
New South Wales -0.081 0.469 −0.061 0.553*** 1.666***
(0.056) (0.706 ) (0.084 ) (0.125 ) (0.094 )
Victoria -0.214 0.066 −0.107*** 0.179*** −0.281***
(0.363) (0.099 ) (0.003 ) (0.021 ) (0.041 )
Queensland -0.229*** 0.032*** 0.612*** −0.509* −0.772***
(0.059) (0.012 ) (0.037 ) (0.290 ) (0.009 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.




Contrary to the results for state funding, Table 4 and Table 5 show largely neg-
ative estimated coefficients for the impact of federal funding on NAPLAN test
scores in both reading and numeracy. The effect of federal government funding
on school-average NAPLAN test scores is unambiguous, and illustrates the lim-
its of centralised funding allocations, casting doubt on the efficiency of federal
policy in supporting schools to improve their performance.
Successive Australian governments have pledged not to decrease funding to
any school, making it unlikely that an increase in test scores could be related
to decreased levels of funding. Negative coefficients would therefore indicate
an inefficiency in spending and illustrate the limits of the federal government to
centrally allocate money to schools successfully. A possible reason for such a
result could reside in the nature of the funding itself, as the spending of federal
money follows strict guidelines and offers little to no flexibility regarding its al-
location. Over the time period studied, federal funds were given to schools in the
form of National Schools Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs),43 which are grants
made to the states bearing conditions on how they are spent. In other words, fed-
eral funding may be spent on resources such as computing facilities,44 but this
has very little to do with students’ performance in NAPLAN tests (although be-
neficial in other ways). In contrast, state funding is spent on daily operational
needs, as schools require, and can perhaps more directly impact NAPLAN test
scores.
Particularly, as federal government funding is mostly allocated to private
schools, we would expect to see the strongest positive relationship between fed-
43See National Commission of Audit (2014).
44See Gonski et al. (2011) for details on specific SPPs.
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eral funding and test scores in these schools. We, however, see the counterintu-
itive result that there is a negative relationship between federal funding and test
scores, especially in private schools in New South Wales where we can see an
estimated coefficient of -1.317 at the 0.9 quantile for numeracy. This result is
particularly interesting given that the estimates for state funding in these schools
show a strong positive relationship. As federal government funding is a kind of
‘top-up’ funding, it is possible that state policy in New South Wales is in fact
favouring private schools, and funding received from the federal government
therefore has little role to play here.45 Moreover, the only notable cases of pos-
itive coefficients for federal funding are at the higher quantiles for both reading
and numeracy in public schools in New South Wales. As we saw previously,
these schools are generally performing more poorly than public schools in Vic-
toria and we saw negative coefficients for the estimated impact of state funding
in these schools. Potentially, funding from the federal government is making up
for the shortcomings of New South Wales state government funding in public
schools. However, while this remains speculation, what is clear is that federal
government funding generally has a minimal impact on its own, and largely acts
as a ‘top up’ kind of spending that is perhaps only helpful if state government
funding is not already at a high enough level.
45In fact, if we look at the levels of funding provided to public schools in New South Wales,
they are receiving significantly more funding from the state government than Victorian schools.
The median for state government funding in a Victorian public school is only $1240 per student,
compared to $2030 per student in New South Wales.
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Table 4: Quantile Estimates for Federal Funding (Reading)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia -0.232** 0.068 −0.055*** 0.032 −0.038***
(0.090) (0.065 ) (0.020 ) (0.037 ) (0.015 )
New South Wales 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.072** 0.012 0.515***
(0.022) (0.006 ) (0.031 ) (0.009 ) (0.019 )
Victoria -0.272** −0.600*** −0.405*** −0.439*** −0.402***
(0.130) (0.124 ) (0.150 ) (0.032 ) (0.118 )
Queensland 0.177 −0.134 −0.218*** −0.100 −0.176***
(0.182) (0.095 ) (0.066 ) (0.077 ) (0.032 )
Private schools
South Australia -0.284* −0.634*** −0.773*** 0.213*** −0.166***
(0.151) (0.067 ) (0.003 ) (0.025 ) (0.043 )
New South Wales -0.092*** −0.350** −0.544** −1.017*** −0.655***
(0.011) (0.138 ) (0.236 ) (0.063 ) (0.000 )
Victoria -0.098 −0.373 −1.545 0.013 −0.153***
(0.105) (0.448 ) (1.001 ) (0.016 ) (0.018 )
Queensland 0.090 −0.094*** −0.084*** −0.130*** −0.504
(0.063) (0.011 ) (0.002 ) (0.035 ) (0.606 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5: Quantile Estimates for Federal Funding (Numeracy)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia 0.313 0.052 −0.622** 0.000 0.036***
(0.439) (0.051 ) (0.255 ) (0.010 ) (0.002 )
New South Wales -0.154** −0.026 −0.012 0.129*** 0.074***
(0.077) (0.016 ) (0.029 ) (0.002 ) (0.007 )
Victoria -0.163 −0.416*** −0.413*** −0.589*** −1.332***
(0.100) (0.136 ) (0.087 ) (0.098 ) (0.347 )
Queensland -0.277** 0.002 −0.481* −0.003 −0.135
(0.109) (0.158 ) (0.268 ) (0.174 ) (0.194 )
Private schools
South Australia -0.360*** −0.297 −0.827*** −0.678*** −0.279***
(0.056) (0.215 ) (0.001 ) (0.004 ) (0.088 )
New South Wales -0.465*** −0.391 −0.305** −0.426*** −1.317***
(0.124) (0.428 ) (0.154 ) (0.085 ) (0.069 )
Victoria 0.126 −0.353** 0.032*** −0.446*** −0.110***
(0.225) (0.147 ) (0.003 ) (0.021 ) (0.030 )
Queensland -0.530*** −0.129*** −0.315*** −0.369* −1.050***
(0.040) (0.022 ) (0.027 ) (0.201 ) (0.043 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.




The results for parent fees are presented in Table 6 and Table 7. The main goal
of looking at the results for parent fees is to find whether it is the higher parent
fees in private schools that are driving their improved performance in NAPLAN
testing. The results would indicate that there is generally not much difference in
magnitude for the impact of parent fees between public and private schools. For
example, at the 0.9 quantile, the coefficient for a private school in Queensland
is 0.057 compared to 0.087 in a public school for numeracy. In fact, in some
cases the coefficient for parent fees is in fact negative at the 0.9 quantile.46 It is
therefore not the case that extremely high levels of parent fees are always going
to improve NAPLAN scores, in any type of school.
Nevertheless, there are cases where parent fees are having a positive impact.
If we look at the two more poorly-performing states in our sample, South Aus-
tralia and Queensland, these states are, for the most part, receiving a benefit
from parent fees in both the public and private sectors. Overall it is clear that
parent fees, although a very small fraction of the public schools’ total funding,
can play a key role in helping schools improve their NAPLAN test outcomes.
This may be due to the school’s ability to allocate funding where it is needed
most, since there is no restriction as to how parent fees should be spent.47 In
some other cases, such as in private schools, the income received by parent fees
may be bringing their budgets to a level similar to that of public schools, as
shown in Figure 2. In that case, the majority of parent fees are likely to be spent
on ordinary expenses aimed at schools’ daily operations. As noted by Williams
46For example, both private and public schools in Victoria for both reading and numeracy.
47Schools are able to charge parent fees for “any specific purpose identified by the school”
(see Victorian Department of Education and Training (2015)).
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(1985), private schools do indeed mostly direct extra funding towards teacher
salaries. For others, who charge significantly higher fees, it could just be that
funding is directed towards extra-curricular activities, and not directly related
with student performance in NAPLAN tests.
It is arguable that this is what is driving the successful appearance of private
schools, as they have more power over their own operation and spending.48 This
conclusion is strengthened by the result we found for state funding in Victorian
public schools, where principals have power over budget allocations. In these
schools, parent fees do not have a significant positive impact, potentially as state
government funding is already supporting their improvement.
48This interpretation links with the proposition of Coelli et al. (2018) that the rigid policy
setting of schools may possibly be preventing school principals from changing their behaviours
when faced with poor NAPLAN results.
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Table 6: Quantile Estimates for Parent Fees (Reading)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia 0.155*** 0.090*** 0.124*** 0.096* 0.010***
(0.057) (0.012 ) (0.043 ) (0.054 ) (0.001 )
New South Wales 0.008 0.052*** −0.038* 0.034*** 0.156***
(0.022) (0.009 ) (0.021 ) (0.010 ) (0.004 )
Victoria 0.036 0.019 −0.054*** −0.011 −0.228***
(0.023) (0.023 ) (0.015 ) (0.023 ) (0.072 )
Queensland 0.085* 0.007 0.040*** 0.006 −0.042***
(0.045) (0.005 ) (0.008 ) (0.013 ) (0.009 )
Private schools
South Australia 0.238* 0.138*** 0.556*** 0.159*** 0.053***
(0.143) (0.015 ) (0.003 ) (0.017 ) (0.007 )
New South Wales 0.104*** 0.017 0.033 0.812*** 0.416***
(0.011) (0.023 ) (0.035 ) (0.034 ) (0.000 )
Victoria 0.168** 0.472 0.009 0.053** −0.046***
(0.078) (0.502 ) (0.131 ) (0.021 ) (0.005 )
Queensland 0.030*** 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.219*** −0.029
(0.004) (0.003 ) (0.001 ) (0.063 ) (0.059 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7: Quantile Estimates for Parent Fees (Numeracy)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia -0.034 0.110*** 0.307*** 0.019*** 0.003***
(0.156) (0.020 ) (0.082 ) (0.003 ) (0.000 )
New South Wales -0.005 0.031 0.012 0.022*** −0.151***
(0.023) (0.019 ) (0.028 ) (0.001 ) (0.006 )
Victoria 0.037 −0.066* −0.072** 0.054 −0.199***
(0.056) (0.037 ) (0.036 ) (0.038 ) (0.052 )
Queensland 0.002 0.072* 0.257* 0.010*** 0.087*
(0.016) (0.041 ) (0.137 ) (0.002 ) (0.048 )
Private schools
South Australia 0.198*** −0.047* 0.503*** 0.025*** 0.023**
(0.020) (0.028 ) (0.001 ) (0.000 ) (0.011 )
New South Wales -0.135* 0.320 0.082** 0.492*** 1.516***
(0.080) (0.279 ) (0.039 ) (0.095 ) (0.082 )
Victoria -0.005 −0.009 −0.009*** 0.090*** −0.192***
(0.169) (0.058 ) (0.001 ) (0.018 ) (0.026 )
Queensland -0.051*** 0.056*** 0.318*** 0.181** 0.057***
(0.006) (0.007 ) (0.007 ) (0.092 ) (0.002 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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6 Discussion and concluding remarks
Overall, we see that the relationship between funding and test scores varies
between states, sectors, and funding types, as well as over the test score dis-
tribution, highlighting the level of complexity required when designing school
funding policy in Australia. Most importantly for policy, we find that it is not
always how much money a school is given, but how that money is allocated
and spent within a school. Interestingly, Victorian public schools seem to be
the success story of this case study, yet overall these schools receive less money
on average than any other of the states and sectors in our sample. Indeed, in
the context of federalism, the three sources of funding studied, federal funding,
state funding, and parent fees line up to three levels of decision-making - na-
tional, state and school - respectively. The results of this study highlight the
limits of centralised funding allocations, and in terms of policy would recom-
mend a renewed emphasis on federalism in Australia when designing education
funding policy. It is clear that there is substitutability between funding types
when another source is not providing enough, meaning that money provided
from one source, i.e., the federal government, may in fact be preventing money
from a more allocatively-efficient source, i.e., the state government, being given
to a school instead. This study would support the findings of unimpressive res-
ults from increased Commonwealth encroachment on education funding in the
Global Financial Crisis period, and in conjunction with the needs identified by
the 2011 Review of Funding for Schooling, make a clear case for the reform of
federalism as it pertains to education policy in Australia.
Of course, it must be kept in mind that not all schools have the ability to
charge high levels of parent fees, and that there are numerous other practical
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factors restricting school funding policy. It must also be remembered that these
results hold firstly only for grade 3 classrooms, and secondly only for the out-
come of NAPLAN scores, as school funding has other important functions in
providing other important services to schools. However, the future focus of this
policy debate needs to be on the level at which budget decisions are made. We
would argue that the school-level is the best place for budget allocation to be
determined, and that there should be less restrictions on how schools spend their
budgets as they know best how to allocate funds to improve the performance
of their own students. Further studies therefore need to develop a better un-
derstanding of how money is actually spent within schools, and how efficiently
schools themselves spend their funds.
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A Detailed funding summary statistics
Table A1: South Australia
N Mean S.D. Median Min Max
Public schools
Federal 1248 1.82 0.63 1.70 0.96 6.93
State 1248 9.39 2.29 8.87 5.88 24.02
Parent fees 1248 0.36 0.14 0.33 0.00 1.17
Private schools
Federal 300 5.52 1.32 5.60 2.63 9.79
State 300 1.62 0.48 1.53 0.91 3.56
Parent fees 300 4.62 4.40 2.69 0.61 17.95
Table A2: New South Wales
N Mean S.D. Median Min Max
Public schools
Federal 5164 1.67 0.68 1.42 0.98 9.26
State 5164 8.60 2.79 7.89 3.21 85.64
Parent fees 5164 0.44 0.34 0.37 0.07 14.74
Private schools
Federal 816 5.01 1.72 5.41 1.18 9.65
State 816 1.96 0.55 2.03 0.05 3.74
Parent fees 816 7.56 6.28 4.87 0.00 27.20
Table A3: Victoria
N Mean S.D. Median Min Max
Public schools
Federal 3600 1.55 0.55 1.41 0.48 9.18
State 3600 7.30 1.66 6.86 4.47 23.78
Parent fees 3600 0.40 0.21 0.36 0.01 1.87
Private schools
Federal 536 4.99 1.66 5.29 1.44 10.50
State 536 1.51 0.89 1.24 0.43 5.17
Parent fees 536 8.79 6.71 5.89 0.49 24.91
Table A4: Queensland
N Mean S.D. Median Min Max
Public schools
Federal 2692 1.58 0.30 1.54 1.07 2.94
State 2692 8.91 2.80 8.23 5.41 58.44
Parent fees 2692 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.00 1.28
Private schools
Federal 508 5.61 1.53 5.55 1.61 16.39
State 508 1.89 0.42 1.81 0.37 4.97
Parent fees 508 5.62 3.48 4.83 0.03 18.00
Note: Variables are expressed in thousands of dollars per student.
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B OLS model and tests on the pooled model (public and private
estimated jointly)
Table B1: Estimates for joint pooled OLS models
(1) (2)
NAPLAN reading score NAPLAN math score
Funding
Federal funding -7.064*** −2.128
(1.401) (1.351 )
State funding -14.330*** −15.607***
(1.861) (1.891 )
Parent fees 7.547*** 6.951***
(0.557) (0.532 )
Private schooling dummy and interactions
=1 if Private -15.518 −42.236
(45.330) (48.094 )
Federal funding -6.417* −7.594*
(3.642) (4.269 )
State funding 10.139*** 13.283***
(3.225) (3.327 )






* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: The logarithm has been taken of all continuous variables. Year dummies were included in each
specification. Standard errors in parentheses.
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C Instrument tests
Table C1: Correlation coefficients between each funding variable
and its own lag
Federal funding State funding Parent fees
Public schools
SA 0.7520 0.9073 0.7762
NSW 0.6215 0.9187 0.8618
VIC 0.6114 0.8679 0.8273
QLD 0.3891 0.9331 0.5264
Private schools
SA 0.9812 0.9134 0.9866
NSW 0.9810 0.8424 0.9908
VIC 0.9896 0.9654 0.9948
QLD 0.9792 0.7794 0.9843
Note: All coefficients are greater than 0.75 except for federal funding and parent fees
in public schools in Queensland.
Table C2: 2SLS estimates for South Australia (Grade 3)
Public schools Private schools
Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
Federal funding 0.028 0.144*** 0.008 −0.063
(0.043) (0.050 ) (0.051 ) (0.045 )
State funding -0.035 −0.178*** −0.003 0.039
(0.050) (0.058 ) (0.042 ) (0.035 )
Parent fees 0.040** 0.031** 0.017 0.007
(0.017) (0.016 ) (0.012 ) (0.010 )
N 935 935 225 225
min. Eigenvalue 28.715 28.715 99.832 99.832
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C3: 2SLS estimates for South Australia (Grade 5)
Public schools Private schools
Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
Federal funding 0.006 0.081*** −0.020 −0.046*
(0.027) (0.025 ) (0.029 ) (0.028 )
State funding -0.023 −0.096*** −0.081*** −0.015
(0.030) (0.028 ) (0.024 ) (0.020 )
Parent fees 0.043*** 0.038*** 0.013** 0.018***
(0.014) (0.013 ) (0.006 ) (0.006 )
N 971 971 234 234
min. Eigenvalue 36.098 36.098 74.712 94.712
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table C4: 2SLS estimates for New South Wales (Grade 3)
Public schools Private schools
Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
Federal funding -0.062*** −0.015 −0.030** −0.023
(0.011) (0.011 ) (0.014 ) (0.015 )
State funding 0.001 −0.030** −0.002 −0.025
(0.013) (0.012 ) (0.016 ) (0.018 )
Parent fees 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.024** 0.014*
(0.006) (0.005 ) (0.010 ) (0.008 )
N 3879 3879 611 611
min. Eigenvalue 259.885 259.885 196.240 196.240
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table C5: 2SLS estimates for New South Wales (Grade 5)
Public schools Private schools
Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
Federal funding -0.020** 0.029*** −0.027** −0.047***
(0.009) (0.009 ) (0.013 ) (0.014 )
State funding -0.009 −0.056*** −0.012 −0.018
(0.010) (0.010 ) (0.016 ) (0.015 )
Parent fees 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.018** 0.001
(0.004) (0.004 ) (0.008 ) (0.007 )
N 3882 3882 653 653
min. Eigenvalue 236.324 236.324 197.108 197.108
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C6: 2SLS estimates for Victoria (Grade 3)
Public schools Private schools
Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
Federal funding -0.300 0.488 0.007 0.015
(0.301) (0.466 ) (0.019 ) (0.022 )
State funding 0.348 −0.630 −0.057*** −0.066***
(0.377) (0.584 ) (0.020 ) (0.021 )
Parent fees 0.014** 0.003 0.003 −0.010
(0.007) (0.011 ) (0.012 ) (0.015 )
N 2709 2709 402 402
min. Eigenvalue 0.945 0.945 194.779 194.779
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table C7: 2SLS estimates for Victoria (Grade 5)
Public schools Private schools
Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
Federal funding -0.376 0.561 0.011 0.004
(0.362) (0.544 ) (0.013 ) (0.015 )
State funding 0.458 −0.713 −0.065*** −0.051***
(0.451) (0.675 ) (0.013 ) (0.014 )
Parent fees 0.013* 0.006 −0.013* −0.016*
(0.007) (0.011 ) (0.007 ) (0.008 )
N 2745 2745 411 411
min. Eigenvalue 0.809 0.809 185.417 185.417
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table C8: 2SLS estimates for Queensland (Grade 3)
Public schools Private schools
Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
Federal funding 0.008 −0.102** −0.062** −0.028
(0.052) (0.052 ) (0.029 ) (0.026 )
State funding -0.012 0.004 0.126* 0.069
(0.013) (0.012 ) (0.073 ) (0.051 )
Parent fees 0.006 0.011* −0.001 0.006
(0.005) (0.006 ) (0.016 ) (0.014 )
N 1994 1994 381 381
min. Eigenvalue 39.035 39.035 73.300 73.300
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C9: 2SLS estimates for Queensland (Grade 5)
Public schools Private schools
Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
Federal funding -0.052 −0.063* −0.035*** −0.028**
(0.038) (0.035 ) (0.009 ) (0.014 )
State funding 0.005 −0.001 0.022 0.015
(0.010) (0.009 ) (0.025 ) (0.031 )
Parent fees -0.002 0.000 0.013* 0.015*
(0.004) (0.004 ) (0.008 ) (0.008 )
N 2022 2022 384 384
min. Eigenvalue 34.721 34.721 256.912 256.912
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure C1: Correlation between predicted residuals and demeaned lagged
federal funding. Residuals predicted for the quantile regression on year 3 reading
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Figure C2: Correlation between predicted residuals and demeaned lagged state
funding. Residuals predicted for the quantile regression on year 3 reading scores.
Scatter plots shown for Victoria in the year 2012.
Table C10: Correlation coefficients between predicted residuals and the demeaned
lagged funding variables for year 2012
0.1 quantile 0.9 quantile
Federal State Parent fees Federal State Parent fees
Public schools
SA 0.0928 0.0313 0.0594 0.0391 0.0621 −0.0994
NSW −0.0524 0.0289 0.0347 0.0188 −0.0203 0.0058
VIC 0.0900 −0.0256 0.0350 −0.0641 0.0426 0.1423
QLD −0.0555 −0.0432 0.0018 0.0297 0.0386 −0.0631
Private schools
SA −0.1360 −0.0004 0.1561 −0.0190 0.0524 0.1584
NSW 0.0749 −0.0365 −0.0666 0.0061 −0.2056 −0.1346
VIC 0.0975 0.1899 0.1247 0.1548 −0.0837 0.0550
QLD 0.0037 −0.2450 −0.3094 0.0460 −0.2839 0.1568


















-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Lagged parent fees
















-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Lagged parent fees
















-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Lagged parent fees
















-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Lagged parent fees
(d) Private schools at 0.9 quantile
Figure C3: Correlation between predicted residuals and demeaned lagged parent
fees. Residuals predicted for the quantile regression on year 3 reading scores.
Scatter plots shown for Victoria in the year 2012.
Table C11: Correlation coefficients between predicted residuals and the demeaned
lagged funding variables for year 2011
0.1 quantile 0.9 quantile
Federal State Parent fees Federal State Parent fees
Public schools
SA −0.0178 0.0058 0.1944 0.1385 0.0287 −0.1125
NSW 0.0597 −0.0907 0.0425 0.0736 −0.0533 0.0373
VIC −0.0556 0.0522 −0.0220 0.0816 0.0479 0.0110
QLD −0.0185 0.0993 0.1207 0.0209 −0.0286 −0.0030
Private schools
SA −0.3029 0.2484 −0.0663 −0.3525 0.2388 −0.1138
NSW 0.0923 0.0873 0.0001 0.1255 0.0745 −0.0039
VIC −0.0276 −0.1486 0.1193 0.0072 0.1813 0.1098
QLD −0.3424 −0.0165 −0.1602 0.1798 −0.1026 −0.4732
Note: Residuals predicted for the quantile regression on year 3 reading scores.
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Table C12: Correlation coefficients between predicted residuals and the demeaned
lagged funding variables for year 2010
0.1 quantile 0.9 quantile
Federal State Parent fees Federal State Parent fees
Public schools
SA 0.0831 0.0727 0.1536 0.2786 0.1121 0.0353
NSW −0.1687 0.0521 −0.0766 0.0750 −0.0522 −0.0342
VIC −0.0409 −0.0059 −0.0530 0.0884 −0.0010 −0.0425
QLD 0.0332 0.0650 −0.0327 −0.0580 0.0998 −0.0308
Private schools
SA 0.1501 −0.1498 −0.1468 0.0281 0.0514 −0.0887
NSW −0.0303 0.0187 −0.0609 −0.0221 0.0294 −0.0371
VIC 0.0522 −0.1325 −0.1257 −0.0193 0.0086 −0.0901
QLD 0.0180 0.2047 0.3192 −0.1113 0.3080 0.0011
Note: Residuals predicted for the quantile regression on year 3 reading scores.
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D Adaptive MCMC with vanishing adaptation
Table D1: Overview of an adaptive Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a multivariate
normal proposal and vanishing adaptation
Adaptive MCMC algorithm with normal proposal and vanishing adaptation
1: Set starting values X0, µ0,Σ0,λ0,α∗,δ (δ > 0), and draws T .
2: Set t = 0 and repeat steps 3-10 while t ≤ T :
3: Draw a candidate Yt ∼MV N(Xt ,λtΣt).






5: Set Xt+1 = Yt with probability α(Yt ,Xt),
Xt+1 = Xt with probability 1−α(Yt ,Xt).
6: Compute weighting parameter γt = 11+tδ .
7: Update λt+1 = exp[γt(α(Yt ,Xt)−α∗)]λt .
8: Update µt+1 = µt + γt(Xt+1−µt)
9: Update Σt+1 = Σt + γt [(Xt+1−µt)(Xt+1−µt)′−Σt ]
10: Increment t.
Output: the sequence {Xt}Tt=1
Source: Reproduced from Baker (2014).
Note: In step one, the algorithm starts with initial value, X0, an initial variance-covariance matrix for proposals, Σ0,
an initial value of the scaling parameter, λ0, and a targeted acceptance rate α∗. δ is an averaging or damping
parameter that controls how quickly the impact of the tuning mechanism decays through the parameter γt .
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E Grade 5 Results
The results for grade 5 are reproduced in this Appendix for the purposes of
robustness checks. While the magnitudes differ, we can see the same general
patterns as in the grade 3 results. For example, the estimates for federal funding
remain negative, except for some positive estimates for reading in public schools
in New South Wales. The positive estimates for numeracy in South Australian
public schools are also reproduced by the results for grade 5. The patterns for
parent fees also match those exhibited by the grade 3 results, with significant
positive effects save for some negative estimate at the higher quantiles in Vic-
torian public schools for reading and numeracy. Furthermore, we see negative
coefficients at the 0.9 quantile for numeracy in public schools in New South
Wales for both grade levels. There are, however, some changes in sign at the
lower quantiles for numeracy regarding parent fees.
Our key results for state funding are also largely supported by the results
for grade 5. Firstly, private schools in New South Wales are still exhibiting
strong positive coefficients for state funding, indicating that conditions in this
state seem to conducive to private schools succeeding. We also identify again a
strong positive effect for state funding in Victorian public schools. The positive
effects for Queensland, however, are less clear in the grade 5 results than those
for grade 3.
It must be remembered that the education production function theory behind
our study relies on reading and numeracy being the major outputs of education.
As noted by Hanushek (1979), at the older grade levels the emphasis becomes
less on basic skills and more towards varied outputs in a manner of different
subjects. For this reason, it is unsurprising that we see slight differences between
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the results for grade 3 and grade 5. This information, however, is still of interest
to the policy-maker in this domain. It must therefore be noted again that the
main results of our paper are the contemporaneous effect of funding in a grade
3 classroom, and more work must be done to understand the role of funding in
older classrooms with more varied learning outputs.
Table E1: Quantile Estimates for Federal Funding (Reading)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia 0.099 −0.401*** −0.048 0.031*** 0.057*
(0.719) (0.075 ) (0.231 ) (0.006 ) (0.033 )
New South Wales -0.033*** −0.003 0.019*** 0.446*** 0.041
(0.009) (0.006 ) (0.006 ) (0.049 ) (0.099 )
Victoria -0.307*** −0.018 −0.167*** −0.277** −0.216***
(0.099) (0.177 ) (0.019 ) (0.114 ) (0.022 )
Queensland 0.067*** −0.094*** 0.008 0.133 −0.848***
(0.012) (0.020 ) (0.116 ) (0.355 ) (0.322 )
Private schools
South Australia -0.050 −0.386 −0.056*** −0.520*** 0.055
(0.157) (0.399 ) (0.006 ) (0.000 ) (0.060 )
New South Wales 0.146 −0.239 −0.384** −3.161*** −2.040**
(0.298) (0.361 ) (0.175 ) (0.510 ) (0.839 )
Victoria -0.139* −0.308*** 0.303 −0.142*** −0.012***
(0.078) (0.072 ) (0.349 ) (0.003 ) (0.002 )
Queensland -0.558 0.837 −0.562 −4.052 0.003
(1.386) (0.757 ) (0.727 ) (3.024 ) (0.002 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table E2: Quantile Estimates for Federal Funding (Numeracy)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia -0.239 −0.171 −0.465** 0.082*** 0.330***
(0.369) (0.111 ) (0.213 ) (0.013 ) (0.036 )
New South Wales -0.017 0.016 −0.001 1.232** 0.538***
(0.018) (0.012 ) (0.006 ) (0.554 ) (0.060 )
Victoria -0.244* −0.666 −0.670 −1.226 −0.756***
(0.138) (0.435 ) (0.791 ) (1.054 ) (0.102 )
Queensland -0.196** −0.026*** −0.206*** −0.764*** −0.834***
(0.078) (0.006 ) (0.013 ) (0.194 ) (0.182 )
Private schools
South Australia -0.192*** 0.104 −1.439*** −1.116*** −0.363***
(0.021) (0.895 ) (0.444 ) (0.023 ) (0.115 )
New South Wales -0.277*** −0.037 −1.111*** −1.647*** −0.287***
(0.075) (0.773 ) (0.267 ) (0.450 ) (0.105 )
Victoria -0.107** −0.063 −0.281** −1.317*** −0.011
(0.054) (0.128 ) (0.140 ) (0.000 ) (0.010 )
Queensland -0.094*** 0.006 −1.480*** −0.333 −0.171***
(0.025) (0.011 ) (0.550 ) (0.322 ) (0.050 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table E3: Quantile Estimates for State Funding (Reading)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia -0.151 0.384*** −0.080 −0.004 0.000
(0.606) (0.105 ) (0.128 ) (0.004 ) (0.031 )
New South Wales -0.049*** −0.037 −0.067*** 0.019* 0.024***
(0.014) (0.039 ) (0.013 ) (0.010 ) (0.006 )
Victoria 0.271** −0.028 0.172*** 0.283*** 0.204***
(0.135) (0.196 ) (0.021 ) (0.071 ) (0.008 )
Queensland -0.048*** 0.024 −0.041 −0.200 −0.170***
(0.015) (0.044 ) (0.066 ) (0.538 ) (0.053 )
Private schools
South Australia -0.130 −0.522 −0.067*** 0.550*** −0.001
(0.088) (0.896 ) (0.002 ) (0.000 ) (0.036 )
New South Wales -0.112 −0.209 0.033 2.306*** 1.570**
(0.270) (1.203 ) (0.083 ) (0.381 ) (0.624 )
Victoria 0.214** 0.204*** 0.370 0.168*** −0.032***
(0.109) (0.075 ) (0.355 ) (0.003 ) (0.001 )
Queensland 0.270 0.155 0.382 1.296 0.000
(0.693) (0.711 ) (0.358 ) (1.050 ) (0.008 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table E4: Quantile Estimates for State Funding (Numeracy)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia -0.073 0.285* −0.142 0.039 −0.311***
(0.618) (0.165 ) (0.333 ) (0.026 ) (0.037 )
New South Wales -0.092*** −0.062** −0.015 −0.316** 0.053***
(0.028) (0.028 ) (0.037 ) (0.129 ) (0.008 )
Victoria 0.248 0.965 0.716 1.475 1.067***
(0.277) (0.591 ) (0.773 ) (1.291 ) (0.119 )
Queensland 0.092 −0.035*** 0.047* 0.311*** 1.138***
(0.073) (0.002 ) (0.027 ) (0.089 ) (0.248 )
Private schools
South Australia -0.016*** −0.568 0.258*** −1.961*** 0.090***
(0.002) (0.641 ) (0.082 ) (0.042 ) (0.027 )
New South Wales 0.063*** 0.344 0.843*** 2.849*** 0.238*
(0.022) (1.076 ) (0.202 ) (0.817 ) (0.125 )
Victoria 0.071 0.198 −0.098 0.415*** 0.008
(0.061) (0.259 ) (0.114 ) (0.000 ) (0.008 )
Queensland 0.109** 0.028 −0.108 −0.591 0.112**
(0.048) (0.022 ) (0.114 ) (0.473 ) (0.045 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table E5: Quantile Estimates for Parent Fees (Reading)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia 0.049 0.138*** 0.083** 0.018*** 0.025*
(0.110) (0.026 ) (0.040 ) (0.002 ) (0.015 )
New South Wales 0.038*** 0.019 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.015
(0.009) (0.012 ) (0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.018 )
Victoria -0.037 0.001 −0.012*** −0.014 −0.200***
(0.030) (0.017 ) (0.003 ) (0.017 ) (0.009 )
Queensland 0.005* 0.019*** 0.036 0.068 −0.045***
(0.003) (0.005 ) (0.033 ) (0.121 ) (0.013 )
Private schools
South Australia 0.032*** 0.057 0.008*** 0.282*** 0.063**
(0.002) (0.042 ) (0.001 ) (0.000 ) (0.029 )
New South Wales 0.130** 0.004 0.021 1.337*** 0.671***
(0.055) (0.507 ) (0.029 ) (0.213 ) (0.204 )
Victoria 0.128*** 0.220*** −0.014 0.235*** 0.004***
(0.042) (0.064 ) (0.151 ) (0.005 ) (0.001 )
Queensland 0.032 0.117 0.410 −0.408 0.019***
(0.043) (0.145 ) (0.362 ) (0.312 ) (0.001 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table E6: Quantile Estimates for Parent Fees (Numeracy)
Quantile estimates
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Public schools
South Australia 0.022 0.178*** 0.215 −0.004 −0.162***
(0.173) (0.025 ) (0.152 ) (0.009 ) (0.021 )
New South Wales 0.025*** 0.007 0.026*** −0.028 −0.200***
(0.004) (0.019 ) (0.004 ) (0.029 ) (0.027 )
Victoria -0.030 0.037*** −0.130 −0.153 −0.192***
(0.045) (0.013 ) (0.124 ) (0.287 ) (0.029 )
Queensland 0.066*** 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.079** 0.421***
(0.021) (0.002 ) (0.004 ) (0.031 ) (0.093 )
Private schools
South Australia 0.031*** −0.195 0.018*** 0.257*** 0.057***
(0.002) (0.438 ) (0.006 ) (0.005 ) (0.006 )
New South Wales 0.123*** 0.289 0.254*** 1.376*** 0.207*
(0.026) (0.503 ) (0.055 ) (0.380 ) (0.107 )
Victoria 0.042* −0.042 −0.009 −0.346*** 0.031***
(0.021) (0.062 ) (0.061 ) (0.000 ) (0.005 )
Queensland 0.086*** 0.033*** 0.315*** 0.173 0.088***
(0.006) (0.001 ) (0.059 ) (0.143 ) (0.027 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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This study examines the determinants of low educational achievement in Aus-
tralian schoolchildren. Using a control function approach that addresses issues
related to self-selection on unobservables into the private schooling sector, we
estimate the impact of student background characteristics on the likelihood of
meeting the national minimum standard on NAPLAN testing in reading and nu-
meracy. Next, we analyse how private schooling impacts this likelihood for stu-
dents from various socio-educational backgrounds. We find that students with
a language other than English or an Indigenous background are more likely to
achieve NAPLAN scores below minimum standards, as well as students with a
parent who did not complete year 12, does not have a university degree or is not
employed. Moreover, private schooling may make some kinds of students more
likely to perform above the minimum national standard on NAPLAN.
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1 Introduction
Education is often seen as providing individuals with the skills to lead fulfilling
lives, and countries with the tools for a productive economy.1 Nevertheless, a
∗This research is supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP)
Scholarship. Thanks must also be given to the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Report-
ing Authority for the provision of the data utilised by this study. Thank you to Firmin Doko
Tchatoka, Gareth Myles, Robert Garrard, Julie Moschion, participants at the 2018 Australian
Conference of Economists, participants at the 31st PhD Conference in Economics and Busi-
ness, and four anonymous referees for useful comments that have improved this paper. Stata
codes for this paper may be found at Github.com/SarahCornell-Farrow
†Email: sarah.cornell-farrow@adelaide.edu.au
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significant proportion of children across the globe are not meeting basic literacy
and numeracy standards.2 While it is well-known that individual-level factors
such as household income, gender, ethnicity, and educational achievement of
parents play a large role in determining outcomes,3 the role that school-level
factors play in student educational achievement are less clear.4 First, as dis-
cussed in Hanushek (2003), the role that school resources play in educational
outcomes remains controversial. Second, the role that public or private pro-
vision of schooling plays in educational achievement is also contested. In the
United States, Elder and Jepsen (2014) found that higher outcomes in Cath-
olic schools are solely due to selection bias, a finding supported by Gibbons
and Silva (2011) in the United Kingdom. Chudgar and Quin (2012) also con-
clude that private schooling may not have an unequivocal positive effect. In
contrast, Lefebvre et al. (2011) found that switching from a public to a private
high school significantly improves student test scores in Canada. Furthermore,
Altonji et al. (2000) find that attendance at Catholic high schools increases the
probability of graduating high school; however, they find little evidence for test
scores. Green et al. (2011) found that the observable characteristics of children
attending private schools has not changed over time in private schools, yet edu-
cational achievement has increased from these schools, indicating that it may not
be social or economic advantage driving improved outcomes in private schools.
This study investigates the determinants of poor educational achievement in
Australian children, as well as analysing if private schooling may shield students
2For an overview of testing practices and achievement in OECD countries see Morris
(2011).
3See Bedard and Cho (2010); Alderman et al. (1996); Behrman and Knowles (1999); Card
and Payne (2002); Cobb-Clark and Nguyen (2012); Dickerson et al. (2015); Fryer and Levitt
(2010); Gibbons et al. (2013); Fryer and Levitt (2004); Jensen and Rasmussen (2011); Nicoletti
and Rabe (2013); Shafiq (2013); Stevens and Schaller (2011); Suziedelyte and Zhu (2015).
4See, for example, Ellison and Swanson (2016).
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with disadvantaged characteristics from poor performance. Australia makes a
particularly interesting setting as educational quality is relatively high, yet so-
cially disadvantaged students quickly fall far behind their peers with similar
capabilities (Goss and Sonnemann, 2016). In Australia, the literature on the
differences in performance between public and private schools remains limited
and inconclusive. Furthermore, few papers have focused on the National Assess-
ment Program - Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) set of data, which assesses
students through primary and high school, a crucial time period where policy
may still be effectively targeted at students for their improvement. Nghiem et al.
(2015) used data from the Longitudinal Study of Australia’s Children (LSAC) to
estimate the gain from attending private school on a child’s test scores, as well
as their non-cognitive outcomes such as social skills. They found that private
schools do not produce better outcomes when compared to public schools. Con-
trary to this result, Miller and Voon (2012) found that private schools scored
higher on standardised tests than public schools. Nonetheless, they also con-
cluded that these better results are the result of selection bias, corroborating the
findings of Elder and Jepsen (2014) in the United States and Gibbons and Silva
(2011) in the United Kingdom.
It is well-accepted that student background determines test scores, with Miller
and Voon (2011) finding these measures to be strong determinants of NAPLAN
scores. Furthermore, Cobb-Clark and Nguyen (2012) found differing levels of
educational advantage between Australian-born, English-speaking migrant, and
non-English-speaking migrant students. There is, however, little understanding
as to whether different types of schooling can shield students from the effects
of disadvantage, or if the two main schooling sectors in Australia simply differ
in their levels of disadvantage in the first place. Given that low socio-economic
111
1 INTRODUCTION
status is linked to poor educational performance, it is necessary to understand
policies that can be aimed at these ‘at risk’ children to improve their educational
outcomes.
In order to do this, first we estimate the impact of student background charac-
teristics on the likelihood of meeting the national minimum standard in reading
and numeracy using an individual-level NAPLAN data set. Second, we analyse
how private schooling may change the probability that a student with certain
disadvantaged characteristics will meet minimum standards. This paper focuses
on low-performing and socio-economically disadvantaged students and aims to
understand if choice in schooling may be able to improve their outcomes, rather
than focusing on overall improvement.
Given that students or parents tend to self-select into private schooling based
on unobservable characteristics such as ability, we propose the control function
approach of Wooldridge (2015) to achieve identification. Estimation takes a
two-stage approach, which provides a simple way to estimate our fairly com-
plicated model with a binary endogenous variable and a multinomial ordered
outcome. Adding a control function, estimated in a first stage, renders the en-
dogenous explanatory variable exogenous in the second-stage equation. Im-
plementing the control function approach should therefore ensure identification
of the effect of private schooling. A more traditional way to address sample
selection into private schooling would be to implement a Heckman (1979) cor-
rection.5 However, as we have non-linear models in the first and second stages
due to limited dependent variables,6 this approach would cause the estimates
5Terza et al. (2008) discusses the differences between two-stage predictor substitution such
as the Heckman correction and two-stage residual inclusion such as our method in the context
of the health economics literature. Other methods include work based on Lee et al. (1980) and
De Luca and Perotti (2011).
6Semykina and Wooldridge (n.d.) have developed a semi-parametric estimator for panel
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to be inconsistent. Instead, the control function approach allows us to identify
the parameters under similar kinds of conditions to instrumental variable estim-
ation. In fact, for linear endogenous explanatory variables the control function
approach yields the 2SLS estimator. However, for non-linear models the con-
trol function approach offers significant efficiency advantages over standard IV
methods, and delivers more reliable estimates of the partial effects (although
the assumptions for consistency of the partial effects are somewhat nonstand-
ard and controversial) (Wooldridge, 2015). Moreover, control function methods
are computationally simpler and require fewer assumptions than full maximum
likelihood procedures.7
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on public and private
schooling. Importantly, we focus on ‘at risk’ students, that is, students that are
already or who are in danger of not meeting the Australian minimum educational
standard. The availability of a large individual-level data set allows us to directly
control for background characteristics in a precise way. We can link parent data
directly to individual students instead of working at a school-average level, thus
accounting for heterogeneity within schools instead of simply across schools.
Furthermore, as the data represents close to a census of all Australian children
in the calendar year 2013, the large sample size allow us to very precisely es-
timate small impacts of student background characteristics on outcomes. This
paper provides, to our knowledge, the first systematic Australia-wide study of
the determinants of poor educational achievement in schoolchildren across both
the public and private schooling sectors.
data.
7For examples of the implementation of control function approaches in the applied literat-
ure, see Liu et al. (2010); Castells-Quintana and Royuela (2017); Di Porto et al. (2017); Semyk-
ina (2017); Yeung (2017); Bourlass et al. (2018); Le Van et al. (2018).
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Ultimately, we find that students with a language background other than Eng-
lish or an Indigenous background are at risk of poor performance in NAPLAN.
Moreover, parent background factors have an impact on student achievement,
as students with a parent who did not complete year 12 or university studies, or
is not employed, are more likely to achieve below minimum standards. Given
the results of the study of predicted probabilities, we find that private school-
ing makes certain students more likely to surpass achievement standards, but
not others. Specifically, students at the margin of poor achievement may most
benefit from private schooling. This result has significant ramifications for the
literature on school choice, indicating that matching students to sectors may play
a role in their achievement capabilities. The impact of disadvantaged character-
istics on student achievement need not be as great as we often see, and more
can be done to enable these students to succeed. Sensitivity analyses on various
specifications and subsets of the data show the robustness of these results, and
can be found in the Appendix.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a discussion of the data, fol-
lowed by the theoretical model in Section 3. Section 4 outlines our estimation
strategy. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 presents a study of pre-
dicted probabilities. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
This paper uses individual-level data from the National Assessment Program -
Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN)8 to estimate the role private schooling plays
in enabling students to meet minimum educational standards in Australia. The
8Thanks must go to the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority for the
provision of these data.
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NAPLAN data is unique in providing standardised test results to measure edu-
cational outcomes for the universe of students in Australia. Each year, students
in grades 3, 5, 7, and 9 sit tests in reading, writing, language conventions, and
numeracy. The results for each student are reported to schools and parents on
a scale that shows how that student has performed in the tests in comparison
to established national standards. Alongside these test scores, data is collected
by the Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA)
on parent background, language background other than English status and other
measures.
Specifically, we use individual-level student data from the testing years 2013
and 2014. As tests are sat by individual students every two years, no students
will appear in the data set twice so we have pooled these observations giving
an initial sample of 2,235,804 students in 9249 schools. Necessarily, we have
made a few sample restrictions, generally due to missing data. Missing data
is usually the result of non-reporting by parents on school enrolment forms or
testing documents. The omission of these students may therefore pose a problem
if non-respondents share similar characteristics. We also keep only students that
have been in the same school for at least two years to ensure that they have not
recently swapped between the public and private systems. We are left with an
actual sample of 471,453 students in 8160 schools, with 45% of the students in
the sample attending private school.9 In the original sample, 35% of students
9Much of this significant decrease in observations is due to omitting those without a score
in the previous period. The reasoning behind this is that we do not have enough information
about these students to know if they have been in the public or private sector for a long enough
period of time for the schooling to have had an effect. For example, many students in Year 7
will not have a previous score as they changed schools between Year 5 and Year 7 when going to
high school. All students in grade 3 are also omitted for this reason. This is why we can observe
significant drops in the number of students, but not in the number of schools. While dropping
these observations may introduce bias if they all share similar characteristics (for example, if
all students swapped from public school to private school between year 5 and year 7), this is
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attended private school so the actual sample may not be representative of the true
population regarding the schooling type variable. This would reflect the fact that
it is harder to collect parent background data from public school students than
from private school students, where these types of information are a necessity
upon enrolment. Given this, we have accordingly weighted our samples by the
inverse of the probability of being sampled.10 This will allow valid inference
about the population, not just the sample.
The outcome variable achievement, ai, is an ordered limited dependent vari-
able, where each individual student is classified into one of three groups based
on their raw NAPLAN score: 1) not meeting minimum standards, 2) just meet-
ing minimum standards, and 3) above minimum standards. We have classified
students into these groups given the raw cutoff scores for each band in each
grade in each year, using the score equivalence tables provided by ACARA.11
We analyse student achievement in both the reading test and the numeracy test,12
with the analysis undertaken separately for each domain due to differences in
achievement between these subject areas. As these bands are a sliding scale
constructed to be comparable over time for an individual student, this particular
construction of the achievement variable means that we do not need to further
account for a student’s grade level in the specification. By limiting the depend-
ent variable to these three groups, we increase the policy relevance of our res-
unlikely. Minimising bias caused by students not being in the school for long enough to be
considered a representation of that sector is more crucial. In Appendix H we take a randomised
sample of the data to ensure that the results are not being biased by sample definition.
10This was achieved using pweight in Stata to ensure means and variances are not affected
due to the non-random sampling. The sample is weighted by the inverse of the probability that
they are sampled as this number reflects how many individuals they represent in the population.
11See Appendix A.
12The NAPLAN reading test involves a reading comprehension test on a range of text types,
designed to test a student’s understanding of English in context. The numeracy test is made up
of a multiple-choice section and a written response section, focusing on the areas of number and
algebra, measurement and geometry, and statistics and probability.
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ults as we are able to target students that are not meeting minimum standards
or at risk. Secondly, as NAPLAN is often seen as an imperfect measure of ac-
tual underlying student achievement, this methodology removes systematic bias
potentially introduced into the model by measurement error in raw NAPLAN
scores. While NAPLAN may not perfectly measure a student’s actual achieve-
ment levels, the chosen bands represent the illustration of particular skills as
set out in the National Curriculum. Students must therefore demonstrate or not
demonstrate these specific skills in order to be located within these bands, mean-
ing that we can best model this outcome discretely. The proportion of students










Figure 1: Student achievement by school sector
in each achievement group are illustrated by Figure 1, and compared between
public and private schools. It can be seen that in private schools a higher propor-
tion of students are achieving above standards, with 91% of students achieving
in this band for reading compared to only 87% in public schools. As we shift to
the lower achieving bands, the share of private school students falls, with 1.05%
of private school students in the ‘at minimum standards’ group and 1.84% of
public school students. These broad patterns are mirrored by the results in nu-
meracy. The figures are reported in Table C1 in Appendix C, and a simple t-test
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procedure shows that, within each achievement group, the proportions of pub-
lic and private schoolchildren are significantly different from each other at the
1% level. These stylised facts would lead one to believe that students in private
schools are less likely to be scoring in the lower achievement bands than those in
public schools, providing evidence that the findings of Miller and Voon (2012)
at the school-average level are also supported at the individual student level.
Table 1: Student background characteristics by schooling sector
Public Private
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.6315 0.7305***
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree 0.2769 0.3787***
Mother employed 0.7106 0.8253***
Father completed year 12 0.5428 0.6657***
Father holds a bachelor’s degree 0.2466 0.3573***





Attends school in city 0.7428 0.7976***
Attends school in provincial area 0.2445 0.1984***
Attends school in remote area 0.0126 0.0040***
n 258290 213163
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: t-tests are conducted for Ho: proportion of students with given characteristic
for private school = proportion of public students with said characteristic,
against the two-tailed alternative. Thus, significance is only reported for the
private school proportions.
Table 1 illustrates the differences in student background between public and
private schools. It can be seen that, for private schools, both the mother and the
father are significantly more likely to have completed year 12, attained a bach-
elor’s degree, and to be currently employed. Furthermore, a student in a private
school is less likely to come from an Indigenous or language other than Eng-
lish background. Clearly, students in private schools have a significant socio-
educational advantage over their peers. These variables are therefore also all
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included in the model. We also include dummies for the state the student resides
in, and a year dummy to control for differences in testing period.
It is also important to note that these sample statistics highlight how signific-
ant a threat to identification selection bias is in our estimation. We would like to
isolate the effects of different student characteristics in a private school versus
a public school, so it is crucial to understand if students are more likely to suc-
ceed in private school or if it is simply the case that students in a private school
have some kind of pre-existing socio-educational advantage, on average. These
features of the data drive the control function methodology of our paper.
We must also acknowledge that in Australia not only ‘advantaged’ students
attend private schools, and ‘disadvantaged’ students public. This is especially
the case in the younger years of schooling where many students attend public
schools before transferring to the private system for high school. The Australian
context provides good variance in student background features in both schooling
systems, making it ideal for comparatively analysing disadvantage in the public
and private sectors. As can be seen in Table C2 in Appendix C, there is good
variation in regressors for each schooling sector and both sectors have students
from both significantly advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds.
3 Theoretical model
We model educational achievement using the education production function ap-
proach, as discussed by Hanushek (1979). Educational achievement, a∗i , is a
function of a set of inputs, xi:
a∗i = f (xi) (1)
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These inputs are commonly school resources, other school features, and stu-
dent background characteristics. In many existing studies, school resources
have been shown to, on average, have no systematic relationship with outcomes
(Hanushek, 2003),13 so can be omitted from empirical estimations of production
functions without introducing substantial omitted variable bias.
We are left with two determinants of outcomes, school-level factors and stu-
dent background characteristics. Student background is determined by charac-
teristics such as parental education and employment, gender, and race. School
characteristics often include community factors such as location, organisational
features such as public or private status, and peer features such as average cohort
test scores. We model educational achievement as a function of the following
inputs; organisation (public or private), mother and father’s education levels and
employment status, Indigenous status, language background other than English,
gender, and school location (state/territory of Australia, and rural/metropolitan
status). We model latent educational achievement, a∗i , as the outcome a ji, an
ordered categorical variable that represents levels of achievement on a standard-
ised test.
Consider the following potential outcomes framework for educational achieve-
ment, a ji:
a ji = x′jiβ j +D
′
jiθ j + v ji, j = 0,1; i = 1, . . . ,n. (2)
D ji =

0, if z′jiγ j + u ji ≤ 0
1, if z′jiγ j + u ji > 0
(3)
13Reference the preceding chapter for further discussions on this. While we found evidence
of a relationship between test scores and funding and certain points of the distribution, it was
not found that there is a relationship on average, that is, when running a simple OLS model.
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where j = 0 for public schooling and j = 1 for private schooling. D ji repres-
ents potential outcomes for a student, where D0i gives their potential outcome in
public schooling and D1i the outcome of the same student in private schooling.
θ j measures the effect of private schooling on educational achievement, that is,
how the probability of meeting a given achievement band varies with type of
schooling. The x ji contains weakly exogenous student background covariates,
and the z ji include these covariates as well as additional covariates partially cor-
related with D ji to provide variation separate from that in the achievement equa-
tion. β j therefore measures how the probability of meeting a given achievement
band varies with each of the characteristics contained in x ji. We have theorised
this effect as β ji so that we may understand the effect of these characteristics
on educational achievement for students in private schools, j = 1, as well as the
different effect these characteristics may have students in a public school, j = 0,
i.e. β0i 6= β1i. γ j measures how the probability of attending private school var-
ies with each of the characteristics contained in z ji. The (v ji,u ji) are assumed






. We allow the case that ρ 6= 0, to account for self-selection into
private schooling, thus the v ji in equation (2) are linearly correlated with the u ji
in equation (3).
In reality, each student is observed in only one outcome - public or private
schooling. Let Priv denote a dummy variable equal to one if individual i actually
receives private schooling and zero if public schooling. Given (2) - (3), the
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observed outcome, ai, and the Di are:
ai = Priv ·a1i +(1−Priv)a0i, i = 1, . . . ,n (4)
Di = Priv ·D1i +(1−Priv)D0i, i = 1, . . . ,n (5)
As x ji and z ji contain the same variables for both the public schooling and






1iθ1 +(Priv · x′i)δ + εi (6)
Di = 1[z′iγ + ũi ≥ 0] (7)
where δ = β1−β0, ζ = γ1− γ0, εi = v1i +(v1i−v0i)Priv, and ũi = u1i +(u1i−
u0i)Priv. We would like to find δ , the difference in the effect of each stu-
dent background characteristic on educational achievement between public and
private school students.
4 Estimation strategy
To account for the correlation between u ji and v ji, we implement the control
function approach suggested by Wooldridge (2015). Our method is outlined
below.
1. Estimate equation (3) using probit, P[Di = 1|zi] = Φ(z′iγ), where Φ(·) is
the cumulative density function for a standard normal distribution.
2. Obtain the ‘generalised residuals’, an estimate for the unobservables con-
tained in ui. As discussed in Wooldridge (2015), it is well known that
under our given assumptions:
E[a∗i |zi,Di] = x′iβ +ρ [Diλ (z′iγ)−1− (1−Di)λ (−z′iγ)] (8)
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where λ (·) is the inverse Mills ratio.14 The function r(Di,ziγ) =Diλ (z′iγ)−
1− (1−Di)λ (−z′iγ) is the generalised residual, and has a mean of zero
conditional on zi.
3. Estimate equation (2) using maximum likelihood with the addition of







iρ + εi (9)
where the error term, εi, is now uncorrelated with the Di to consistently
estimate β , δ , and ρ15. a∗i is not observed, we instead observe ai = 1 if
a∗i < c1, ai = 2 if c1 ≤ a∗i < c2, or ai = 3 if a∗i ≥ c2. c1 and c2 are certain
thresholds of achievement, where c1 < c2. Multinomial ordered probit is
therefore used to estimate this second stage.
4. Compute the marginal effects for the multinomial probit at the mean so we
can understand the effects for an ‘average’ student. As most variables are
dummy variables, the marginal effect δ for the outcome of not meeting
minimum standards, for example, is given by P(ai = 1|Di = 1,xi, r̂i)−
P(ai = 1|Di = 0,xi, r̂i). We then average these effects across all of the
data to determine the marginal effect at the mean.
5. Bootstrap the standard errors to correct for the two-stage procedure.
Naive estimation would have assumed that ρ = 0 in the covariance matrix of
the v ji in equation (2) and u ji in equation (3). This would imply that there is no
correlation between equation (2) and equation (3), or, as above, ρ = 0. Identi-
fication would be based on the assumption that selection into private schooling
is based only on observables, in other words, conditional on the covariates in the
vector xi, potential outcomes are mean-independent of schooling sector selec-
tion. In reality, it is likely that there is unobservable self-selection into attending
private school; for example, if these students have some kind of greater underly-
ing ability. The pathway by which this operates is that the propensity to send a
14The inverse Mills ratio φ (·)/Φ(·) is the same as that typically used in an ordinary Heck-
man correction.
15Consider the t-statistic on the estimate for ρ to simply test the null hypothesis that the
private schooling dummy Di is exogenous, and that the control function correction was appro-
priate (similarly to the well-known Hausman (1978) test of endogeneity).
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child to private school is based on the apparent educational gains that may result
from this schooling sector. This selection on unobservables causes the private
schooling dummy, Di to be correlated with the error term, ui. A simple ordered
multinomial probit will obtain upwards biased estimates on the coefficient on the
private school dummy, overestimating the effect of private schooling on student
achievement.
Given that the model is correctly specified, estimation requires the following
assumptions (Wooldridge, 2015; Murtazashvili and Wooldridge, 2016):
ASSUMPTION 1 (Validity). E[vi|zi] = 0 and E[ui|zi] = 0.
ASSUMPTION 2 (Normality). [ui,vi]′ ∼ N(0,Σ).
ASSUMPTION 3 (Rank condition). There is at least one regressor in zi that is
not also in xi with non-zero coefficient in equation (7).
Assumption 1 assumes that the instruments contained in zi are valid. As-
sumption 2 assumes joint normality of the error terms. Assumption 3 is the
usual rank condition requiring at least one instrument partially correlated with
ai.
Following Assumptions 1 and 2, we can write:
E(vi|zi,Di) = E(vi|u j) = ρui, (10)
where ρ = 0 would correspond to exogeneity of Di. Substituting, this yields
equation (8) where under Assumptions 1 - 3 we can consistently estimate β ,
δ , and ρ . A simple 2SLS approach would be consistent, but would make no
distinction between a binary or continuous Di. If the assumptions for consist-




To ensure Assumption 1, we require at least one exogenous variable that
causes variation in Di not explained by xi to obtain suitable estimates for vi.
We must therefore develop an understanding of what factors are driving school
choice in Australia. We assume that parents attempt to choose the ‘best’ school
for their child, but there are numerous factors underlying this decision that may
not involve a school’s ability to causally improve their child’s test scores.16 For
example, a legacy of private schooling in a family may increase the likelihood
that those parents will send their child to a private school, and vice versa. A
parent may be interested in matching their child to a school based on ethos, re-
ligion, or simply from positive recommendations from their neighbours. To fur-
ther complicate the matter, some families will be restricted in the set of schools
that they may choose from depending on the level of fees charged and their
child’s ability to earn a scholarship. Ultimately, we focus on a condition that
appears to drive school choice, but not student outcomes. This condition is the
job category of the mother. As shown by Table F4, the proportion of children
in the lowest band of achievement who have a mother with a job in categor-
ies 3 and 4 remains relatively consistent at just above 20%.17 It is, therefore,
unlikely that having a mother with a job in these categories affects the likeli-
hood of not meeting minimum standards, which is what we are interested in.
A job in category 3 refers to tradespeople, clerks, and skilled office, sales, and
service staff. Some examples of these jobs are; personal assistants, sales staff,
flight attendants, fitness instructors, and child care workers. A job in category
4 covers machine operators, hospitality staff, assistants, labourers, and related
workers; for example, office assistants, miners, farmers, guards, and members
16Dearden et al. (2011) provides a discussion of the determinants of private school choice in
Australia and the United Kingdom.
1723.32 and 23.02 respecitively for reading, and 22.68 and 22.89 for numeracy.
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of the defence force ranked below senior non-commissioned officer.
While these occupations of the mother do not appear to influence educational
achievement, they do indeed affect choice in schooling. In particular, the largest
proportion of students attending private school have a mother in job category
3, whereas students in a public school are more likely to have a mother who
is not employed. It is intuitive that the mother’s employment would determine
school choice, as it is the variable contained in our data set which can most
tell us something about the financial situation and labour allocation to work of
a family, which is likely to be a significant driver of school choice, without
impacting achievement. Further analysis of these variable choices can be found
in Appendix F.
There are a number of reasons as to why this variable may not satisfy the
exclusion restriction, which must be kept in mind. To confirm its validity we
would need to analyse the sensitivity of mothers to the labour force to under-
stand how workforce entry/exit may be related to school choice, as well as other
choices related to organisation of the family. Census data (at the family unit)
is difficult to link to information about the child’s school attendance, making it
hard to analyse underlying trends about family decision-making for their chil-
dren. It is indeed possible that the results of this paper may hold best only for
particular subgroups of the Australian population. However, given the current
form of the data, the use of these variables provides the best attempt at sourcing
an instrument, as it does not appear to be correlated with potential confounding
channels in the data. This is a research area that using the LSAC or LSAY data
could be valuable in strengthening our understanding of family decision-making
and school choice. Future versions of this paper will work on using auxiliary





We analyse the results for each level of the outcome, educational achievement,
to determine the marginal effect of private schooling for an average student in
each achievement band. Recall that as each variable is a dummy variable, the
marginal effect can be interpreted as the change in probability of a given out-
come occurring by switching that dummy variable from zero to one. For ex-
ample, P[ai1|xi,Di = 1]−P[ai1|xi,Di = 0] gives the change in probability from
attending private school (switching the private schooling dummy from ‘off’ to
‘on’) on a given student achieving a NAPLAN score in outcome band 1 (not
meeting minimum standards). In the tables, this is displayed as the marginal
effect of private schooling. The marginal effects are non-linear for our model,
so we therefore evaluate them at the mean of each regressor so that they can be
interpreted as the effect for an ‘average’ student. The estimates for the probit
regression, as well as some alternative specifications for the model, can be found
in the Appendices. The marginal effects are presented in the following Tables 2
- 4.
What these results show are that, on average, private school students are
more likely to achieve above standards on NAPLAN in reading and math, and
less likely to achieve below standards than public school students. However,
the impact that private schooling has on a student’s outcomes depends on their
level of achievement. While private schooling has a marginal effect of 0.104
for both reading and numeracy for the outcome ‘achieving above standards’,
the marginal effects are small for those achieving below minimum standards.
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The marginal effects for this outcome are only -0.016 and -0.011. These res-
ults would indicate that while private schooling may provide gains for students
already achieving above minimum standards, school choice matters little for
those achieving below standards. Nevertheless, at the margin there may be some
gains for students to make. The marginal effects for just meeting minimum
standards are -0.088 and -0.093 respectively, meaning that students at this level
of achievement are about 8 or 9 percentage points less likely to be in this band of
achievement if they attend private school. These results provide some evidence
that school matching may enable students at the boundary of poor achievement
to meet minimum standards. Potentially, private schooling enables students to
lift their scores just enough that they can meet minimum standards. An area
for further research is to understand how private schools are either successfully
targeting these at risk students, or alternatively if they are ‘gaming’ the system
when sitting NAPLAN tests in some way.18
These results also indicate that conditioning on observable demographics
alone are not enough to capture selection into the private schooling sector. The
coefficients on the predicted residuals are statistically significant at the 1% level
in all cases, indicating that, in terms of NAPLAN achievement, there exists self-
selection into school sectors based on unobservable characteristics. It is also
interesting to note that the marginal effects for achieving above standards in-
crease in magnitude after correcting for endogeneity. If it is indeed true that
student ability is driving these school choice decisions, we would expect to see
decreased marginal effects following the implementation of the control function
approach. What this result indicates is that it is unlikely to be ability that is driv-
18See Battistin et al. (2017) for evidence of score manipulation in Italy, and Reback (2008)
for an analysis of ‘teaching to the test’ in the United States.
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ing school choice decisions in Australia. For example, it has been suggested that
a familial legacy of private schooling is the main determinant of school choice in
Australia.19 It may also be the case that parents with a child of high ability know
they will be able to succeed in either a public or private environment, whereas
parents of lower ability children may select private schools due to their apparent
gains in NAPLAN achievement. The sign on the predicted residuals was in fact
negative for the outcome ‘achieving above minimum standards’, indicating that
the unobservables correlated with private schooling and achievement are such
that the characteristics they contain disadvantage students in NAPLAN. This
would support the story that it is in fact students at the margin of lower ability
whose parents choose private schooling.
5.2 Student background and educational achievement
Next, we analyse the role of certain background factors in determining student
achievement. The results show that both parental characteristics and student
characteristics are statistically significant in determining outcomes. The mar-
ginal effects for the background characteristic variables have been computed for
each outcome (in the same manner as the preceding section) and presented in
Tables 2 - 4 alongside the marginal effects for private schooling.
It can be seen that a student whose parents completed year 12, have Bach-
elor’s degrees and are employed are less likely to achieve below minimum stand-
ards on NAPLAN. However, the impact of these variables is generally small. For
example, the marginal effect for a mother holding a bachelor’s degree qualifica-
tion is only -0.007. The impact of all of these variables is larger for reading than
19See Dearden et al. (2011) for analysis of these other potential determinants of private
school choice in Australia.
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numeracy; for example, the marginal effect for a mother holding a Bachelor’s
degree on achieving below standards decreases to -0.004 for numeracy. The ef-
fect is over twice as large for reading than for numeracy for many cases. It can
therefore be concluded that parent background will affect a student’s achieve-
ment in mathematics less than in reading.
In terms of student background, there is a comparably large marginal effect
for Indigenous status, of 0.009 for reading and 0.011, making these students
much more likely to achieve below standards in both reading and mathematics
respectively. This indicates that addressing problems involved with Indigenous
education remains a significant policy issue in Australia. Secondly, although the
effect is small, students with a language background other than English are more
likely to score below minimum standards in both reading and mathematics. The
effect is smaller for mathematics, which is logical as their language background
will have less of an effect in this subject area than in reading, which is tested in
English.
It is interesting to note that the marginal effect of being female has opposing
signs for reading and numeracy. The marginal effect for achieving below stand-
ards is -0.006 for reading, but 0.001 for mathematics. This could indicate that
girls have improved ability in reading, or potentially teaching styles for reading
in Australia favour female styles of learning, whereas mathematics classrooms
may favour a male learning style. Nevertheless, these differences are relatively
small in magnitude.
At the school level, location seems to matter to some extent, with students in
provincial areas less likely to succeed in both reading and numeracy than a stu-
dent in the city (the base group). However, these effects are also once again, per-
haps surprisingly, small. It appears that after controlling for other student back-
130
5 RESULTS
ground features, location seems only to have a small effect on the likelihood of a
student meeting minimum NAPLAN standards. It is possible that improved res-
ults of metropolitan students are therefore a result of the public/private choice of
schooling, rather than a pure location effect. This would lead us to conclude that
perhaps differences in achievement in Australia are due to differences in oppor-
tunities provided to socio-economically advantaged and disadvantaged students,
rather than being driven by ability. This would be consistent with our unintuitive
increase in the marginal effect once accounting for sample selection, as perhaps
it is not unobservable ability driving private school attendance, which is often
argued. Further work needs to be done to understand what is driving school
choice, as our understanding of this decision is limited here by our data. These
results need not mean that all students should be attending private school, but
simply indicate that improved outcomes for disadvantaged students are indeed
possible. We require an increased policy focus on correcting inequities of op-
portunity in the Australian school system, to ensure that no student is limited by
their socio-economic background.
If we look at the results from the other side of the coin, that is, the marginal
effects for a student achieving above standards, we see a similar picture. From
Table 4, we can see that a student with a mother and father who completed year
12, hold a Bachelor’s degree, and are working are more likely to achieve above
standards in both reading and math. However, mother’s employment seems to
play little role in achievement above minimum standards.
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Table 2: Marginal effects of a multinomial probit regression on
NAPLAN achievement, corrected for endogeneity (%)
Outcome: not meeting standards Reading Numeracy
Private schooling −0.0160*** −0.0112***
(0.0013) (0.0011)
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 −0.0059*** −0.0053***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree −0.0069*** −0.0040***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Mother employed 0.0006*** 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Father completed year 12 −0.0050*** −0.0039***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Father holds a bachelor’s degree −0.0067*** −0.0024***
(0.0002) (0.0001)









Attends school in provincial area 0.0016*** 0.0004**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Attends school in remote area 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0006)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the mean. Standard errors in parentheses and
constructed using the bootstrap. The sign on r̂ is positive and significant.
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Table 3: Marginal effects of a multinomial probit regression on
NAPLAN achievement, corrected for endogeneity (%)
Outcome: at standard Reading Numeracy
Private schooling −0.0877*** −0.0931***
(0.0071) (0.0093)
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 −0.0306*** −0.0420***
(0.0009) (0.0012)
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree −0.0398*** −0.0205***
(0.0009) (0.0013)
Mother employed −0.0032*** −0.0016
(0.0011) (0.0014)
Father completed year 12 −0.0266*** −0.0314***
(0.0010) (0.0012)
Father holds a bachelor’s degree −0.0386*** −0.0205***
(0.0010) (0.0013)









Attends school in provincial area 0.0088*** 0.0029**
(0.0010) (0.0012)
Attends school in remote area 0.0019 0.0019
(0.0043) (0.0045)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the mean. Standard errors in parentheses and
constructed using the bootstrap. The sign on r̂ is positive and significant.
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Table 4: Marginal effects of a multinomial probit regression on
NAPLAN achievement, corrected for endogeneity (%)
Outcome: above standards Reading Numeracy
Private schooling 0.1037*** 0.1043***
(0.0085) (0.0104)
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.0363*** 0.0473***
(0.0011) (0.0014)
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree 0.0467*** 0.0382***
(0.0011) (0.0014)
Mother employed −0.0038*** −0.0018
(0.0013) (0.0016)
Father completed year 12 0.0316*** 0.0352***
(0.0012) (0.0014)
Father holds a bachelor’s degree 0.0452*** 0.0229***
(0.0012) (0.0014)









Attends school in provincial area −0.0104*** −0.0032**
(0.0012) (0.0014)
Attends school in remote area −0.0022 −0.0022
(0.0051) (0.0055)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the mean. Standard errors in parentheses and




In the model above, we have developed a tool for predicting NAPLAN achieve-
ment of individual students based on socio-educational background determin-
ants. In this section we analyse whether a student’s achievement can accur-
ately be predicted using this model. We generate the probabilities for students
with certain background features to reach certain levels of achievement, and see
how these probabilities change when certain characteristics are ‘switched on’
or ‘off’. We are interested in how the probability of meeting certain levels of
achievement changes with public or private schooling, for students with differ-
ent background characteristics. Models like these may have significant ability to
predict poor performance before it occurs, thus enabling policy-makers, schools,
and teachers to provide attention where it is most required.
Specifically, we calculate the predicted probabilities for each type of stu-
dent by controlling their background characteristics. Recall that the marginal
effects and predicted probabilities for the probit model are non-linear, and thus
will change by manipulating what values we input to the model. For example,
to predict the probability of a disadvantaged female student in a public school
achieving above standards, we substitute Private = 0, girl = 1, Indigenous = 1,
etc., into the model in the preceding section to calculate that type of student’s
likelihood of achieving above standards on NAPLAN. Given the results of the
previous section, we define ‘advantaged’ characteristics as any characteristic
that has a positive sign for surpassing minimum standards. That is, an advant-
aged student has a mother and father who completed year 12 and a Bachelor’s
degree, and is employed. They do not come from an Indigenous or LBOTE
background and attend school in the city. A ‘disadvantaged’ student is the op-
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posite of this. We then vary (i.e., set to either zero or one) certain other char-
acteristics such as language background, living in a provincial area, Indigenous
background, and gender.
The following table presents the predicted probabilities for achieving below
the minimum standard on NAPLAN testing, given certain sets of characteristics.
The predicted probabilities for achieving above minimum standards are repro-
duced in Table 6 for the same sets of background characteristics.
Table 5: Predicted probabilities for not meeting minimum standards, for certain
socio-educational groups
Reading Numeracy
Background characteristics Public Private Public Private
Advantaged Female - 0.0025*** 0.0003*** 0.0064*** 0.0018***
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Advantaged Male - 0.0047*** 0.0007*** 0.0056*** 0.0016***
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Disadvantaged Female - 0.0899*** 0.0263*** 0.0862*** 0.0373***
(0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0050)
Disadvantaged Male - 0.1295*** 0.0421*** 0.0797*** 0.0340***
(0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0040) (0.0047)
Advantaged Female LBOTE 0.0038*** 0.0006*** 0.0088*** 0.0026***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0002)
Advantaged Male LBOTE 0.0071*** 0.0011*** 0.0079*** 0.0023***
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Advantaged Female Indigenous 0.0052*** 0.0008*** 0.0136*** 0.0043***
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0004)
Advantaged Male Indigenous 0.0094*** 0.0016*** 0.0122*** 0.0038***
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Advantaged Female Provincial 0.0029*** 0.0004*** 0.0066*** 0.0019***
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Advantaged Male Provincial 0.0055*** 0.0008*** 0.0059*** 0.0017***
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Disadvantaged Female Provincial 0.0976*** 0.0292*** 0.0868*** 0.0377***
(0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0041)
Disadvantaged Male Provincial 0.1395*** 0.0465*** 0.0804*** 0.0343***
(0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0026) (0.0038)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and constructed using the bootstrap.
These predicted probabilities show wide differences in the likelihood that
certain students will meet given levels of achievement, based off background
factors alone. They also indicate the potential for gains to private schooling for
certain types of student, and not for others. For example, advantaged male and
female students have high probabilities of achieving above minimum standards
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Table 6: Predicted probabilities for achieving above minimum standards, for certain
socio-educational groups
Reading Numeracy
Background characteristics Public Private Public Private
Advantaged Female - 0.9625*** 0.9913*** 0.8720*** 0.9399***
(0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0050) (0.0027)
Advantaged Male - 0.9415*** 0.9848*** 0.8806*** 0.9447***
(0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0047) (0.0025)
Disadvantaged Female - 0.6209*** 0.8174*** 0.3034*** 0.6650***
(0.0116) (0.0177) (0.0108) (0.0224)
Disadvantaged Male - 0.5380*** 0.7558*** 0.5201*** 0.6802***
(0.0122) (0.0213) (0.0107) (0.0220)
Advantaged Female LBOTE 0.9487*** 0.9871*** 0.8452*** 0.9242***
(0.0027) (0.0009) (0.0053) (0.0036)
Advantaged Male LBOTE 0.9221*** 0.9782*** 0.8550*** 0.9300***
(0.0036) (0.0015) (0.0050) (0.0034)
Advantaged Female Indigenous 0.9368*** 0.9832*** 0.8028*** 0.8979***
(0.0035) (0.0014) (0.0069) (0.0054)
Advantaged Male Indigenous 0.9059*** 0.9722*** 0.8143*** 0.9052***
(0.0046) (0.0022) (0.0067) (0.0052)
Advantaged Female Provincial 0.9574*** 0.9898*** 0.8692*** 0.9383***
(0.0022) (0.0008) (0.0047) (0.0030)
Advantaged Male Provincial 0.9343*** 0.9824*** 0.8780*** 0.9433***
(0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0045) (0.0028)
Disadvantaged Female Provincial 0.6032*** 0.8049*** 0.5017*** 0.6635***
(0.0071) (0.0143) (0.0067) (0.0181)
Disadvantaged Male Provincial 0.5196*** 0.7411*** 0.5184*** 0.6787***
(0.0071) (0.0170) (0.0068) (0.0179)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and constructed using the bootstrap.
on both their NAPLAN reading and numeracy tests in both public and private
schools. In contrast, socio-educationally disadvantaged students are much more
likely to succeed in a private school. This is especially the case for female
disadvantaged students, who only have a 30% probability of achieving above
standards in numeracy if attending a public school, which more than doubles to
66% in a private school.
The results for students with an Indigenous background or language back-
ground other than English are also particularly interesting. Students with these
backgrounds, who are otherwise advantaged, have much higher probabilities of
good performance. These results indicate that these characteristics need not be
causing poor performance in and of themselves.
The probabilities for both advantaged and disadvantaged students living in
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provincial areas have also been reproduced in these tables. The results indicate
again that living in a provincial area in itself need not determine poor outcomes,
as otherwise advantaged students living in provincial areas have high probab-
ilities of meeting minimum standards regardless of their location. What all of
these results would indicate is that it is the parent background factors, specific-
ally their education levels, that are most strongly driving student achievement
on NAPLAN. This would be consistent with the literature on intergenerational
mobility, which finds education to be a transmission mechanism for higher eco-
nomic outcomes across generations of a family.20
7 Conclusion
Test score data has shown large differences in achievement between students
in public and private school systems in Australia. We aim to understand the
causes of these differences by analysing what background factors predict poor
NAPLAN performance in Australian children. Secondly, we seek to determine
if private schooling may shield the effects of disadvantage to enable students
with these characteristics to meet minimum educational standards.
We find that there are numerous characteristics that predict poor NAPLAN
performance in Australian children. Specifically, children with an Indigenous
or language other than English background are at risk of not meeting minimum
standards. Furthermore, students with a parent who did not complete year 12,
20See Bjorklund and Jantti (1997); Corak (2013); Clark (2014); Chetty, Hendren, Kline and
Saez (2014); Mendolia and Siminski (2017) for more of the literature on intergenerational mo-
bility. While this is not the focus of this paper, the results would show that levels of education
have a role to play in the transmission of economic outcomes between parents and children.
While the literature is inconsistent in the magnitude of the effects of intergenerational transmis-
sion of outcomes, as further NAPLAN data becomes available (linked to more types of economic
outcome data) more can be done to understand the mechanisms at work.
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did not attend university or is not employed are also more likely to perform
poorly. Students who attend schools in provincial or remote areas are also at risk
of poor NAPLAN performance. In terms of private schooling, we find that there
are gains for some particular student groups, but not all. An implication of these
results is that perhaps school vouchers to improve student to school matching or
expanding scholarship programs for disadvantaged students with particular risk
factors to attend private schools may improve student achievement.
There are certain important statements that can be made about educational
achievement from these results. Firstly, it appears that disadvantage is gener-
ally a cumulative problem. While the effect of having any one of these features
is small, if a student has a large number of negative characteristics the effect
on their test score will be compounded. In a socio-economically disadvantaged
student, these small marginal effects could add up to a significant educational
disadvantage rapidly. For example, if a student’s mother has not completed Year
12 she will not have a bachelor’s degree and may also not be employed. As it
is likely that markers of disadvantage exist in concert with each other, the im-
pact of socio-economic background on educational achievement remains a sig-
nificant problem in Australia. The probabilities predicted by our model suggest
that simply manipulating one or two background characteristics leads to large
changes in a student’s likelihood of achieving minimum standards. This result
is positive, as it indicates that there is potential for policy to be targeted more
directly to students with particular characteristics, such as Indigenous students,
to improve their outcomes. It is well-known that in Australia many disadvant-
aged members of society suffer from entanglement in the ‘web of disadvantage’,
where the effect of one form of disadvantage can reinforce impacts of other dis-
advantage markers. These members of society face significant constraints to
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the opportunities they receive, and more can be done to address these markers
directly to diminish their impacts. In this case, disadvantage may restrict the
set of schools that parents can choose from for their child, meaning that their
child may not be matched to the best school possible for them. Policies aimed at
improving school matching should therefore be considered by the government;
however, more work needs to be done on a data set containing more covariates
(potentially the LSAC) to confirm this finding and better understand the mech-
anisms at work.
Secondly, these results indicate that parent educational attainment is the most
significant driver of a student’s achievement in NAPLAN, given the variables in
this data set. The policy consideration from this finding is that by encouraging
higher levels of educational attainment across society in the long-term we may
be able to improve educational standards in Australia for future generations.
This conclusion should also be considered alongside future studies using the
LSAC, LSAY, or census data in order to understand the mechanisms at work in
greater detail.
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A NAPLAN score equivalence tables
Table A1: 2013 NAPLAN score equivalence table
Grade 3 Grade 5 Grade 7 Grade 9
Band Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
1 266 264
2 322* 314*
3 369 366 368 371
4 424 417 419* 422* 419 423
5 469 475 471 475 477* 477* 471 477
6 771 741 523 529 523 526 528* 526*
7 574 571 575 578 580 580
8 758 834 627 631 630 632
9 890 900 686 683
10 891 977
Note: Starred bands mark the minimum standard for that grade and subject in that year. Scores reported are the
upper limit for that band.
Source: acara.edu.au.
Table A2: 2014 NAPLAN score equivalence table
Grade 3 Grade 5 Grade 7 Grade 9
Band Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
1 269 252
2 319* 317*
3 365 369 369 371
4 420 417 424* 424* 421 424
5 467 475 475 471 473* 476* 478 473
6 772 750 528 529 526 529 529* 527*
7 577 572 579 580 576 578
8 812 815 631 632 627 631
9 935 886 684 682
10 908 921
Note: Starred bands mark the minimum standard for that grade and subject in that year. Scores reported are the
upper limit for that band.
Source: acara.edu.au.
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B Variables contained in the NAPLAN student-level data set
Table B1: Variables contained in the student-level NAPLAN data set
Variable Description
Reading standard =0 if student is below standard in reading, =1 if at standard, and =2 if above stand-
ard
Math standard =0 if student is below standard in numeracy, =1 if at standard, and =2 if above
standard
Private schooling =1 if student attends a non-government school, and =0 if government school
Age Age at the time of taking the test to one decimal place
LBOTE =1 if the student has a language background other than English, and =0 if not
Indigenous =1 if the student identifies as Indigenous Australian or Torres Strait Islander, and
=0 if not
Female =1 if the student is female, and =0 if male
Metropolitan =1 if the student lives in a metropolitan location, and =0 if not
Provincial =1 if the student lives in a provincial location, and =0 if not
Rural =1 if the student lives in a remote or very remote location, and =0 if not
State dummies Dummy variables =1 if the student lives in that state (South Australia, New South
Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, Western Australia, Australian Capital Ter-
ritory, Northern Territory), and =0 if not
Mother year 12 =1 if the student’s mother finished year 12, and =0 if not
Mother Bachelor’s degree =1 if a student’s mother’s highest level of education is a Bachelor’s degree, and =0
if not
Mother diploma =1 if a student’s mother’s highest level of education is a Diploma or Advanced
Diploma, and =0 if not
Mother certificate =1 if a student’s mother’s highest level of education is a certificate I to IV or trade
qualification, and =0 if not
Mother not employed =1 if a student’s mother is not employed, and =0 if not
Mother job category 1 =1 if a student’s mother employed in category 1,21 and =0 if not
Mother job category 2 =1 if a student’s mother employed in category 2,22 and =0 if not
Mother job category 3 =1 if a student’s mother employed in category 3,23 and =0 if not
Mother job category 4 =1 if a student’s mother employed in category 4,24 and =0 if not
Father year 12 =1 if the student’s mother finished year 12, and =0 if not
Father Bachelor’s degree =1 if a student’s father’s highest level of education is a Bachelor’s degree, and =0
if not
Father diploma =1 if a student’s father’s highest level of education is a Diploma or Advanced
Diploma, and =0 if not
Father certificate =1 if a student’s father’s highest level of education is a certificate I to IV or trade
qualification, and =0 if not
Father not employed =1 if a student’s father is not employed, and =0 if not
Father job category 1 =1 if a student’s father employed in category 1, and =0 if not
Father job category 2 =1 if a student’s father employed in category 2, and =0 if not
Father job category 3 =1 if a student’s father employed in category 3, and =0 if not
Father job category 4 =1 if a student’s father employed in category 4, and =0 if not
Note: Raw data provided by the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority through their Data
Access Program. Our expanded dataset also includes the interactions and squared terms of each variable (ex-
cluding the band of achievement variables and the private schooling variable as these are outcome variables
in the main equation and selection equation). Interactions are also not included for the state dummies.
21Senior management in a large business organisation, government administration, or defence, and qual-
ified professionals; e.g., business/policy analyst, defence forces commissioned officer, professionals with
degree or higher qualifications, administrators such as school principals, etc.
22Other business managers, arts/media/sportspersons, and associate professionals; e.g., owner/manager
of a farm or business, retail sales/service manager, musician, journalist, designer, sports official, busi-
ness/administrative staff, etc.
23Tradespeople, clerks, and skilled office, sales, and service staff; e.g., 4 year trade certificate by appren-
ticeship, clerks, personal assistants, sales, flight attendants, fitness instructors, child care workers, etc.
24Machine operators, hospitality staff, assistants, labourers and related workers; e.g., machine operators,
drivers, labourers, office assistants, defence forces ranked below senior non-commissioned officer, miners,
farmers, factory hands, guards, etc.
C Supplementary data
Table C1: Proportion of students at each standard of achievement by schooling sector
Public schools Private schools
Above At Below Above At Below
Reading 0.8702 0.1113 0.0184 0.9068*** 0.0827*** 0.0105***
Numeracy 0.8136 0.1716 0.0148 0.8431*** 0.1482*** 0.0120***
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: n=471453. ’Above’ refers to the proportion of students above standard, ’At’ refers to students just meeting
the minimum standard, and ’Below’ refers to students not meeting minimum standards. t-tests are conducted
for Ho: proportion of students in a given band for private school = proportion of public students in said band,
against the two-tailed alternative. Thus, significance is only reported for the private school proportions.
Table C2: Standard deviation of background characteristic
regressors by schooling sector
Public Private
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.482 0.444
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree 0.495 0.496
Mother employed 0.453 0.380
Father completed year 12 0.498 0.472
Father holds a bachelor’s degree 0.481 0.500





Attends school in city 0.437 0.402
Attends school in provincial area 0.430 0.399
Attends school in remote area 0.112 0.063
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D Alternative probit specifications
Table D1: Ordered probit estimates of the determinants of student achievement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy Reading Numeracy
Private school 0.184*** 0.109*** 0.068*** 0.022** 0.160*** 0.092*** 0.056*** 0.014
(0.015 ) (0.012 ) (0.012 ) (0.012 ) (0.015 ) (0.012 ) (0.012 ) (0.011 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.213*** 0.192*** 0.215*** 0.194***
(0.006 ) (0.006 ) (0.006 ) (0.006 )
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree 0.305*** 0.172*** 0.304*** 0.169***
(0.008 ) (0.008 ) (0.008 ) (0.008 )
Mother employed 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.027*** 0.032***
(0.007 ) (0.006 ) (0.007 ) (0.032 )
Father completed year 12 0.200*** 0.154*** 0.207*** 0.161***
(0.006 ) (0.006 ) (0.006 ) (0.006 )
Father holds a bachelor’s degree 0.313*** 0.117*** 0.312*** 0.117***
(0.008 ) (0.010 ) (0.008 ) (0.009 )
Father employed 0.223*** 0.222*** 0.177*** 0.180***
(0.013 ) (0.012 ) (0.012 ) (0.012 )
Student characteristics
Indigenous −0.474*** −0.460*** −0.305*** −0.324***
(0.017 ) (0.016 ) (0.012 ) (0.016 )
LBOTE −0.122*** −0.109*** −0.168*** −0.135***
(0.014 ) (0.016 ) (0.011 ) (0.012 )
Female 0.208*** −0.037*** 0.218*** −0.038***
(0.007 ) (0.006 ) (0.006 ) (0.006 )
Attends school in provincial area −0.176*** −0.100*** −0.077*** −0.027***
(0.015 ) (0.014 ) (0.014 ) (0.013 )
Attends school in remote area −0.241*** −0.174*** −0.143*** −0.108***
(0.033 ) (0.029 ) (0.033 ) (0.028 )
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 471453 471453 471453 471453 471453 471453 471453 471453
Pseudo R2 0.0074 0.0085 0.0586 0.0331 0.0188 0.0128 0.0671 0.0358
log pseudo-L -900994 -1130960 -854463 -1102893 -890631 -1126038 -846835 -1099826
Pr > Wald χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and clustered by school.
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E Marginal effects for a naive ordered multinomial probit regression on
NAPLAN achievement
Table E1: Marginal effects of a multinomial probit
regression on NAPLAN achievement
Outcome: not meeting standards Reading Numeracy
Private schooling −0.002*** −0.001***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 −0.006*** −0.006***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree −0.007*** −0.004***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
Mother employed −0.001*** −0.001***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
Father completed year 12 −0.006*** −0.004***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
Father holds a bachelor’s degree −0.007*** −0.003***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
Father employed −0.006*** −0.006***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
Student characteristics
Indigenous 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
LBOTE 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
Female −0.006*** 0.001***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
Attends school in provincial area 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
Attends school in remote area 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Table E2: Marginal effects of a multinomial probit
regression on NAPLAN achievement
Outcome: at standard Reading Numeracy
Private schooling −0.009*** −0.004*
(0.001 ) (0.003 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 −0.033*** −0.044***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree −0.042*** −0.037***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Mother employed −0.003*** −0.007***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Father completed year 12 −0.031*** −0.036***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Father holds a bachelor’s degree −0.042*** −0.025***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Father employed −0.028*** −0.043***
(0.002 ) (0.003 )
Student characteristics
Indigenous 0.052*** 0.080***
(0.003 ) (0.004 )
LBOTE 0.026*** 0.031***
(0.002 ) (0.003 )
Female −0.032*** 0.008***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Attends school in provincial area 0.012*** 0.006*
(0.002 ) (0.003 )
Attends school in remote area 0.023*** 0.025***
(0.006 ) (0.007 )
Table E3: Marginal effects of a multinomial probit
regression on NAPLAN achievement
Outcome: above standards Reading Numeracy
Private schooling 0.010*** 0.005***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.0392*** 0.050***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree 0.049*** 0.041***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Mother employed 0.005*** 0.008***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Father completed year 12 0.0368*** 0.041***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Father holds a bachelor’s degree 0.050*** 0.028***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Father employed 0.034*** 0.0484***
(0.003 ) (0.003 )
Student characteristics
Indigenous −0.063*** −0.093***
(0.004 ) (0.005 )
LBOTE −0.031*** −0.035***
(0.002 ) (0.003 )
Female 0.0377*** −0.009***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Attends school in provincial area −0.014*** −0.007**
(0.002 ) (0.003 )
Attends school in remote area −0.027*** −0.028***
(0.007 ) (0.008 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the mean. Standard errors in
parentheses and clustered by school.
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Table F1: Basic probit models for first and second stages
Dependent variable Private schooling Reading band Numeracy band
Potential instruments
Mother with a category 3 job −0.143*** −0.043*** −0.021***
(0.005 ) (0.007 ) (0.006 )
Mother with a category 4 job −0.448*** −0.154*** −0.132***
(0.006 ) (0.008 ) (0.007 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.060*** 0.207*** 0.188***
(0.005 ) (0.006 ) (0.005 )
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree −0.030*** 0.263*** 0.129***
(0.005 ) (0.008 ) (0.006 )
Mother employed 0.471*** 0.091*** 0.069***
(0.005 ) (0.007 ) (0.006 )
Father completed year 12 0.153*** 0.204*** 0.159***
(0.005 ) (0.006 ) (0.005 )
Father holds a bachelor’s degree 0.130*** 0.304*** 0.097***
(0.005 ) (0.008 ) (0.006 )
Father employed 0.345*** 0.187*** 0.188***
(0.008 ) (0.009 ) (0.008 )
Student characteristics
Indigenous −0.379*** −0.305*** −0.320***
(0.015 ) (0.014 ) (0.014 )
LBOTE −0.088*** −0.156*** −0.129***
(0.005 ) (0.006 ) (0.005 )
Female 0.031*** 0.221*** −0.035***
(0.004 ) (0.005 ) (0.004 )
Attends school in provincial area −0.120*** −0.074*** −0.022***
(0.005 ) (0.006 ) (0.005 )
Attends school in remote area −0.636*** −0.111*** −0.043***
(0.023 ) (0.024 ) (0.022 )
State dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: For the private schooling outcome a probit model was estimated. Multinomial ordered probits were estimated
for the reading band and numeracy band outcomes. Coefficients are therefore not interpretable as marginal
effects. Standard errors in parentheses. A job in category three refers to “Tradespeople, clerks, and skilled office,
sales, and service staff; e.g., 4 year trade certificate by apprenticeship, clerks, personal assistants, sales, flight
attendants, fitness instructors, child care workers, etc.”. A job in category four refers to “Machine operators,
hospitality staff, assistants, labourers and related workers; e.g., machine operators, drivers, labourers, office
assistants, defence forces ranked below senior non-commissioned officer, miners, farmers, factory hands, guards,
etc.”.
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Table F2: 2SLS model instrumenting for private
schooling
Reading Numeracy
Private schooling 0.214*** 0.229***
(0.011 ) (0.012 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.052*** 0.055***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree 0.039*** 0.030***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Mother employed −0.016*** −0.017***
(0.002 ) (0.002 )
Father completed year 12 0.039*** 0.034***
(0.002 ) (0.002 )
Father holds a bachelor’s degree 0.030*** 0.009***
(0.002 ) (0.002 )
Father employed 0.036*** 0.042***
(0.003 ) (0.003 )
Student characteristics
Indigenous −0.076*** −0.092***
(0.004 ) (0.005 )
LBOTE −0.026*** −0.028***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Female 0.044*** −0.013***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Attends school in provincial area −0.007*** 0.004***
(0.001 ) (0.002 )
Attends school in remote area 0.016** 0.035***
(0.006 ) (0.007 )
State dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Instruments used are;
Mother with a job in category 3, and Mother with a job
in category 4. A job in category three refers to “Trades-
people, clerks, and skilled office, sales, and service staff;
e.g., 4 year trade certificate by apprenticeship, clerks, per-
sonal assistants, sales, flight attendants, fitness instructors,
child care workers, etc.”. A job in category four refers
to “Machine operators, hospitality staff, assistants, labour-
ers and related workers; e.g., machine operators, drivers,
labourers, office assistants, defence forces ranked below
senior non-commissioned officer, miners, farmers, factory
hands, guards, etc.”.
Table F3: First stage of 2SLS model
Private schooling
Instruments
Mother with a category 3 job −0.057***
(0.002 )
Mother with a category 4 job −0.173***
(0.002 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.021***
(0.002 )




Father completed year 12 0.058***
(0.002 )











Attends school in provincial area −0.045***
(0.002 )




* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. A job in category three
refers to “Tradespeople, clerks, and skilled office, sales,
and service staff; e.g., 4 year trade certificate by appren-
ticeship, clerks, personal assistants, sales, flight attend-
ants, fitness instructors, child care workers, etc.”. A job
in category four refers to “Machine operators, hospital-
ity staff, assistants, labourers and related workers; e.g.,
machine operators, drivers, labourers, office assistants,
defence forces ranked below senior non-commissioned
officer, miners, farmers, factory hands, guards, etc.”.
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Table F4: Tabulation for the proportions of students with a mother in each occupational group across
schooling sectors and achievement bands (%)
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Not employed Total
Reading band
Below standards 7.33 14.16 23.32 23.02 32.18 100.00
At standards 8.98 16.15 25.06 20.56 29.26 100.00
Above standards 20.52 20.88 22.44 13.16 23.00 100.00
Numeracy band
Below standards 6.81 13.93 22.68 22.89 33.70 100.00
At standards 14.35 17.13 23.41 17.99 27.11 100.00
Above standards 20.31 21.03 22.58 13.14 22.95 100.00
Schooling sector
Public schooling 14.45 17.59 21.94 17.08 28.94 100.00
Private schooling 24.93 23.62 23.64 10.35 17.37 100.00
Note: Explanations of each job category are given in Appendix B.
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G Ordered probit model corrected for endogeneity
Table G1: Estimates for an ordered probit model
corrected for endogeneity
Reading Numeracy
Private schooling 0.598*** 0.418***
(0.048 ) (0.042 )
r̂ −0.331*** −0.248***
(0.029 ) (0.025 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.201*** 0.184***
(0.006 ) (0.005 )
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree 0.288*** 0.158***
(0.007 ) (0.006 )
Mother employed −0.022*** −0.007
(0.007 ) (0.006 )
Father completed year 12 0.178*** 0.140***
(0.007 ) (0.005 )
Father holds a bachelor’s degree 0.281*** 0.094***
(0.008 ) (0.006 )
Father employed 0.133*** 0.147***
(0.011 ) (0.009 )
Student characteristics
Indigenous −0.252*** −0.284***
(0.016 ) (0.015 )
LBOTE −0.148*** −0.120***
(0.007 ) (0.006 )
Female 0.212*** −0.042***
(0.005 ) (0.005 )
Attends school in provincial area −0.059*** −0.013**
(0.007 ) (0.006 )
Attends school in remote area −0.013 −0.009
(0.029 ) (0.022 )
State dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and corrected using the boot-
strap. Instruments used are; Mother with a job in cat-
egory 3, and Mother with a job in category 4. A job in
category three refers to “Tradespeople, clerks, and skilled
office, sales, and service staff; e.g., 4 year trade certificate
by apprenticeship, clerks, personal assistants, sales, flight
attendants, fitness instructors, child care workers, etc.”. A
job in category four refers to “Machine operators, hospit-
ality staff, assistants, labourers and related workers; e.g.,
machine operators, drivers, labourers, office assistants, de-
fence forces ranked below senior non-commissioned of-
ficer, miners, farmers, factory hands, guards, etc.”.
Table G2: Estimates of a probit model for private
schooling (Control function first-stage)
Private schooling
Instruments
Mother with a category 3 job −0.142***
(0.005 )
Mother with a category 4 job −0.438***
(0.006 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.048***
(0.005 )




Father completed year 12 0.143***
(0.005 )











Attends school in provincial area −0.088***
(0.005 )




* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust errors in parentheses. A job
in category three refers to “Tradespeople, clerks, and
skilled office, sales, and service staff; e.g., 4 year trade
certificate by apprenticeship, clerks, personal assist-
ants, sales, flight attendants, fitness instructors, child
care workers, etc.”. A job in category four refers
to “Machine operators, hospitality staff, assistants, la-
bourers and related workers; e.g., machine operat-
ors, drivers, labourers, office assistants, defence forces
ranked below senior non-commissioned officer, miners,
farmers, factory hands, guards, etc.”.
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H Sensitivity to data subset
Table H1: Marginal effects of a multinomial probit
regression on NAPLAN achievement (10% stratified
sample, n = 47144)
Outcome: not meeting standards Reading Numeracy
Private schooling −0.010** −0.006*
(0.005 ) (0.004 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 −0.006*** −0.005***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree −0.007*** −0.005***
(0.001 ) (0.000 )
Mother employed 0.000 0.000
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Father completed year 12 −0.006*** −0.004***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Father holds a bachelor’s degree −0.008*** −0.003***
(0.001 ) (0.000 )
Father employed −0.003*** −0.004***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Student characteristics
Indigenous 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.003 ) (0.002 )
LBOTE 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Female −0.006*** 0.002***
(0.001 ) (0.000 )
Attends school in provincial area 0.003*** 0.001**
(0.001 ) (0.001 )
Attends school in remote area 0.004 0.003
(0.003 ) (0.003 )
Table H2: Marginal effects of a multinomial probit
regression on NAPLAN achievement (10% stratified
sample, n = 47144)
Outcome: at standard Reading Numeracy
Private schooling −0.050** −0.050*
(0.024 ) (0.031 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 −0.030*** −0.041***
(0.003 ) (0.004 )
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree −0.038*** −0.042***
(0.003 ) (0.004 )
Mother employed −0.001 −0.002
(0.003 ) (0.005 )
Father completed year 12 −0.028*** −0.032***
(0.003 ) (0.004 )
Father holds a bachelor’s degree −0.044*** −0.027***
(0.004 ) (0.004 )
Father employed −0.017*** −0.030***
(0.006 ) (0.007 )
Student characteristics
Indigenous 0.052*** 0.070***
(0.009 ) (0.012 )
LBOTE 0.029*** 0.028***
(0.003 ) (0.004 )
Female −0.032*** 0.013***
(0.002 ) (0.003 )
Attends school in provincial area 0.013*** 0.009**
(0.003 ) (0.004 )
Attends school in remote area 0.017 0.022
(0.014 ) (0.019 )
Table H3: Marginal effects of a multinomial probit
regression on NAPLAN achievement (10% stratified
sample, n = 47144)
Outcome: above standards Reading Numeracy
Private schooling 0.060** 0.056*
(0.029 ) (0.034 )
Parental characteristics
Mother completed year 12 0.036*** 0.046***
(0.004 ) (0.004 )
Mother holds a bachelor’s degree 0.046*** 0.047***
(0.004 ) (0.005 )
Mother employed 0.001 0.002
(0.004 ) (0.005 )
Father completed year 12 0.034*** 0.036***
(0.003 ) (0.005 )
Father holds a bachelor’s degree 0.051*** 0.031***
(0.004 ) (0.005 )
Father employed 0.020*** 0.034***
(0.007 ) (0.008 )
Student characteristics
Indigenous −0.064*** −0.081***
(0.012 ) (0.014 )
LBOTE −0.035*** −0.032***
(0.004 ) (0.005 )
Female 0.038*** −0.014***
(0.003 ) (0.004 )
Attends school in provincial area −0.015*** −0.010**
(0.004 ) (0.005 )
Attends school in remote area −0.021 −0.025
(0.016 ) (0.022 )
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the mean. Standard errors in
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Not only are a large number of Australian students achieving poor educational
outcomes, but there is a significant disparity in achievement levels within the
same age groups and even within the same classroom. ‘One-size-fits-all’ policy
approaches have not been successful in bringing under-achieving students up to
minimum standards. In order to support these students in reaching their full po-
tential, it may be necessary to tailor policies and teaching strategies to individual
students who are at risk of low achievement. Since schools face resource con-
straints, it is essential to detect ‘at risk’ students early and with high precision.
In this setting, the goal is not to conduct causal inference on a coefficient of
interest, but to produce a purely predictive model that classifies students with
high accuracy. Machine learning (ML) methods tend to greatly outperform tra-
ditional statistical models. For example, when attempting to classify images of
handwritten digits correctly, standard logistic regression achieves an accuracy
of around 70%, whereas state-of-the-art neural networks obtain 99.79% accur-
acy (Wan et al., 2013). Machine learning estimators perform well by exploiting
the bias-variance trade-off, in which the estimator is permitted to be biased in
exchange for a large reduction in its variance, as well as incorporating non-
linearities in a tractable way. It has been argued that machine learning will
bring significant change to the way economists analyse policy (Einav and Levin,
2014; Varian, 2014; Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017),1 and the publication of the
NAPLAN data in Australia provides an opportunity to test the performance of
1As a practical example, see Ben-David and Frank (2009); Chang et al. (2016); Luo et al.
(2017); Bacham and Zhao (2017); Guegan and Hassani (2018); Adams (2018) for more on




machine learning in a real-world setting.2
The application of machine learning methods to education data has been re-
ferred to as Educational Data Mining (Romero and Ventura, 2007). Its use in the
prediction of academic performance has been predominantly in the higher edu-
cation context (Vandamme et al., 2007; Kotsiantis, 2012; Yadav and Pal, 2012;
Jishan et al., 2015) largely due to the availability of administrative data sets col-
lected by universities.3 Interestingly, when machine learning models are bench-
marked against logistic regression, they show no or unsubstantial improvement
(Kotsiantis et al., 2004; Cortez and Silva, 2008; Huang and Fang, 2013; Gray
et al., 2013).
In this paper we exploit a large data set containing scores on the Australian
National Assessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN). This data
set contains raw scores for all students who sat the test in the years 2013 and
2014, as well as administrative data on students’ individual- and family-level
characteristics. In total, the data set contains observations on 2.2 million unique
students. As we are interested in detecting below standard achievement, we label
students into two classes: ‘At Standard’ and ‘Below Standard’, according to
whether or not their score meets minimum achievement standards as determined
by the Australian Curriculum, Assessment, and Reporting Agency (ACARA).
This is done for two learning areas: literacy and numeracy. We split students
into those in grade 3, for whom this would be their first time sitting NAPLAN,
and students in grades 5 and above, for whom their previous achievement on
NAPLAN may be used as a predictor.
We train a set of popular machine learning classifiers with standard logistic
2See Pugh and Foster (2014) for a discussion of ‘Big Data’ in the Australian education
setting.
3See Shingari et al. (2017) for a recent review.
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regression serving as a benchmark. We find that none of the machine learning
models outperform logistic regression. It would therefore appear that machine
learning methods do not improve our ability to predict poor educational per-
formance. However, machine learning methods, such as the decision tree, may
still provide valuable insight to the policy-maker as they can provide simple dia-
gnostic rules for the teacher and the policy-maker. For example, for grades 5 and
above the trees show that students who did not previously meet minimum stand-
ards in reading are at risk of also falling behind in numeracy in their next test,
and vice versa. It is interesting that these trees do not exploit socio-educational
status variables, as we would have expected. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper to apply machine learning methods to the prediction of primary
and middle school student achievement in a large sample size setting.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data set.
Section 3 will give a summary of ML methods, compared to typical regression
methods. Section 4 describes pre-processing of the data and the particular meth-
ods used in this paper to build the set of classifiers. Section 5 presents the results,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The National Assessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN)4 is a
set of standardised literacy and numeracy tests sat by all students in Australia in
Years 3, 5, 7, and 9, in both the government and non-government schooling sec-
tors. NAP is described as providing “the measure through which governments,




ans are meeting important educational outcomes.”5 The tests cover five learning
areas known as ‘test domains’: Reading, Writing, Spelling, Grammar and Punc-
tuation, and Numeracy. The tests are designed to assess student performance
relative to the Australian curriculum, at a minimum standards level.
We use individual student-level data from the NAPLAN reading and numer-
acy tests administered in 2013 and 2014. The NAPLAN reading test involves
a reading comprehension-style test on a range of texts, including imaginative,
persuasive, and informative. The questions are designed to test knowledge and
interpretation of English language in context. The NAPLAN numeracy tests as-
sess students on their performance in mathematics, namely number and algebra,
measurement and geometry, and statistics and probability.
The data set contains 2,235,804 unique student IDs, who are attending 9,250
different schools in both the public and private sectors in all states across Aus-
tralia. NAPLAN scores are calculated to be comparable across testing cycles,
so we can combine the 2013 and 2014 data sets into a pooled panel data set
and consider these test scores as the students’ score in the ‘current’ time period.
All individuals in the data set are unique, as a student sitting NAPLAN testing
in 2013 would not sit the test in 2014, and vice versa. The data set therefore
covers all Australian students who were in grades 2-9 in the calendar year 2013,
although their actual years of sitting the test may differ. The individual scores
for each student in each domain are collected by the Australian Curriculum As-
sessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), alongside student background in-
formation which is collected by schools from students’ parents or carers via en-
rolment forms. Table 1 provides a detailed summary of the variables contained




Table 1: Variables contained in the student-level NAPLAN data set
Variable Description
Reading standard =1 if student is below standard in reading, and =0 if above standard
Math standard =1 if student is below standard in numeracy, and =0 if above standard
Private schooling =1 if student attends a non-government school [priv1], and =0 if government
school
Age Age at the time of taking the test to one decimal place [age]
LBOTE =1 if the student has a language background other than English [lbote1], and =0 if
not
Indigenous =1 if the student identifies as Indigenous Australian or Torres Strait Islander [in-
dig1], and =0 if not
Female =1 if the student is female [girl1], and =0 if male
Metropolitan =1 if the student lives in a metropolitan location [met1], and =0 if not
Provincial =1 if the student lives in a provincial location [provincial1], and =0 if not
Remote =1 if the student lives in a remote or very remote location [remote1], and =0 if not
State dummies Dummy variables =1 if the student lives in that state (South Australia [SA1], New
South Wales [NSW1], Victoria [VIC1], Queensland [QLD1], Tasmania [TAS1],
Western Australia [WA1], Australian Capital Territory [ACT1], Northern Territory
[NT1]), and =0 if not
Mother’s education Mother completed up to Grade 9 [mumschool1], Grade 10 [mumschool2], Grade
11 [mumschool3], or Grade 12 [mumschool4]
Mother’s higher education Mother’s highest level of education is a certificate I to IV or trade qualification
[mumhighed5], a Diploma or Advanced Diploma [mumhighed6], Bachelor’s de-
gree [mumhighed7], or none [mumhighed8]
Mother’s employment Mother employed in category 1 [mumoccup1]†, category 2 [mumoccup2]‡, cat-
egory 3 [mumoccup3]††, category 4 [mumoccup4]‡‡, or is not employed [mumoc-
cup8]
Father’s education Father completed up to Grade 9 [dadschool1], Grade 10 [dadschool2], Grade 11
[dadschool3], or Grade 12 [dadschool4]
Father’s higher education Father’s highest level of education is a certificate I to IV or trade qualification
[dadhighed5], a Diploma or Advanced Diploma [dadhighed6], Bachelor’s degree
[dadhighed7], or none [dadhighed8]
Father’s employment Father employed in category 1 [dadoccup1]†, category 2 [dadoccup2]‡, category
3 [dadoccup3]††, category 4 [dadoccup4]‡‡, or is not employed [dadoccup8]
Note: Raw data provided by the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority through their Data
Access Program. Variable name codes given in square brackets.
†Category 1: Senior management in a large business organisation, government administration, or defence,
and qualified professionals; e.g., business/policy analyst, defence forces commissioned officer, professionals
with degree or higher qualifications, administrators such as school principals, etc.
‡Category 2: Other business managers, arts/media/sportspersons, and associate professionals; e.g.,
owner/manager of a farm or business, retail sales/service manager, musician, journalist, designer, sports
official, business/administrative staff, etc.
††Category 3: Tradespeople, clerks, and skilled office, sales, and service staff; e.g., 4 year trade certificate
by apprenticeship, clerks, personal assistants, sales, flight attendants, fitness instructors, child care workers,
etc.
‡‡Category 4: Machine operators, hospitality staff, assistants, labourers and related workers; e.g., machine
operators, drivers, labourers, office assistants, defence forces ranked below senior non-commissioned officer,
miners, farmers, factory hands, guards, etc.
We use these student background observables to detect which students may
be at risk of low academic performance so that policies may be directly tar-
geted at the individual level to support their learning. For each testing domain
in each year, ACARA determines achievement bands to classify a student’s level
of achievement based on what particular skills they can perform, e.g.,, addition
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Table 2: Tabulations for NAPLAN achievement
Reading Numeracy
Below minimum standards 364,733 389,676
(%) (16.29) (17.40)
Above minimum standards 1,874,321 1,849,378
(%) (83.71) (82.60)
of simple numbers, understanding of probability, etc.. For each year level, stu-
dents in the lowest two bands of achievement are deemed to be achieving ‘below
minimum standards’. Given the raw scores for each student available in the data,
we have classified each student into their relevant achievement band following
the cut-off scores published by ACARA on their website.6 Using these bands,
we have created a categorical variable which equals zero if a student is meeting
minimum standards, and one if they are not, for reading and numeracy respect-
ively.
The tabulations for these variables are presented in Table 2. In the period
studied, 364,733 students are not meeting minimum standards in reading and
389,676 in numeracy. This is equivalent to 16.29% and 17.40% of the sample
not meeting minimum standards.
3 Summary of machine learning approaches
When undertaking regression, the researcher may have one of two goals: causal
inference or prediction. Typically, the economist has focused on the goal of
causal inference; however, with the growth of big data, prediction problems
have become increasingly of interest. Kleinberg et al. (2015) have argued that
these predictive problems are also valuable to the economist, depending on the
type of question we wish to answer. In the case of this paper, we are interested
6See nap.edu.au
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in successfully predicting poor educational performance. This section will sum-
marise machine learning methods in the context of those utilised by this paper,
using Friedman et al. (2001) as a guide.7
Generally, the objective of regression is to estimate some function that will
tell you the expected value of this outcome variable, y, given the values of the
observed variables in the data, x. For example, where ε gives some random
error:
y = m(x)+ ε (1)
m = E[y|x], (2)
where (2) gives the conditional expectation function, m. Typically, the applied
economist will make the simplifying assumption that m is linear in order to
estimate this function, giving the usual:
y = Xβ + ε . (3)
When estimating, for example, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the researcher
minimises the sum of squared residuals of a set of data, ||y− ŷ||22. This sum of
squared residuals, 1n ||y− ŷ||
2
2,
8 is made up of three parts:
1. irreducible error, 1n ||ε||
2
2, which converges to the variance of the random
disturbance,
2. bias squared, 1n ||m(x)−E[ŷ]||
2
2, which gives how far the expected value
of the predicted y is from the true value of y, on average; and,
7This text provides a useful entry point to machine learning methods for the interested
reader.
8||a||22 = ∑a2i denotes the `2 vector norm.
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3. variance, 1n ||ŷ−E[ŷ]||
2
2, giving how often the predicted y is above or below
the expected value of the predicted y.
Under the Gauss-Markov theorem, OLS gives the best linear unbiased estimator
(BLUE) of β if the true CEF is linear and the model is ‘correct’, i.e., m(x) = Xβ
and E[X ′ε ] = 0. ‘Best’ means the variance is lower than that of any other linear
unbiased estimator, and unbiased means that the bias is equal to zero, or E[ŷ] =
m(x). In other words, the mean squared error of the estimator is as small as
possible, with bias set to zero and variance minimised. The unbiasedness of the
estimator is typically useful for inference;9 however, may not be as important
for prediction. In order to predict well, we want to minimise this mean squared
error on new data (xnew,ynew). It is possible that a biased estimator may have a
lower mean squared error than the BLUE, trading bias for a smaller variance.
This idea is illustrated in Figure 1. The point marked with a circle on the ‘bias’
line could be illustrative of an OLS estimator, where the bias is low (in fact,
zero if the Gauss-Markov assumptions hold). However, if we follow the grey
dotted line it can be seen that the variance is relatively high, and the overall
predictive error is not minimised for this point. It can also be noted that the
OLS estimator lies to the higher end of the model complexity axis. This is
because the OLS estimator is relatively multidimensional, as all coefficients take
a non-zero value with probability 1. It is indeed possible that there exists an
optimal predictor, shown on the diagram with a diamond, such as a penalised
least squares estimator. Following the dotted grey line for this point, it can be
seen that the bias is higher than that of the OLS estimator; however, the variance
9Specifically, the sampling distribution of the estimator should be centred at the true value
asymptotically in order to construct confidence intervals with correct coverage. The Lasso,
for example, is a consistent estimator whose sampling distribution is asymptotically biased,
resulting in difficulty in constructing confidence intervals (Knight and Fu, 2000). However, the
Lasso often predicts better than OLS by exploiting the bias-variance tradeoff.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the bias-variance trade-off
is lower. Overall, this optimal predictor minimises the predictive error. Thus
this biased estimator may predict ‘better’ on new data than the OLS estimator.
Machine learning uses tuning parameters, sometimes called hyperparamet-
ers, to exploit this trade-off between bias and variance. It also allows m(x) to
be non-linear. Specifically, we will be focusing on supervised learning, where
we attempt to predict the value of a dependent variable or outcome Y given a
number of independent variables or predictors, X .10 Furthermore, we will focus
on regression for classification for the purposes of this study, that is, where the
outcome variable is discrete. Our task is therefore to make a good prediction,
Ŷ ∈ {0,1}, of Y ∈ {0,1}. In context, Y may be either ‘student is at risk’ for poor
educational performance, where Y = 1, or ‘student is not at risk’, where Y = 0.
A basic machine learning approach to modelling is described in Table 3. To
make a prediction, a ‘training’ set of data is fed into a learning algorithm in
order to observe the phenomenon being studied, and fit a function to it. The
10This differs from unsupervised learning, which aims to describe relationships and patterns
between variables, without an outcome Y .
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program produces outputs, in our case classifying students as at risk or not at
risk. It then ‘learns’ by comparing the simulated outputs to the actual outputs in
the data, modifying the functional relationship between inputs and outputs until
the artificial outputs are close enough to reality. This fitting of the model could
include both variable selection and parameter estimation. Once the program has
‘learnt’ about the relationship between inputs and outputs, new data can be fed
in to predict future outcomes.
Table 3: Overview of a basic machine learning approach
Algorithm:
1: Split data into a training set, a validation set, and a test set.*
2: Fit initial models to the training data set using a supervised learning
method (generate candidate algorithms).
3: Use the fitted model to successively predict the responses for the
observations in the validation data set. The validation data tunes the
hyperparameters and evaluates the fit of the candidate models.
5: Use the test data set to evaluate overall model performance, e.g.
sensitivity and specificity. This step also confirms that the model has
not been overfitted to the test set, if it performs well on new data.
Note: *A different approach is the use of cross-validation, where the data is split into random test and training subsets
a number of times. It is important that the validation set is independent of the data the model was trained on.
In this paper we use cross-validation to tune the hyperparameters, as it is allows us to keep the final training
set as large as possible.
3.1 Baseline classification: logistic
A baseline classification method for a binary outcome could be as simple as us-
ing a logit or probit with no tuning parameters. For example, in the preceding
chapter we used the probit model, albeit with causal inference in mind. How-
ever, these methods can also be used for prediction when employed on a training
set and a test set. Using the training set of data, parameters are picked to max-
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{yi lnF(x′iβ )+ (1− yi) lnF(−x′iβ )}. (4)
Most often for prediction, F(·) is the logistic function. Under certain condi-
tions, the maximum likelihood estimator is consistent. This method, however,
is a rudimentary effort at allowing non-linearities in the modelling approach,
employing a simple monotone transformation to the linear model. As explained
above in the case of OLS, it is also true for the logit that there may exist a
biased estimator with a smaller mean squared error, which would be better for
prediction. In order to improve the predictive accuracy, we could add a tuning
parameter to exploit the bias-variance trade-off.
3.2 Ridge regression, the lasso, and elastic net
Next, we look at using penalties for model shrinkage and variable selection. The
goal is to make the model more parsimonious than the logit, shifting us toward
the ‘optimal’ predictor. For these models, we trade off some positive bias to
decrease the variance and overall prediction error.
First we discuss ridge regression (Hoerl and Kennard, 1970), which imposes
a penalty on the size of the coefficients to shrink them towards zero and each





















where λ ≥ 0 controls the amount of shrinkage. Zero is the case of no shrinkage,
and the amount of shrinkage increases as λ increases. In a normal linear regres-
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sion model, if there are many highly correlated variables the coefficients may
be poorly determined. A very high positive coefficient on one variable may be
cancelled out by a large negative coefficient on another highly correlated vari-
able. The benefit of ridge regression is that by shrinking the coefficients towards
zero, this problem can be avoided. Note that, due to the scaling, it is necessary
to standardise the variables before implementing ridge regression and to leave
the intercept out of the penalty term.






















The lasso differs from ridge regression in that an `1 lasso penalty is used instead
of the `2 ridge penalty term. Instead of shrinking all the coefficients proportion-
ally, the lasso translates each coefficient by the constant factor λ , setting some
to zero. A limitation of the lasso method is that if two variables are highly cor-
related, it tends to arbitrarily set one to zero, giving the full coefficient value to
the other. In contrast, ridge would give both of these variables equal weighting.
In this study, we use an elastic net penalty (Zou and Hastie, 2005), which
aims to find a compromise between these two approaches. This method ex-
hibits the variable selection properties of the lasso, while shrinking together the
remaining coefficients of correlated predictors as in ridge regression. This meth-
odology will be discussed in further detail in the methods section of this paper,
Section 4.
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3.3 Decision trees and random forests
While these approaches are useful for prediction, they may be difficult to inter-
pret in a practical sense. We therefore also implement a decision tree algorithm,
as well as a random forest. This algorithm is a variant of the decision tree ap-
proach that currently represents the best ‘off-the-shelf’ machine learning tech-
nique. A number of studies have found that decision trees predict well in the
education context (Kovacic, 2010; Jishan et al., 2015; Elakia and Aarthi, 2014;
Natek and Zwilling, 2014; Mishra et al., 2014).
A decision tree, or classification tree, is an algorithm that searches through
the data to find conditional statements that split the data in two, along many
nodes. A tree can be described as a visual representation as a number of ‘de-
cision rules’. These rules that the form: IF condition1 AND condition2 THEN
outcome1. For example, a basic decision tree could look as follows:
Figure 2: Illustration of a decision tree. Idea based on the prediction problem
described in Kleinberg et al. (2015)
.
By following each split of the tree (based on the given predictors), one can
determine the outcome of interest. The algorithm for generating a tree on the
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training set (i.e., step 2 of the overall machine learning algorithm above) may be
as follows:
Table 4: Generating a decision tree with 2 predictors, x1 and x2
Algorithm:
1: Searches through x1 and x2 for the point with the best split (knowing that
it will take an average to minimise mean squared error).
2: Takes the average in each region to generate the predicted value.
3: Makes a rule, e.g. if x1 < 20.
5: Iterates 1-3 to make another split until some optimal stopping point.
Stopping rules may include, for example, preventing a split when the
number of observed individuals in a branch reaches some size smaller
than a specified percentage of the overall training data.
Note: N.B that decision tree processes may also include ‘pruning’ of its branches to avoid overfitting
and improve predictive accuracy. This process removes parts of the tree that provide little
power for classification.
Decision trees have the benefit of being easily interpretable, as they provide
easy rules to follow for classification in the real world. However, the algorithm
is ‘greedy’, in that it makes a local optimal choice at each stage. This may
mean that the final predictor is not the overall optimal predictor. It is possible
to improve the accuracy of this process by bootstrap aggregating (or ‘bagging’)
the trees;11 however, each tree generated will be very similar and thus may not
reduce variance. An alternative approach to reduce both the bias and variance
of a decision tree approach is to generate a random forest of decision trees.
Random forests (Breiman, 2001) work by growing many single decision
trees. For each tree, we sample N observations with replacement from the ori-
ginal data to construct the training set. A random subset, m,12 of the variables is
also selected for each tree. The forest of trees is then grown, without any prun-
11A special case of model averaging. See Breiman (1996) for more.
12Friedman et al. (2001) describes a rule of thumb for selecting m: for classification purposes,
the default value is
√
p and the minimum node size is one. The best values for m will change
dependent on the problem, and thus should be thought of as tuning parameters in practice.
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ing. The models are then averaged across, as with bagging. However, unlike the
bagging approach, these trees will have a lower correlation with each other due
to the omission of some variables from each. The strength of each individual
tree, and the correlation between trees, will be reduced by reducing the number
of variables, m, selected. The performance of the classifier is therefore sensitive
to the choice of m. This method is extremely accurate among existing off-the-
shelf algorithms; however, it does not provide the interpretability of the simple
decision rules that the single classification tree method gives.
4 Methodology
Our objective is to predict, based on observables in the data set, whether or not
a student will perform in the ‘below standard’ band for their age group upon
sitting their next NAPLAN. Note that since family-level student characteristics
were collected by the schools themselves, it is reasonable to assume that indi-
vidual schools will have access to the predictors used in this study well before
its students are scheduled to sit their next NAPLAN.
Each row in the data set contains a predictor corresponding to that student’s
score in reading and numeracy for the NAPLAN most recently sat by that stu-
dent; i.e., two years previously. Since NAPLAN is compulsory for all students
in a given year level, every observation of a student in grades 5 and above has
this data. However, since grade 3 is the first grade in which NAPLAN is sat,
grade 3 students have missing data for this column.
We split the data set into students in grade 3, and students in grades 5 and
above. Classification for the grade 3 students will need to rely on family-level
observables; whereas classification for students in grades 5 and up may exploit
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the presumably strong predictor of previous NAPLAN scores.
4.1 Pre-processing
To obtain the subset of observations containing grades 5 and above, we remove
from the sample any rows of observations containing missing data. Every grade
3 student has missing data for the previous reading and math scores, since NA-
PLAN is first sat in grade 3, and so they are removed from the sample. This
reduces the sample size from 2,239,054 observations to 886,392 observations.
In order to construct the subset containing only grade 3 students, we first ex-
tract the rows corresponding to students in grade 3. We then delete the columns
corresponding to the student’s grade, which contains no variation, and the stu-
dent’s previous NAPLAN scores, which are missing. Finally, we remove any
rows containing missing data. The final sample for grade 3 students contains
345,817 observations.
For each data set, and for each response variable corresponding to the reading
and numeracy standards respectively, we use stratified sampling of the classes
to obtain a two thirds/one third split for training and test sets. 13
4.2 Class Imbalance
The data used in this study exhibits slightly imbalanced class labels, with 1
in 5 observations classified as ‘below standard’. Machine learning approaches
to classification typically involve fitting a model that minimises a convex loss
function that treats observations symmetrically, in that true (false) positives and
true (false) negatives are all given equal weight. However, if class imbalance is




present in the data such that one class is relatively rare, then symmetric treatment
of these observations may lead the loss function to be minimised by classifying
all observations as the majority class. Adopting alternate loss functions that treat
observations asymmetrically, such as an F-measure (Chinchor and Sundheim,
1993), can lead to non-convexity of the loss function, which raises difficulties in
training the classifier. Two common approaches for addressing class imbalance
while preserving convexity of the loss function are weighting and re-sampling.
4.2.1 Weighting
Weighting the observations can be achieved with a loss function of the form
L (ŷ,y) = ∑
i
L(ŷi,yi)w(ŷi,yi) (7)
where L(·) is a loss function that treats observations symmetrically, yi is the
true class of observation i, ŷi is the predicted class, and w(·) is a function that
assigns a weight to each observation i. Classifiers with such loss functions are
referred to as ‘cost-sensitive classifiers’ (Elkan, 2001), as true (false) positives
and negatives may incur different weights in the loss function.




2|{ j |y j = yi}|
(8)
where yi denotes the true class of observation i and | · | denotes set cardinality.




An alternative approach is to use an unweighted loss function and approxim-
ately balance class instances by resampling from the data. The data may either
be under-sampled by randomly choosing a subset of the majority class, or over-
sampled by creating random copies of the minority class (Japkowicz et al.,
2000). While each of these procedures produce a more balanced data set, under-
sampling discards potentially useful information about the majority classes, while
over-sampling can tend to overfit noise in the minority classes. ‘Synthetic Minor-
ity Over-sampling Technique’ (Chawla et al., 2002) provides a method of over-
sampling that may reduce this overfitting. Rather than over-sampling by directly
copying existing observations, SMOTE creates new ‘synthetic’ observations by
choosing points in the feature space which are convex combinations of minor-
ity class observations. A combination of over-sampling the minority class using
synthetic data together with under-sampling the majority class may then be used.
SMOTE sampling may also be used for constructing ensemble classifiers, such
as through bootstrap aggregating (bagging) and boosting (Chawla et al., 2003).
We use the package DMwR (Torgo and Torgo, 2013) to construct a SMOTE
sample which combines synthetic over-sampling of the minority class and under-
sampling of the majority class. Ideally, optimal rates for over and under-sampling
would be tuned, such as has been considered by Agrawal and Menzies (2018).
However, to the best of our knowledge, no implementation for SMOTE tuning
is available in R at the time of writing (July, 2018). As such, we use the out-
of-the-box parameters for generating the SMOTE sample. For each minority
observation, its 5-nearest neighbours are used to generate two additional minor-
ity samples; and the majority class is under-sampled to achieve approximate
171
4 METHODOLOGY
class balance with the synthetic sample.
We generate the SMOTE training sets from the original training sets de-
scribed in the previous section. We therefore have two training sets - a weighted
set and a SMOTE set - for each subject and grade level of interest, e.g., grade 3
Reading. After running each of the models for that subject and grade level, they
are all evaluated for performance on the same test set as generated in the data
pre-processing.
It is not known a priori which correction to the class imbalance problem will
perform best, so we train a set of classifiers using both methods. Since the class
imbalance is not severe, we focus on weighted classifiers for the results of this
paper. The SMOTE results may be found in the Appendices.
4.3 Classifiers
For each data set and class type we estimate four classifiers: once using the full
data set combined with observation weights, and then again using the synthetic
SMOTE data set.
We first use a logistic classifier and an elastic net (Zou and Hastie, 2005).
The loss function takes the form:
L (y, ŷ) = l(y, ŷ|w,β )+λ
(
α||β ||1 +(1−α)||β ||22
)
(9)
where l(·) denotes the binary cross-entropy loss function14 with vector of weights
w and estimated coefficient vector β ; and λ is a tuning parameter determining
the strength of the combination `1 (lasso) and `2 (ridge) penalty. We impose that
the α = 0.5, such that the lasso and ridge penalties have equal weight and select
14N.B. the negative of a logistic log-likelihood function.
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λ through 10-fold cross-validation using the R package glmnet (Friedman et al.,
2009).15
A classification tree is trained using the package rpart (Therneau et al.,
2015), which grows the tree using a recursive partitioning algorithm and prunes
it using 10-fold cross-validation.
Finally, we estimate a random forest with an ensemble of 200 trees using the
ranger package (Wright et al., 2018).
4.4 Evaluation of methods
The output of a classifier is usually a set of predicted ‘probabilities’, or scores,
for each class representing how confident the model is that an observation be-
longs to that class. The class with the highest score is usually selected to be the
predicted class of the observation. In the two class setting, this corresponds to
selecting whichever class has predicted probability greater than half. Alternat-
ively, one could choose some desired threshold and classify an observation into
the positive class if its predicted probability exceeds that threshold.
To measure classification performance we can analyse two characteristics:
sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity in our case refers to the percentage of
students that are at risk of poor performance that are correctly identified, or the
true positive rate. Conversely, specificity measures the percentage of students
that are not at risk of poor performance that are correctly identified as not be-
ing at risk, or the true negative rate. We can choose the desired sensitivity of
a classifier by setting the threshold at which observations are classified in the
positive class appropriately; although this trades off specificity. The set of sens-
15The mixing parameter, α , may also be tuned. However, this option is not included in the
glmnet package. We re-estimated the classifiers with α = 0.1 and α = 0.9 with no significant
change to the results.
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itivity/specificity pairs that may be achieved by varying this threshold between
0 and 1 can be illustrated by a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve.
A classifier with a larger area under the ROC curve (referred to as AUC) than
another is able to achieve a greater sensitivity for a given specificity, and vice
versa. We use AUC to rank the performance of the classifiers.
5 Results
The AUC for each classifier using weighted observations is displayed in Table 5.16
Table 5: Performance metrics (AUC) for weighted observations
Grade 3
Classifier Literacy Numeracy
AUC 95% CI AUC 95% CI
Logistic 0.722 (0.717, 0.726) 0.707 (0.702, 0.712)
Elastic Net 0.721 (0.717, 0.726) 0.707 (0.702, 0.712)
Decision Tree 0.656 (0.650, 0.660) 0.668 (0.663, 0.673)
Random Forest 0.687 (0.692, 0.686) 0.681 (0.676, 0.686)
Grade 5+
Classifier Literacy Numeracy
AUC 95% CI AUC 95% CI
Logistic 0.839 (0.837, 0.841) 0.833 (0.830, 0.835)
Elastic Net 0.839 (0.837, 0.841) 0.832 (0.830, 0.835)
Decision Tree 0.767 (0.765, 0.770) 0.760 (0.758, 0.763)
Random Forest 0.829 (0.826, 0.831) 0.823 (0.820, 0.825)
Note: Confidence intervals for AUC are constructed according to Bamber (1975).
In terms of AUC, there is no significant difference in performance between
the logistic and the elastic net for all subjects and grades. It is likely that the
penalty used to exploit the trade-off between bias and variance is having little
effect as the sample size is so large. Moreover, the decision trees and random
16The metrics for the SMOTE sample are found in Appendix A. The ROC curves can be
found in Appendix B.
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forests perform poorly compared to the simple logistic classifier, indicating that
machine learning may not be as useful as some may believe in improving pre-
dictions of this type. Non-linearities may not play a large role on the basis of
these regressors, as was the case in the higher-education setting.
Nevertheless, the decision trees may be useful in terms of interpretation, as
they provide simple rules or heuristics for detecting students at risk of poor
performance. For example, the decision trees for grades 5 and above using the
weighted observations are shown in Figure 3.17
When previous achievement on NAPLAN is available, the decision trees
learn a very simple and intuitive decision rule. If a student was below standard
on either literacy or numeracy in the previous testing period, they are classified
as at risk in both subjects in the next period. This is of value, as it indicates that
a school faced with a student that has performed below standard in numeracy in
one period should not shift all of their resources towards improving only their
math ability. In the United States, Reback (2008) highlighted that Texan schools
re-allocated resources towards students based on their performance on previous
tests. We provide evidence that this may not be a useful approach, and instead a
focus on overall improvement in all subject areas should be emphasised. This is
a particularly interesting finding in the context of “teaching to the test”, a pop-
ular argument against standardised testing. Perhaps if a student fell behind in
reading, for example, in the previous period, so many resources were allocated
toward training the student to improve in the reading test that they then fall be-
hind in numeracy in the following period. This is an important area for further
research.
The decision trees for grade 3, for which achievement in the previous period
17Decision trees for the SMOTE data are reproduced in Appendix C.
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 prevreadrisk = At Standard
 prevnumrisk = At Standard




 prevnumrisk = At Standard
 prevreadrisk = At Standard




Figure 3: Decison trees for Grades 5+ with weighted observations
is not available, also provide interesting insight to the predictors of poor achieve-
ment in Australia. The trees using the weighted observations are shown in Fig-
ure 4. Categorising students as at risk or not depends completely on the edu-
cation levels and occupation of their parents. For both literacy and numeracy,
the first split is made regarding mother’s higher education. The predictor mum-
highed=7 refers to whether the student’s mother holds a Bachelor’s degree or
not. If a student’s mother has a Bachelor’s degree, a student will be predicted to
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 mumhighed = 7
 dadhighed = 6,7




 mumhighed = 7
 dadoccup = 1,2,3
 dadhighed = 6,7





Figure 4: Decison trees for Grade 3 with weighted observations.
meet minimum standards. However, if the mother does not hold a degree, their
performance depends on the education of their father. If their father also does not
have higher education qualifications, the student will be predicted to not meet
minimum standards. If their father has either a Bachelor’s degree, a diploma or
an advanced diploma,18 the student will be predicted to meet minimum stand-
ards. In general terms, if at least one of the student’s parents has a Bachelor’s
18If dadhighed=6, the student’s father has a diploma or advanced diploma.
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degree, or their father has a diploma or advanced diploma, a student is not at risk
of poor performance on NAPLAN. This finding matches much of the literature,
which finds that family background strongly determines educational outcomes
(Cobb-Clark and Nguyen, 2012; Ford, 2013). In fact, Nicoletti and Rabe (2013)
found that family background explains 44-55% of the variation in test scores for
students in England. There could be a number of mechanisms by which this
could operate. One example is that perhaps parents with higher levels of educa-
tion are more likely to actively participate in their child’s learning. Fryer et al.
(2015) show that incentivising parents to participate in their child’s education
can improve a student’s test scores. As the mother is often the primary care-
giver, perhaps a more highly educated mother, who is actively participating in
their child’s education, enables a child to be more likely to succeed.
The results are the same for literacy and numeracy, save the addition of a de-
cision rule regarding father’s occupation for numeracy. dadoccup=1,2,3 means
that the father has a job in either Category 1, 2, or 3. The easiest way to in-
terpret this is that the father is employed, and he is not employed in Category
4. Category 4 encompasses machine operators, hospitality staff, assistants, la-
bourers and related workers. Therefore, if a student’s father is not employed or
employed in one of these types of job, such as a farmer or factory hand, they will
be predicted as at risk of not meeting minimum standards in the numeracy test.
Behrman and Knowles (1999) found a relationship between a household’s in-
come and educational success in Vietnam, so perhaps this decision rule is based
on lower household incomes earned in some of these careers. There could be a
number of alternate explanations; for example, perhaps if a student has a father




This paper trained a number of machine learning classifiers on the NAPLAN
data, in order to find if these techniques can improve the econometrician’s abil-
ity to predict poor educational performance. It has been posited that machine
learning methods will change the way that the applied economist approaches
data analysis. The large individual-level NAPLAN data set provides a unique
opportunity with which to explore this claim in the context of education.
It has been argued that machine learning methods may be better at predicting
outcomes than traditional econometric approaches for two reasons. First, they
are able to exploit the trade-off between bias and variance in order to find an
estimator with lower predictive error than the unbiased estimator. Second, they
can better exploit non-linearities in the data, unlike most typical approaches. In
order to test these claims, we estimated an elastic net, a decision tree, and a
random forest, and find that these methods fail to out-perform the logistic clas-
sifier. The elastic net matched the performance of the logistic, indicating that
the penalty used to exploit the bias-variance trade-off did not improve predict-
ive ability. The decision tree and random forests significantly underperformed
the logistic and the elastic net. It is therefore unlikely that non-linearities are
present, matching findings in the higher education context. These results call
into question if machine learning methods can really improve predictive studies
as much as some believe.
Nevertheless, machine learning methods do provide some insights into the
analysis of school education data. A greater emphasis on analysing problems of
a predictive type using predictive methods may still provide beneficial. These
kinds of analysis can still provide policy insight, despite the focus of the applied
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economist towards establish causality. Furthermore, they can provide useful
heuristics for use in the real world. For example, the decision trees generated in
this paper provide simple easy-to-remember rules for application by the school,
teacher, and policy-maker. Further discussion is required as to the role of pre-
diction problems in applied economics, but with the caveat that their usefulness
not be over-exaggerated.
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A Performance metrics (AUC)
Table A1: Performance metrics for SMOTE sample
Grade 3
Classifier Literacy Numeracy
AUC 95% CI AUC 95% CI
Logistic 0.704 (0.699, 0.709) 0.696 (0.691, 0.701)
Elastic Net 0.704 (0.699, 0.709) 0.696 (0.691, 0.701)
Decision Tree 0.617 (0.612, 0.622) 0.614 (0.609, 0.619)
Random Forest 0.697 (0.692, 0.701) 0.689 (0.684, 0.694)
Grade 5+
Classifier Literacy Numeracy
AUC 95% CI AUC 95% CI
Logistic 0.825 (0.823, 0.828) 0.817 (0.815, 0.819)
Elastic Net 0.826 (0.823, 0.828) 0.817 (0.815, 0.820)
Decision Tree 0.771 (0.768, 0.774) 0.764 (0.762, 0.767)
Random Forest 0.824 (0.822, 0.8827) 0.820 (0.818, 0.822)
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(d) Grade 5+ Numeracy
Classifier Logistic Elastic Net Decision Tree Random Forest
Figure B1: ROC curves for weighted observations
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(d) Grade 5+ Numeracy
Classifier Logistic Elastic Net Decision Tree Random Forest
Figure B2: ROC curves for the SMOTE sample
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C Decision trees for the SMOTE sample
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Figure C1: Decison trees for Grade 3 using the SMOTE sample
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C DECISION TREES FOR THE SMOTE SAMPLE
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Standardised testing has played an increasingly important role in economic ana-
lysis and education policy development. This thesis explored the National As-
sessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) and its uses for both the
economist and the policy analyst. While this data set has some particular, and
significant, limitations in its ability to achieve causal identification of certain
effects on educational outcomes, it remains useful for providing some guidance
on the factors determining educational achievement. The goal of understand-
ing how to improve educational outcomes for students may remain difficult, but
this thesis situates an Australian research agenda within the international liter-
ature, provides some solutions for analysing questions of funding and student
background, and develops a future roadmap for the econometric analysis of test
scores within the wider framework of big data and modern machine learning
techniques.
The first chapter details various testing programmes across a number of coun-
tries, before outlining NAPLAN testing in Australia. The goal of this chapter
is to provide a description of the uses of this data set, given the types of ana-
lysis undertaken using standardised test score data in the international literature.
Secondly, we aim to understand the limitations of the NAPLAN data, in order
to compare and contrast the kinds of analysis that can be done in Australia and
internationally. These limitations are significant, particularly the inability to link
the school-level data to the student-level data and the problems associated with
following students across time properly. Despite these deficiencies, we define
two areas for analysis that may be attempted:




2. Examining the kinds of students at risk of poor performance on NAPLAN
using the student-level test score data.
The next chapters dealt with these research areas in turn.
The second chapter of this thesis attempts to determine the causal effect
of per-student school funding on school-average NAPLAN test scores. Using
school-average data on test scores, funding, and other covariates, we imple-
ment an unconditional panel quantile regression approach, instrumenting with
the lagged levels of school funding. Typical OLS estimates may be biased due
to reverse causality between test scores and school funding. By instrumenting
with funding in the previous period, we account for this reverse causality as
the funding in the previous period is exogenous to scores in the current period.
The quantile regression approach allows us to understand how funding may im-
pact schools differently across the test score distribution. We find that this is
indeed the case, which may explain why the literature has struggled to find a
relationship between funding and test scores ‘on average’. Specifically, we find
that funding is most beneficial when provided at as local a level as possible,
indicating the importance of federalist structures for funding and governance
of schools. Future analysis of school funding could be improved by nesting
the student-level test score data into the school-level data, to understand how
changes in funding may affect particular students directly. Alternative future
approaches could include difference-in-difference analysis of schools selected
into particular funding programs, but this would require further detailed inform-
ation about funding within these schools. This analysis could also be improved
by a better understanding of how principals are allocating their funding to partic-
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ular budget areas within schools. Nevertheless, this paper reinforces that future
policy will benefit from a federalist approach, giving more spending power loc-
ally to schools themselves.
In chapter 3, we next turned to the question of student background features
and how these interact with performance in both the public and private school
systems. This paper uses the student-level test score data, to find what student
background features determine NAPLAN achievement. Secondly, we analyse
how, given these features, a student’s achievement may differ in the public and
private schooling sectors. In the course of this analysis, we are faced with the
typical sample selection problem into private schools, which is popularly stud-
ied in this literature. In order to combat the fact that higher-achieving students
may self-select into private schools, we implement a control function approach
using mother’s employment categories as a candidate instrument for a family’s
school choice decisions. This variable choice is supported by analysis of the
data, which highlights that while a mother’s employment category is related to
attendance at private school, it does not appear related to test score achievement.
Ultimately, we find that private schooling may be useful for some kinds of so-
cially disadvantaged students. This conclusion, however, must be taken with
some caveats. Future work may include analysis of the LSAC set of data, to bet-
ter control for self-selection. Being able to follow students that change schools
would also be beneficial for better understanding the effects of school choice
on educational achievement. In fact, this paper clearly highlights the difficulties
associated with working with the NAPLAN set of data. The lack of background
covariates makes it difficult to achieve causal inference, and this paper repres-
ents a best attempt to do so. Despite the limitations of this study, it provides an




Finally, this thesis explores the predictive capabilities of this data set, given
its large sample size and the difficulties involved with causal analysis. While
the data remains limited in this sense, it has significant ability for problems
of the predictive type. The fourth chapter uses machine learning techniques
to illustrate how useful this data can be for the policy-maker, and the school
administrator. We show that even with basic background covariates, we are able
to predict students that are at risk of poor performance before it occurs. We
also find that machine learning techniques are unnecessary to generate good
predictions. This paper shows a real, practical example of how this data can be
used by the policy-maker to identify poor performance before the fact.
In conclusion, we have learnt much about the NAPLAN data set and the state
of schooling in Australia. Yet, there remains much to learn. It is the hope that
this thesis can provide a useful starting point for further work in this space, and
that it can encourage the economist, the educator, and the policy-maker - at both
state and federal levels - to fully commit to working together to improve testing
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